Tharrington v. Commonwealth of Va..

Decision Date27 September 2011
Docket NumberRecord No. 1573–10–1.
Citation715 S.E.2d 388,58 Va.App. 704
PartiesRonald Arthur THARRINGTONv.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
CourtVirginia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Robert E. Kowalsky, Jr. (Law Office of Robert Kowalsky, on brief), for appellant.Virginia B. Theisen, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.Present: FELTON, C.J., ELDER, J., and WILLIS, S.J.ELDER, Judge.

Ronald Arthur Tharrington (appellant) was convicted in a jury trial of grand larceny in violation of Code § 18.2–95 and larceny with intent to sell or distribute in violation of Code § 18.2–108.01. 1 On appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the indictments for grand larceny and larceny with intent to sell or distribute because conviction for both offenses stemming from one course of conduct constitutes double jeopardy. Because the General Assembly clearly and unambiguously intended that each statutory offense be punished separately, no double jeopardy violation occurred, and we affirm appellant's convictions.

I.BACKGROUND

“On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’ Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va.App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)). So viewed, the evidence establishes that appellant's convictions stem from the burglary of the residence of Travis Dallos and Tara Black. On January 8, 2009, Dallos and Black returned home and discovered the back door to the residence standing open and shattered glass “all over the place.” Among the items missing from the residence was a PlayStation 3 game console worth $400.

The shift manager of a local pawn shop testified that on January 8, 2009, the same day as the burglary at Dallos's and Black's residence, appellant entered the store and attempted to obtain a loan on a PlayStation 3. Appellant presented identification and filled out the required paperwork in order to collect $100. The form reflected that he owned the game console and had the right to pawn it. At an undisclosed later time, appellant returned to the pawn shop and sold the game console for an additional $150. Upon his arrest, appellant admitted to pawning the game console, but insisted he did not break into Dallos's and Black's residence. At his trial, appellant testified that he obtained the game console from his housemate and gave him the proceeds from the pawn shop.

Appellant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictments for grand larceny and larceny with intent to sell or distribute, contending Code § 18.2–108.01 “is unconstitutional on its face or in application to the facts of this prosecution.” At trial, appellant renewed his objection on double jeopardy grounds, arguing “the constitutional protection of double jeopardy would prevent him being convicted and punished twice for what is essentially the same crime” even though “it may have a separate element.” Appellant reasoned that “you can[not] convict someone twice ... for stealing the same item just because they may have had a different intent.” The trial court denied the motion, holding “the legislature has deemed that [the crime of larceny with intent to sell or distribute] is a separate and distinct crime with a separate intent.” A jury subsequently found appellant guilty of statutory burglary, grand larceny, and larceny with intent to sell. This appeal followed.

II.ANALYSIS

Appellant argues convicting him of both grand larceny and larceny with intent to sell or distribute violates double jeopardy principles because he was punished twice for essentially the same conduct. Appellant compares the dual convictions imposed here with a situation in which a defendant is prosecuted for both simple possession of contraband and possession with intent to distribute. Simultaneous conviction for both crimes is allowed only “if each offense is based upon a distinguishable incident of the offending conduct.” Peake v. Commonwealth, 46 Va.App. 35, 40, 614 S.E.2d 672, 676 (2005). Appellant contends his instant convictions do not meet this test because the theft of the PlayStation 3 cannot be divided into separate incidents of wrongdoing and, therefore, he was unconstitutionally subjected to multiple punishments. To that end, appellant further argues that the “proper interpretation of [Code § ] 18.2–108.01 should be that it constitutes an enhanced punishment if the larceny is for sale or distribut [ion], not that it constitutes a separate additional crime.” 2

“The double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Virginia Constitutions provide that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 720, 722, 273 S.E.2d 778, 780 (1981). “This constitutional provision guarantees protection against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216, 227, 509 S.E.2d 293, 300 (1999). “In the single-trial setting, ‘the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.’ Blythe v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 725, 284 S.E.2d 796, 798 (1981) (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187, 194 (1977)).

“When considering multiple punishments for a single transaction, the controlling factor is legislative intent.” Kelsoe v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 197, 199, 308 S.E.2d 104, 104 (1983). The legislature “may determine the appropriate ‘unit of prosecution and set the penalty for separate violations.” Jordan [ v. Commonwealth], 2 Va.App. [590,] 594, 347 S.E.2d [152,] 154 [ (1986) ]. Therefore, although multiple offenses may be the “same,” an accused may be subjected to legislatively “authorized cumulative punishments.” Id. “It is judicial punishment in excess of legislative intent which offends the double jeopardy clause.” Shears [ v. Commonwealth], 23 Va.App. [394,] 401, 477 S.E.2d [309,] 312 [ (1996) ].

Lane v. Commonwealth, 51 Va.App. 565, 577, 659 S.E.2d 553, 558 (2008). “In reviewing a double jeopardy claim, or a claim based on statutory interpretation, this Court shall conduct a de novo review.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 57 Va.App. 446, 455, 703 S.E.2d 259, 263 (2011).

This Court must determine the General Assembly's intent from the words contained in the statutes. Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006); see Burke v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 183, 188, 510 S.E.2d 743, 745–46 (1999) ( [W]e presume that ... the legislature ‘acted with full knowledge of and in reference to the existing law upon the same subject and the construction placed upon it by the courts.’ (quoting City of Richmond v. Sutherland, 114 Va. 688, 693, 77 S.E. 470, 472 (1913))). Clearly, the language in Code § 18.2–108.01(C) stating that [a] violation of this section constitutes a separate and distinct offense” expresses the legislative intent to authorize the imposition of multiple punishments in conjunction with other larceny statutes such as Code § 18.2–95. See Payne v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 531, 539, 674 S.E.2d 835, 839 (2009) (holding that the plain language of Code § 18.2–36.1(C) allows for the convictions of both aggravated involuntary manslaughter and felony murder in a single trial). Because the legislative intent is unambiguous, we need not determine whether Code §§ 18.2–95 and –108.01 each require proof of a fact which the other does not.3 Accordingly, appellant's convictions for larceny with intent to sell or distribute and grand larceny do not violate his double jeopardy rights.

III.CONCLUSION

The plain language of Code...

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9 cases
  • Paduano v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • Virginia Court of Appeals
    • 30 Diciembre 2014
    ...and Virginia Constitutions provide that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.’ ” Tharrington v. Commonwealth, 58 Va.App. 704, 709, 715 S.E.2d 388, 390 (2011) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 720, 722, 273 S.E.2d 778, 780 (1981) ). “The federal constitutional......
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  • Hall v. Commonwealth
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    • Virginia Court of Appeals
    • 2 Octubre 2012
    ...claim, or a claim based on statutory interpretation, this Court shall conduct a de novo review.'" Tharrington v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 704, 710, 715 S.E.2d 388, 390 (2011) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 446, 455, 703 S.E.2d 259, 263 (2011)). Code § 19.2-294 provides, in rel......
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    ...testified that he obtained the game console from his housemate and gave him the proceeds from the pawn shop.Tharrington v. Commonwealth, 715 S.E.2d 388, 389 (Va. Ct. App. 2011). As the appellate court noted, Tharrington testified at trial that he did not break into the residence, and the ju......
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