Swaim v. Smith

• Decision Date: 01 July 1939
• Parties: SWAIM et al. v. SMITH, County Judge, et al. McNAIRY COUNTY et al. v. SAME.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

130 S.W.2d 116

174 Tenn. 688

SWAIM et al. v. SMITH, County Judge, et al.

McNAIRY COUNTY et al. v. SAME.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 1, 1939

Appeal from Chancery Court, McNairy County; Tom C. Rye, Chancellor.

Two actions by J. R. Swaim and others against R. Carter Smith County Judge, and others to test the constitutionality of an act to redistrict McNairy County, and by McNairy County, by John A. Shelton, County Attorney, and others against R Carter Smith, County Judge, and others to enforce an act redistricting McNairy County. From a decree for plaintiffs in the first suit and for defendants in second suit, the defendants in the first suit and plaintiffs in the second suit appeal.

The decree in both cases sustained in part and reversed in part.

Abernathy & Abernathy and M. E. Lee, all of Selmer, and Ross & Ross, of Savannah, for appellants.

W. P Moss, of Jackson, J. C. & Charles T. Houston, of Selmer, and John A. Shelton, of Adamsville, for appellees.

GREEN Chief Justice.

By chapter 281 of the Private Acts of 1939 the Legislature undertook to redistrict McNairy County. These two suits involved the constitutionality of that Act. The first named suit was filed by certain officials and others insisting that the Act was bad. The second named suit was filed by McNairy County, suing by the County Attorney and others by way of setting up and enforcing the Act. The chancellor was of opinion that the Act was unconstitutional and the validity of the statute is the determinative question on appeal. The statute is entitled:

"An Act to redistrict McNairy County by the consolidation of several of its Civil Districts, to renumber the districts as laid out and to provide for the magistrates and constables thereof and to abolish the offices of magistrate in the incorporated towns therein."

The first section of the Act provides that Civil Districts 8, 16, 11 and 7 "be and the same are hereby consolidated and from and after the effective date of this Act shall be known as Civil District No. 1." Continuing this section provides "Poney Gibson and W. H. Walker, who were duly elected magistrates for the civil districts included in Civil District No. 1 are hereby designated as magistrates for said Civil District No. 1."

Section 1 then proceeds to consolidate Civil Districts 17, 19, 3 and 2 into Civil District No. 2. Civil Districts 12 and 15 into Civil District No. 3, etc., laying of the county into six civil districts when heretofore it had been divided into nineteen civil districts. Two magistrates are named for each of the new civil districts in language similar to that embodied in designating Gibson and Walker as magistrates for the new Civil District No. 1. This is true as to each of the new districts except new district No. 5. As to that district it is provided that "Roy Huggins, Thomas Jones and C. L. McCullar, all duly elected magistrates from one of the civil districts merged to constitute Civil District No. 5, are hereby designated as magistrates from Civil District No. 5, it being the Civil District containing the county town."

Section 2 of the Act is in these words: "Be it further enacted, That from and after the effective date of this Act, the office of justice of the peace in each of the incorporated towns contained in McNairy County be and the is hereby abolished and for naught held."

The first assault upon the Act is that it violates Section 17 of Article 2 of the Constitution. The argument is that the Act contains two subjects, (1) redistricting McNairy County and (2) abolishing the offices of the magistrate in the incorporated towns therein.

We do not find merit in this criticism of the statute. Under its previous organization the County Court of McNairy County was composed of forty-one justices of the peace--two for each of the nineteen districts and one for each of the incorporated towns in that county. Legislation like that before us has been quite common in Tennessee during recent years. A county court with large membership has been often found an inefficient and unwieldy body. It has been thought that better county government would be obtained byentrusting responsibility to fewer men. The underlying purpose of all this legislation is to reduce the membership of the county courts for the reasons indicated. Abolishing the office of magistrates in incorporated towns tends to further this purpose and is germane thereto. Tested by previous decisions of this court, the Act does not contravene the one-subject clause of the Constitution.

That clause of the Constitution "was intended to prevent a combination in the same act of laws upon wholly different subjects; to avoid the union of incongruous matters in one statute; to secure unity of purpose in legislative enactments. State v. Lasater, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 584, [594]; State ex rel. Morrell v. Fickle, 71 Tenn. (3 Lea) 79; Garvin v. State, 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 162; Powers v. McKenzie, 90 Tenn. [167], 178, 16 S.W. 559; State v. Brown, 103 Tenn. 449, 53 S.W. 727; Memphis St. Railroad v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. 278, 104 S.W. 460; Kizer v. State, 140 Tenn. 582, 205 S.W. 423. In these cases and others, statutes have been upheld which upon first inspection appear to have attempted legislation in regard to different matters. Such matters at least were separately mentioned, both in caption and body. An examination of the several statutes, however, disclosed that the matters included in each were related, and that the general purpose of each statute was expressed in its title. It made no difference if such general purpose was expressed in a compound sentence in the caption." Bell v. Hart, 143 Tenn. 587, 223 S.W. 996.

And in Goetz v. Smith, 152 Tenn. 451, 278 S.W. 417, 419, we said:

"From a review of our decisions, it appears, if, upon analysis of the entire statute, its real object or purpose can be discovered, and this object or purpose is fairly indicated in the caption, the title is sufficient. If the various provisions of the act are germane to the object or purpose so discovered and indicated, they are not beyond the title."

Passing the foregoing objection, it is next urged that the statute is invalid insofar as it undertakes to name the officials to serve as justices of the peace for the newly created districts. We think this objection must likewise be overruled.

We may first express our opinion that justices of the peace who will function in McNairy County as redistricted (with exception of the magistrates in the incorporated towns) will fill new offices. The districts will be new and the magistrates will be new. True there were magistrates in McNairy County prior to the Act but no magistrates for these new districts.

Such being the situation, we think it was entirely competent for the Legislature to fill vacancies in the newly created offices, temporarily, under Article 7, Section 4 of the Constitution, "The election of all officers and the filling of all vacancies not otherwise directed or provided by this Constitution, shall be made in such manner as the Legislature shall direct." Grindstaff v. Carter County, 152 Tenn. 605, 279 S.W. 1041, and cases cited.

The fact that the statute fixed no time during which these designated magistrates should serve is immaterial. Article 6, Section 15 of the Constitution, provides that justices of the peace shall be elected in each district by the qualified voters therein and the Act could not have extended the tenure of the officials named further than the next election. The Constitution will fix the tenure of these designated magistrates regardless of the silence of the Act.

Article 7, Section 5 of the Constitution, provides that "Elections for judicial and other civil officers, shall be held on the first Thursday in August, one thousand eight hundred and seventy, and forever thereafter on the first Thursday in August next preceding the expiration of their respective terms of service." And further that "The term of each officer so elected shall be computed from the first day of September next succeeding his election."

Accordingly the magistrates designated for the new districts by this Act will serve until their successors are elected in the general election on the first Thursday in August, 1940, and duly qualified. The view just expressed is strongly opposed by counsel for the old officers upon the idea that Section 678 of the Code controls the method by which a vacancy in the office of justice of the peace is to be filled. That...