Teleflex Automotive Manufacturing Corp. v. Honaker, Record No. 1856-03-3 (Va. App. 4/13/2004)
| Decision Date | 13 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 1856-03-3. |
| Parties | TELEFLEX AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURING CORP. AND TRAVERLERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF AMERICA v. MILDRED HONAKER. |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
James R. Hodges (Bundy McElroy Hodges, on briefs), for appellants.
Paul L. Phipps (D. Allison Mullins; Lee & Phipps, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Kelsey.
On appeal, Teleflex Automotive Manufacturing Corp. claims the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission erred by concluding that Mildred Honaker's knee injury arose out of her employment. Because the commission's decision involves a question of fact and has the support of credible evidence, we will not disturb it.
We view the evidence in the light "most favorable" to the prevailing party before the commission. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Reed, 40 Va. App. 69, 72, 577 S.E.2d 538, 539 (2003) (quoting Tomes v. James City (County Of) Fire, 39 Va. App. 424, 429, 573 S.E.2d 312, 315 (2002)).
Honaker injured her knee while at work as an assembler. At that time, she was operating a workstation where she assisted in assembling "parts to a cable" which were then assembled at a press. While standing on a two-inch thick rubber pad in front of the press, Honaker "turned to her right" and felt her knee "pop." She experienced an immediate onset of pain. "My leg turned," Honaker explained, "but my feet didn't turn with me." At the time of the injury, Honaker was wearing "tennis shoes," her normal footwear. She held in her hands a few small objects of negligible weight. Honaker promptly informed her supervisor, Patsy Monk, about her injury. Monk prepared an accident report detailing Honaker's accident. "Operator turned to her right," Monk's written account of the accident read, "then felt Right knee pop and then it started to hurt."
Honaker later received medical treatment for the injury, including arthroscopic surgery to repair a torn medial meniscus. Seeking lifetime medical benefits and temporary total compensation, she filed a claim with the commission. The deputy commissioner found Honaker "completely credible," but concluded that "no aspect" of the employment caused her injury. On review, the full commission reversed. Honaker injured her knee, the commission found, because her "feet did not turn as she turned the rest of her body." From this fact, the commission drew the inference that Honaker's feet "did not move with her upper body because she was standing on a rubber mat at the time of her turn." Supporting this inference, the commission concluded, was the fact that Monk, Teleflex's representative, acknowledged that the two-inch rubber pad had been placed in front of Honaker's workstation to create "friction."
We begin our analysis with the governing standard of review. On appeal, we defer to the commission in its role as factfinder. VFP, Inc. v. Shepherd, 39 Va. App. 289, 292, 572 S.E.2d 510, 511-12 (2002). "Decisions of the commission as to questions of fact, if supported by credible evidence, are conclusive and binding on this Court." Marshall v. Craft Forklift, Inc., 41 Va. App. 777, 779, 589 S.E.2d 456, 457 (2003) (citation omitted). In addition, the commission's "conclusions upon conflicting inferences, legitimately drawn from proven facts, are equally binding on appeal." Watkins v. Halco Eng'g, Inc., 225 Va. 97, 101, 300 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1983); see also Hall v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 41 Va. App. 835, 843, 589 S.E.2d 484, 488 (2003). Our deference to the commission's factfinding applies "even though there is evidence in the record to support a contrary finding," S.P. Terry Co. v. Rubinos, 38 Va. App. 624, 632, 567 S.E.2d 584, 588 (2002) (citations omitted), because the commission "is free to adopt that view `which is most consistent with reason and justice,'" Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. Robinson, 32 Va. App. 1, 5, 526 S.E.2d 267, 269 (2000) (quoting C.D.S. Const. Servs. v. Petrock, 218 Va. 1064, 1070, 243 S.E.2d 236, 240 (1978)).
To be compensable, an injury must be "by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment . . . ." Code § 65.2-101 (emphasis added).1 The arising-out-of phrase "refers to the origin or cause of the injury." Lucas v. Fed. Express Corp., 41 Va. App. 130, 134, 583 S.E.2d 56, 58 (2003). "An injury arises out of one's employment if there is a causal connection between the injury and the `conditions under which the work is required to be performed.'" Dan River, Inc. v. Giggetts, 34 Va. App. 297, 304, 541 S.E.2d 294, 297 (2001) (quoting Metcalf v. A.M. Express Moving Sys., Inc., 230 Va. 464, 468, 339 S.E.2d 177, 180 (1986)). The condition "`must be peculiar to the work, incidental to the character of the business, and not independent of the master-servant relationship.'" Id. (quoting County of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 183-84, 376 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1989)).2
In this case, we agree with Teleflex that the mere act of turning, by itself, involves no workplace risk justifying compensation. See Johnson, 237 Va. at 186, 376 S.E.2d at 76 (); Grayson Sch. Bd. v. Cornett, 39 Va. App. 279, 287, 572 S.E.2d 505, 509 (2002) ; Vint v. Alleghany Reg'l Hosp., 32 Va. App. 60, 65, 526 S.E.2d 295, 298 (2000) (). Some specific characteristic of the workplace must impair the employee's ability to complete a normal turn before it can be said that any resulting injury arises out of the employment.
The commission found such a specific characteristic in this case. Honaker's foot did not naturally follow the turn of her upper body, the commission found, because of the mat: a two-inch thick slab of rubber that produced some unmeasured degree of "friction" between itself and Honaker's foot. The commission inferred causation from Honaker's testimony and from the conspicuous absence of any other explanation. Honaker had no prior physical impairment with her legs, knees, or feet. She wore the same tennis shoes she ordinarily wears to work. She had no anatomical problems (that we know of) affecting her posture or mobility. Thus, the commission reasoned, the most likely explanation was the mat.3
In theory, of course, had Honaker not been standing on the mat, she might have still injured her knee at that very moment because of some peculiar, unexplainable reason. To prevail, however, Honaker's evidence need not render this hypothesis fanciful or reduce it to a remote improbability. She simply must show it more likely than not to be untrue. In this respect, the case resembles a slip-and-fall where the only evidence is the slippery spot on the floor and the fact that the claimant slipped at that exact spot.4 Reasonable factfinders can draw reasonable inferences in just these kinds of circumstances.
Because the "actual determination of causation" constitutes a finding of fact, we review the case to determine whether the totality of these facts could reveal to a "rational mind" a causal link "between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury." K&G Abatement Co. v. Keil, 38 Va. App. 744, 756, 568 S.E.2d 416, 422 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Having found a rational basis for the commission's decision, we affirm.
Affirmed.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1. The expression "`in the course of,'" we have explained, "refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred." Lucas v. Fed. Express Corp., 41 Va. App. 130, 133-34, 583 S.E.2d 56, 58 (2003) (quoting County of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 183, 376 S.E.2d...
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