Texas Dept. of Health v. Doe

• Decision Date: 10 June 1999
• Citation: 994 S.W.2d 890
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Austin 1999) Texas Department of Health, Appellant v. Jane Doe, Appellee NO. 03-98-00677-CV
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 890

994 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999)

Texas Department of Health, Appellant v. Jane Doe, Appellee

NO. 03-98-00677-CV

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

June 10, 1999

Rehearing Overruled July 29, 1999.

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 53RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 98-01424, HONORABLE JOHN K. DIETZ, JUDGE PRESIDING

Before Justices Jones, B. A. Smith and Yeakel

Bea Ann Smith, Justice

This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying appellant's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. Appellee Jane Doe,¹ sued appellant, the Texas Department of Health ("TDH"), claiming that TDH wrongfully disclosed the positive result of her human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") test to a non-employee nursing student without her consent. Doe sought injunctive relief, civil damages, and a declaration that TDH violated her right to confidentiality under section 81.103(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 81.103(a) (West 1992). TDH filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, claiming governmental immunity, which the trial court denied. We will affirm the trial court's order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Doe has tested positive for HIV. At the time of the alleged disclosure, she was pregnant and was receiving benefits and nutritional guidance from the Women Infants and Children ("WIC") program through TDH. A TDH clinical nurse asked Doe if she would be willing to participate as a research subject for a case study on pregnant women, and Doe agreed.² Doe gave permission for TDH to provide her name and phone number to the researcher conducting the study, nursing student Kyle Ditto, who came to Doe's home to interview her. Ditto was not an employee of TDH. During the interview, Doe learned that Ditto had seen her medical records and was already informed of her HIV status. Neither Ditto nor the TDH nurse had sought or obtained Doe's consent to the release of her medical information.

Doe filed suit against TDH seeking injunctive relief, civil damages, and a declaration that the disclosure of her HIV status without her express written permission violated her right to have her HIV test results kept confidential under section 81.103(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code, which states: "A test result is confidential. A person that possesses or has knowledge of a test result may not release or disclose the test result or allow the test result to become known except as provided by this section." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 81.103(a) (West 1992). Under subsection (f) of section 81.103, unlawful disclosure of the result of an HIV test is a criminal offense, and section 81.104 provides civil remedies for violations of the confidentiality protected under the section. Id. 81.103(f), .104.

TDH responded to Doe's claim with a plea to the jurisdiction and moved to dismiss Doe's claim, arguing that section 81.103(a) did not waive TDH's governmental immunity from suit. See id. 81.103(a). The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. In its sole point of error, TDH urges that the trial court erred in denying TDH's plea.

DISCUSSION

Whether the trial court properly denied TDH's plea to the jurisdiction presents a pure question of law that we will examine under a de novo standard of review. See State Farm Lloyds v. Kessler, 932 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied). The decision to waive immunity for state agencies is left to the legislature. See Texas Dept. of Health v. Ruiz, 960 S.W.2d 714, 715 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, writ denied). The legislature must use clear and unambiguous language to effect a waiver of immunity. See City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. 1995). However, "[t]he rule requiring a waiver of governmental immunity to be clear and unambiguous cannot be applied so rigidly that the almost certain intent of the Legislature is disregarded. Legislative intent remains the polestar of statutory construction." Id. at 292.

TDH argues that only the limited waivers of governmental immunity contained in the Texas Tort Claims Act could support Doe's claim, and that her claim does not fall within the waivers of immunity provided in that law. The Texas Tort Claims Act waives governmental immunity for certain claims concerning the operation of a motor vehicle, the condition or use of tangible property, or defects of premises. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.021, .022 (West 1997). As Doe correctly points out, she made no pleading under the Texas Tort Claims Act, choosing to bring her action under the confidentiality provisions of Chapter 81 of the Health and Safety Code. We reject TDH's argument that Doe's suit must fail if it does not fall under the Texas Tort Claims Act.

TDH argues in the alternative that the provision of the Health and Safety Code under which Doe sues does not waive governmental immunity for state agencies. The heart of TDH's argument is its claim that the civil remedies allowed under Health and Safety Code sections 81.103 and 81.104 are not available against TDH, because TDH is not a "person" for the purposes of this Code. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 81.103, .104 (West 1992). To determine whether the Health and Safety Code contains a waiver of governmental immunity, we first examine the text of the statute. See Smith v. Clary Corp., 917 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex. 1996). Our objective when we construe a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. 1998).

The Health and Safety Code adopts the conventions of statutory construction provided in the Code Construction Act, including the Act's definition of "person." See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 311.005 (West 1998); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 1.002 (West 1992). Under the Code Construction Act definition, "'Person' includes corporation, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, and any other legal entity." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 311.005(2) (West 1998).³ The Code Construction Act applies this definition to codes adopted by the 60th or a subsequent legislature; the Health and Safety Code was adopted in 1989 by the 71st legislature. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 311.002 (West 1998); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 1.001 (West 1992); City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 294 (Tex. 1995). We note with approval the determination of the Fourth Court of Appeals that the City of Kerrville could be sued under an anti-fraud provision of the Business and Commerce Code because the legislature waived governmental immunity by using "person" in a statute that employs the Code Construction Act definition. See Kerrville HRH, Inc. v. City of Kerrville, 803 S.W.2d 377, 383 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).⁴ In order to give effect to the intent of the legislature, we similarly determine that Chapter 81 of the Health and Safety Code waives governmental immunity.

The express language of the provisions for confidentiality in Chapter 81 supports the conclusion that the legislature intended to waive governmental immunity for violations of these provisions. Rules adopted pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 81.102, which allows mandatory HIV testing in certain emergency circumstances, must provide for "procedures and guidelines to be followed by an affected entity or state agency that . . . specify methods to be used to assure confidentiality." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 81.102(d)(2) (West 1992). Section 81.104 creates a civil cause of action to restrain a violation or threatened violation of section 81.102. Id. 81.104. The direct identification of state agencies in the statute indicates that the legislature contemplated the application of this section to state agencies. When construing a statute, we must view its terms in context and give them full effect. See Liberty Mut., 966 S.W.2d at 484. "[L]anguage strongly suggesting a waiver of immunity in contexts in which any other intention is hard to discern" will guide us in determining the intent of the legislature. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d at 292. Considering the context of the whole statute, including the adoption of the Code Construction Act definition of "person," we conclude that the reference to "an affected . . . state agency" in section 81.102 further demonstrates the legislature's intent to waive governmental immunity. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 81.102(d)(2) (West 1992).

TDH reads the Revisor's Note to section 81.103⁵ to indicate that the source law of this section did not include government agencies in the definition of a "person" to whom the section applies. We disagree with this reading of the prior history of section 81.103. The Communicable Disease Prevention and Control Act (the "Act") was passed by the 68th legislature in 1983. See Communicable Disease Prevention and Control Act, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 255, sec. 1, art. I, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1116 (codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 81.001 (West 1992)). Section 1.04 of that Act defines "person" as "an individual, corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, or other legal entity." Id. art. I., 1.04(7).

The legislature amended the Act in 1987, adding article 9, Tests for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and Related Disorders. See Act of June 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 543, sec. 22, art. IX, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2176, 2201 (codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 81.101 (West 1992)). Section 9.03 of the article is the subject of the Revisor's Note to Health and Safety Code section 81.103. See id. art. IX, 9.03; Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 81.103 revisor's note (West 1992). Section 9.03 prohibits "any person, firm, corporation, physician, hospital, blood center, blood bank, laboratory, or other entity" from disclosing the result of...