Tapia v. Leslie

• Decision Date: 21 October 2020
• Docket Number: A19-0627
• Citation: 950 N.W.2d 59
• Parties: Benjamin L. TAPIA, Appellant, v. Dakota County Sheriff, Tim LESLIE, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

950 N.W.2d 59

Benjamin L. TAPIA, Appellant,

v.Dakota County Sheriff, Tim LESLIE, Respondent.

A19-0627

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: October 21, 2020

Steven K. Budke, Leverson Budke, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota, for appellant.

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Helen R. Brosnahan, Assistant Dakota County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota, for respondent.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

The question in this case is whether appellant Benjamin Tapia, who was adjudicated delinquent for theft of a motor vehicle in 1998, is eligible to possess a firearm because the Legislature in 2014 removed that offense from the definition of "crime of violence" in Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2018). Respondent Dakota County Sheriff voided Tapia's permit to carry a firearm upon learning of his 1998 adjudication. Tapia petitioned the Dakota County District Court for a writ of mandamus to order the Sheriff to issue a permit. The district court denied Tapia's petition and a divided court of appeals affirmed. Because the 2014 amendment applies to Tapia, we conclude that he is entitled to a permit. We further conclude that Tapia has satisfied all the requirements for a writ of mandamus. We therefore reverse the court of appeals and grant the petition for a writ of mandamus.

FACTS

This case arises out of the denial of a permit to carry a pistol. A brief discussion of Minnesota law regarding permits to carry is helpful to understanding the facts of this case. Minnesota residents may apply for a permit to carry with the sheriff of the county in which the applicant resides. Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 2(a) (2018). Subject to exceptions not at issue here, the sheriff must issue a permit if the applicant meets certain requirements. Id. , subd. 2(b) (2018). One of these requirements is that the applicant must not be "prohibited from possessing a firearm under ... section[ ] ... 624.713." Id. , subd. 2(b)(4)(v). Section 624.713 makes certain people ineligible to possess a firearm ("an ineligible person"), including those who have been convicted or adjudicated delinquent of a "crime of violence." Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2018). "Crime of violence," in turn, is defined as a "felony conviction" of an offense listed "and an attempt to commit any of these offenses." Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5.

In 1998, Tapia was adjudicated delinquent of theft of a motor vehicle. At the time, this offense was included as a "crime of violence." Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (1996). In 2014, the Legislature removed theft of a motor vehicle from the definition of "crime of violence" ("the 2014 Amendment"). See Act of May 16, 2014, ch. 260, § 1, 2014 Minn. Laws 937, 937 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2018) ). In total, the 2014 Amendment added three crimes and removed three crimes from the definition of crime of violence. Id. The 2014 Amendment concludes by stating: "This section is effective August 1, 2014, and applies to crimes committed on or after that date." Id.

On March 21, 2017, Tapia applied to the Dakota County Sheriff's Office for a permit to carry a firearm. At this time, the Sheriff did not have access to juvenile records. On April 19, 2017, the Sheriff issued Tapia a permit. The following year, the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension granted the Sheriff access to juvenile records through its Gun Permit Background Check database. On July 17, 2018, the Sheriff sent Tapia a letter voiding his permit based on his 1998 juvenile adjudication.

Tapia petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the Sheriff to issue a permit. The district court denied Tapia's petition and a divided court of appeals affirmed. Tapia v. Leslie , 939 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. App. 2020). The court of appeals interpreted the 2014 Amendment to mean "a crime that was removed from the list but occurred before August 1, 2014[ ] is still considered a crime of violence under the statutory scheme." Id. at 323. We granted Tapia's petition for review.

ANALYSIS

We must decide whether Tapia is entitled to a permit to carry a firearm. And if so, we must then determine whether Tapia is entitled to a writ of mandamus. We address each issue in turn.

I.

In order to determine whether Tapia is entitled to a carry permit, we need to interpret the 2014 Amendment. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Haywood , 886 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2016). We "interpret statutory language to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature's intent." State v. Bowen, 921 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Minn. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). Our review begins by determining whether the statute, on its face, is ambiguous. State v. Townsend , 941 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 2020). A statute is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. If the Legislature's intent is apparent from the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, we do not engage in any further statutory construction. Id.

As we previously explained, whether Tapia meets the requirements to receive a permit to carry depends on whether Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), prohibits him from possessing a firearm because he was adjudicated delinquent of a crime of violence. While theft of a motor vehicle was included in the definition of crime of violence in 1998 when Tapia was adjudicated delinquent for that offense, see Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (1996), the Legislature removed it from the definition in the 2014 Amendment. See Act of May 16, 2014, Ch. 260, § 1, 2014 Minn. Laws 937, 937 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2018) ). Determining whether the 2014 Amendment applies to Tapia's 2017 application for a permit to carry requires us to interpret the effective date language of the 2014 Amendment, which reads as follows:

This section is effective August 1, 2014, and applies to crimes committed on or after that date.

Id.

This language is unambiguous as it applies to Tapia. It states that the 2014 Amendment "is effective August 1, 2014." Id. Tapia applied for a permit in 2017. Thus, Tapia's application must be reviewed under the definition of "crime of violence" in effect at the time he applied. Because the definition does not include theft of a motor vehicle, Tapia is entitled to a permit.

In urging us to rule otherwise, the Sheriff asks us to focus only on the second part of the effective-date language: "and applies to crimes committed on or after [August 1, 2014]." Id. According to the Sheriff, Tapia cannot benefit from the 2014 Amendment because his "crime"—the 1998 juvenile adjudication—occurred before August 1, 2014. Essentially, the Sheriff interprets the word "crimes" in the effective-date provision to mean "crime of violence."¹ In other words, the Sheriff argues that to take advantage of the 2014 Amendment, one has to commit a crime of violence on or after August 1, 2014.² We disagree.

In interpreting statutes, we "do not examine different provisions in isolation." State v. Gaiovnik , 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011). Rather, we read "words and sentences ... in light of their context." Id. Context is especially important when interpreting a statutory amendment because an "amendment shall be construed as merging into the original law ... and the remainder of the original enactment and the amendment shall be read together." Minn. Stat. § 645.31, subd. 1 (2018).

Here, the 2014 Amendment modifies a definition, "crime of violence," found in Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5. And the definition of crime of violence, like all of the definitions in section 624.712, applies to "sections 624.711 to 624.717." Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 1. The "crimes" therefore that are referenced in the effective-date language are the crimes to which the definition applies. For example, in section 624.713, it is a crime to possess a firearm if one is ineligible to do so. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 2 (listing penalties for felony and gross misdemeanor offenses). The amended definition of crime of violence applies to these possession crimes if they are committed on or after August 1, 2014.

The Sheriff's interpretation is unreasonable because it ignores the context of the statute. In the specific context of the statutes at issue here, the word "crimes" plainly refers to possession crimes and other crimes within sections 624.711-.717; it does not refer to crimes of violence. Accordingly, the effective-date language of the 2014 Amendment does not prohibit application of the new definition of crime of violence to persons convicted of a crime of violence before the effective date.³

The 2014 Amendment "is effective August 1, 2014." See Act of May 16, 2014, Ch. 260, § 1, 2014 Minn. Laws 937, 937. Tapia applied for a permit to carry in 2017, and we review his entitlement to a permit under the definition of crime of violence in effect at the time he applied for that permit. That definition does not include theft of a motor vehicle. We therefore hold that Minn. Stat. § 624.713 does not prohibit Tapia from possessing a firearm because subdivision 5 of section 624.712 no longer designates the offense for which he was adjudicated delinquent as a crime of violence.

II.

We now turn to the issue of whether Tapia is entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the issuance of his permit to carry. We review de novo the decision on a writ of mandamus when the district court based that decision solely on a legal determination. Madison Equities, Inc. v. Crockarell , 889 N.W.2d 568, 571 (Minn. 2017).

The parties dispute what standard should govern the issuance of a writ in this case. Tapia points to a statute that allows persons "aggrieved by denial or revocation of a permit" to carry to petition for a writ of mandamus from the district court. Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 12(a)–(b). Under that statute, the district court:

must issue its writ of mandamus directing that the permit be issued ... unless the sheriff establishes by clear and convincing evidence ... that the applicant is disqualified [under

...