Superintendent of Schools of Leominster v. Mayor of Leominster
Decision Date | 04 May 1982 |
Parties | , 4 Ed. Law Rep. 259 SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF LEOMINSTER et al. 1 v. MAYOR OF LEOMINSTER. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Robert B. Shumway, Worcester, for plaintiffs.
John J. Curley, III, Leominster, for defendant.
Brian A. Riley, Boston, for Mass. Teachers Ass'n, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Kristen Reasoner Apgar, Newton Center, for Mass. Bd. of Ed., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.
Statute 1980, c. 580, commonly known as "Proposition 21/2" took effect on December 4, 1980. 2 Section 7 of that Act amended G.L. c. 71, § 34, the statute which had, historically, granted fiscal autonomy to school committees in municipalities other than Boston. Pirrone v. Boston, 364 Mass. 403, 406-407, 305 N.E.2d 96 (1973). Casey v. Everett, 330 Mass. 220, 222, 224, 112 N.E.2d 420 (1953). Ring v. Woburn, 311 Mass. 679, 694-695, 43 N.E.2d 8 (1942). Section 7 "limit(s) the amount of money required to be appropriated for public schools to that amount voted upon by the local appropriating authority." Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 1764, 1786, 424 N.E.2d 469. In view of this change, the issue in this case is whether the mayor of the city of Leominster is required to submit to the city council, without change, the budget proposed by the school committee. 3 We conclude that the mayor is not a mere conduit for conveying the demands of the school committee to the city council. The mayor has the authority to recommend a total municipal budget (including his recommendation for an appropriation for school purposes) to the city council.
We summarize the agreed facts. The school committee, by a vote of six to one, approved a school budget for fiscal year 1982 of $10,015,377. 4 The mayor, who is chairman of the school committee, cast the only negative vote. The budget was presented to the mayor with the request that he submit it to the city council. G.L. c. 44, § 32. 5 The mayor refused. Instead, the mayor recommended a reduced budget of $8,402,000, 6 as part of the total municipal budget. The school committee's budget projected a reduction in administrative staff of 23.5%, a reduction in teaching staff of 19.6%, and a reduction in the nonprofessional staff of 35%. The mayor's proposed budget required further reductions in staff.
On May 21, 1981, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court, seeking injunctive relief and declaratory relief pursuant to G.L. c. 231A. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the mayor is required to submit to the city council the budget proposed by the school committee. 7 After a hearing, the judge entered a judgment which declared that the mayor is not required to submit the school committee's proposed budget to the city council without change. We granted the plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review. We affirm.
The fiscal autonomy of school committees to provide for public education has been the law in this Commonwealth since the middle of the Nineteenth Century. See Batchelder v. Salem, 4 Cush. 599 (1850). 8 Statute 1980, c. 580, § 7 (G.L. c. 71, § 34) , ended this long tradition by eliminating the enforcement mechanism of the ten taxpayer suit to compel school appropriations. Statute 1980, c. 580, § 7, further provides that "no city or town shall be required to provide more money for the support of the public schools than is appropriated by vote of the legislative body of the city or town."
The plaintiffs concede that the school committee's unfettered authority over its own budget (see, e.g., Bell v. North Reading, 363 Mass. 505, 510, 295 N.E.2d 894 (1973) ) has been eliminated by St.1980, c. 580, § 7. The plaintiffs argue, however, that prior law, and the broad responsibilities of the school committee, compel the inference that the school committee, and not the mayor, should have the final authority to determine, subject to city council approval, the appropriation necessary to fund the public schools. We do not agree.
Under prior law (see G.L. c. 71, § 34, as in effect prior to December 4, 1980), the school committee of a city or town, except Boston, each year established a budget sufficient for the support of the public schools. Although the mayor or the city council could reduce the budget submitted by the school committee, neither had final authority to do so. "By law ... a municipal appropriating authority was required to appropriate the funds that its school committee designated as necessary for school purposes." Mayor of Holyoke v. Aldermen of Holyoke, --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1980) 2295, 2298, 412 N.E.2d 328.
The mayor traditionally had the "power" 9 not to recommend the appropriation requested by the school committee, 10 but the exercise of that power was futile since "any deficiency in his recommendation could have been made up by an appropriate court order." Mayor of Holyoke v. Aldermen of Holyoke, --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1980) 2295, 2299, 412 N.E.2d 328. See Pirrone v. Boston, 364 Mass. 403, 411, 305 N.E.2d 96 (1973); Casey v. Everett, 330 Mass. 220, 224, 112 N.E.2d 420 (1953); G.L. c. 71, § 34 ( ). Under St.1980, c. 580, § 7, school committees are no longer exempt from the budgetary process mandated by G.L. c. 44, § 32. The school committee must now share the city's limited financial resources with other municipal departments. 11
The plaintiffs claim that the mayor's power to recommend a budget for the school committee as part of the city budget deprives the city council of the opportunity to consider and act upon the budget as proposed by the school committee. The plaintiffs argue that since the city council cannot increase an appropriation over the amount recommended by the mayor (see note 5 supra ), 12 the ability of the school committee to meet the legal obligations imposed by G.L. c. 71 may be frustrated. The city is obligated to provide sufficient funds for its public schools. G.L. c. 71, § 34, as amended through St.1980, c. 580, § 7. See Board of Educ. v. Boston, 386 Mass. 103, 434 N.E.2d 1224 (1982). The mayor does not argue otherwise. He claims that his budget would not deprive "any child in the school system of the City of Leominster ... of an education at the public expense." In the Superior Court, the plaintiffs did not argue that the appropriation recommended by the mayor for school purposes was insufficient to meet the city's educational obligations. See G.L. c. 71. The plaintiffs limited their arguments to whether the mayor was required to present the school committee's proposed budget to the city council.
The plaintiffs also argue that, in view of the school committee's broad responsibilities, its budget should be forwarded to the city council as proposed by it. In effect, the plaintiffs seek to avoid the thrust of G.L. c. 44, § 32 ( ), by asking us to read into the statutory scheme a special budgetary procedure for school committees. This we should not do. Sampson v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 282 Mass. 119, 122, 184 N.E. 465 (1933). General Laws c. 44, § 32, requires the mayor to submit a total annual budget to the city council, including the budget for the schools. "The words of (a) statute cannot be stretched beyond (their) fair meaning ...." Holbrook v. Randolph, 374 Mass. 437, 440-441, 373 N.E.2d 941 (1978). General Laws c. 44, § 32, does not support the plaintiffs' contention that the school committee is entitled to a budgetary procedure which differs from that followed by other municipal departments.
Further, the record does not support the plaintiffs' assertion that the procedure mandated by G.L. c. 44, § 32, destroys the function of the school committee. The school committee retains the authority to determine expenditures within the total appropriation. St.1981, c. 782, § 14. School Comm. of Boston v. Boston, --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 1296, 1308, 421 N.E.2d 1187. Moreover, Leonard v School Comm. of Springfield, 241 Mass. 325, 330, 135 N.E. 459 (1922). 13 In short, the school committee retains all its broad powers and responsibilities, but it no longer has authority over its own budget. See Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 1764, 1786, 424 N.E.2d 469. "It is certainly neither impermissible nor unusual for the Legislature to impose responsibilities on public officials who do not have complete authority to decide how much money will be provided them in order to fulfil those responsibilities." Pirrone v. Boston, 364 Mass. 403, 411, 305 N.E.2d 96 (1973).
We affirm the judge's declaration that the mayor is not required to include in the annual city budget a recommendation for the support of the public schools in the amount requested by the school committee. The mayor has the authority to reduce the budget submitted to him by the school...
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