Casey v. City of Everett

• Decision Date: 11 May 1953
• Parties: CASEY et al. v. CITY OF EVERETT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 420

112 N.E.2d 420

330 Mass. 220

CASEY et al. v. CITY OF EVERETT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued March 2, 1953.

Decided May 11, 1953.

Jerome Medalie, Brighton, for the petitioners.

Harris E. Albert, City Sol., Everett, for the respondent.

Before QUA, C. J., and WILKINS, SPALDING, WILLIAMS and COUNIHAN, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

This is a petition in equity brought by more than ten taxable inhabitants of the respondent under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 34, as appearing in St.1939, c. 294.

The judge made a report of material facts which we summarize as follows: The school committee of Everett submitted to the mayor an itemized estimate of the amounts deemed necessary for the support of the schools for the year 1952, the total of which was $1,841,221. The mayor thereafter transmitted to the city council a recommendation that $1,706,040.41 be appropriated for this purpose, and the council appropriated this amount. The sum so appropriated was less by $135,180.59 than the estimates submitted by the school committee. An additional appropriation of $35,000, however, reduced the amount of this discrepancy to $100,180.59 and a deficiency in that amount was determined by the judge. From a decree ordering the respondent to provide, by borrowing, the amount of this deficiency together with a sum equal to twenty-five per cent thereof, the respondent appealed. The evidence is not reported.

The sole question presented is whether G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 34, is controlling. ¹ The respondent contends that certain provisions of its special charter, St.1892, c. 355 ², exempt it from the requirement imposed by section 34 'annually [to] provide an amount of money sufficient for the support of the public schools as required by this chapter.' The provisions relied upon require in substance that the school committee's requests for appropriations be passed upon by the mayor, who 'shall recommend such appropriations as he shall deem necessary'; that the school committee shall incur no liability in excess of the amount appropriated for its use by the city council 'Unless thereto required by law'; and that the acts of the school committee involving the expenditure of money shall be passed upon by the mayor in the same manner as acts of the city council.

The petitioners, on the other hand, rely upon the Commonwealth's long standing policy with respect to the support and maintenance of the public schools, of which G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 34, as appearing in St.1939, c. 294, is the current manifestation. That policy, with the exception of the sanctions for its enforcement, has remained unchanged since 1647. ³ In broad terms it may be stated as a determination by the Legislature that the maintenance of adequate public schools is of paramount importance. Since the enactment of St.1826, c. 143, § 5, each city and town has been required to elect a school committee to manage the public schools, and to these committees the Legislature has given substantially final authority to decide upon the needs of the school systems in their charge. See Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield, 241 Mass. 325, 328-330, 135 N.E. 459.

This is not the first occasion of an apparent conflict between the duties imposed upon a school committee by G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71 and the limitations placed upon municipal expenditures by charter or by the municipal finance act, G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 44. See, for example, Watt v. Town of Chelmsford, 323 Mass. 697, 84 N.E.2d 28; Attorney General v. City of Woburn, 317 Mass. 465, 58 N.E.2d 746; O'Brien v. Pittsfield, 316 Mass. 283, 55 N.E.2d 440; Hayes v. City of Brockton, 313 Mass. 641, 48 N.E.2d 683; Ring v. City of Woburn, 311 Mass. 679, 43 N.E.2d 8; Callahan v. City of Woburn, 306 Mass. 265, 28 N.E.2d 9; School Committee of City of Lowell v. Mayor of Lowell, 265 Mass. 353, 164 N.E. 91; Decatur v. Auditor of Peabody, 251 Mass. 82, 146 N.E. 360; Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield, 241 Mass. 325, 135 N.E. 459. In each of those cases this court recognized, and where possible enforced, the supremacy of the school committee's authority in matters pertaining to the management of the public schools.

The respondent seeks to differentiate this case from those just cited on the basis of the authority given to the mayor in section 49 of its charter to transmit the school committee's request for appropriations to the city council and to 'recommend such appropriations as he shall deem necessary.' The argument in substance is this: In the above mentioned cases the power of the mayor to recommend appropriations was given in general terms comparable to the provisions of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 44. Those provisions, admittedly, do not impinge upon G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 34. But here the general provisions are supplemented by the precise language of section 49 which is specifically applicable to the school committee's requests for appropriations.

This argument is not persuasive. The procedure generally prevailing in cities and towns is that the school committee submits its requests for appropriations to some body or official charged with the duty of passing upon the appropriation of public funds. The school committee has no power to tax or to appropriate or borrow money, and G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 34, clearly contemplates that the governmental body which has such power may choose to exercise it in derogation of the requirements of the general law governing schools and school committees. In no other way could a deficiency in the 'amount necessary * * * for the support of public schools' come about. It is true, as the respondent argues, that section 49 of the charter applies in terms to the school committee, and that it gives to the mayor the authority to 'recommend such appropriations as he shall deem necessary.' The provision upon which the respondent relies, aside from its specific applicability to the school committee, differs in no significant particular from the general grant of a similar authority to the mayor in section 32 of the charter. ⁴ Nor does section 49 differ materially from G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 44, § 32, as appearing in St.1941, c. 473, § 2, ⁵ which gives to the mayors of all cities except Boston authority similar to that granted by section 32 of the charter before us. It is well settled that despite the importance and the broad sweep of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 44, which regulates municipal finance, section 32 of that chapter does not deprive school committees of the final authority to determine the financial needs of the public schools. Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield, 241 Mass. 325, 331-332, 125 N.E. 459; Decatur v. Auditor of Peabody, 251 Mass. 82, 87-89, 146 N.E. 360; See Callahan v. City of Woburn, 306 Mass. 265, 270, 273, 28 N.E.2d 9; Hayes v. City of Brockton, 313 Mass. 641, 649-650, 48 N.E.2d 683. Beyond the point stressed by the respondent, nothing in the city's charter supports the contention that section 49 thereof was intended to deprive the public schools of the city of Everett of the protection of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71 or to permit the mayor and city council to ignore the basic standards there set out for the maintenance of public school systems throughout the Commonwealth. The charter itself, in sections 48 and 50, recognizes that the school committee's powers and duties are those imposed by general law; these, in a sense, are incorporated by reference. We are, accordingly, of opinion that the bare reiteration in section 49 of the respondent's charter of a power probably contained in section 32 thereof does not have the effect of cutting down the traditional and well established power of the school committee. We hold, therefore, that the provisions of section 49 of the respondent's charter do not preclude the petitioners from invoking the remedy afforded by G....