The State in Behalf of and to Use of Public Schools of Stoddard County v. Crumb
| Decision Date | 30 June 1900 |
| Citation | 57 S.W. 1030,157 Mo. 545 |
| Parties | THE STATE in behalf of and to the use of the PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF STODDARD COUNTY, Appellant, v. CRUMB et al |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Stoddard Circuit Court. -- Hon. Jno. G. Wear, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Henry N. Phillips and Linus Sanford for appellant.
(1) The swamp lands donated by the United States to the State of Missouri under the acts of September 28, 1850, and donated to the several counties by an act of the Legislature, March 27 1868, are held for school purposes only, and are exempt for ordinary liability for county indebtedness. State ex rel Robbins, 51 Mo. 85; Sturgeon v. Hampton, 88 Mo. 211; Railroad v. Hatton, 102 Mo. 55; Dunklin Co. v Chouteau, 120 Mo. 594; Railroad v. Wayne Co., 125 Mo. 356; Hoke v. Chitwood, 127 Mo. 377; Stone v. Perkins, 85 F. 616; Saline Co. v. Wilson, 61 Mo. 237; Acts 1869, p. 67, sec. 3; Coleman v. Farra, 112 Mo. 85; Sturgeon v. Hampton, 88 Mo. 203; Railroad v. Hatton, 102 Mo. 55; Andrew Co. v. Craig, 32 Mo. 528. (a) These statutes do not authorize the county court to appoint a swamp land commissioner to make deeds for the conveyance of swamp lands, and certainly not to compromise them away or to make a patent to them until the full purchase price has been paid. Sturgeon v. Hampton, 88 Mo. 205; Railroad v. Hatton, 102 Mo. 55; Dunklin Co. v. Chouteau, 120 Mo. 594; Hoke v. Chitwood, 127 Mo. 377; Montgomery Co. v. Aukley, 103 Mo. 505. (b) The county court of Stoddard county never had the power to barter its swamp lands -- it had the power only to sell them as was provided by law. See acts of the legislature above cited, and cases cited, and also Walcott v. The County, 26 Mo. 272; Book v. Earl, 87 Mo. 256; Price v. Courtney, 87 Mo. 387; Stone v. Perkins, 85 Mo. 616. (2) The sheriff's deed to D. Starks Crumb, Louis M. Ringer et al., did not convey the county's title to the swamp land described in said deed, or any other title, legal or equitable. State ex rel. v. Robbins, 51 Mo. 82; Sturgeon v. Hampton, 88 Mo. 211; Railroad v. Hatton, 102 Mo. 55; Dunklin Co. v. Chouteau, 120 Mo. 594; Railroad v. Wayne Co., 125 Mo. 356.
C. L. Keaton and Martin L. Clardy for respondents.
(1) The attorneys prosecuting this action have no authority to institute or prosecute the action. There is no evidence of appointment, whatever, in the record, and they assume to act as and for public agents and must show their authority of record; nor was this suit ever authorized by any one, nor does the petition state that the school board has anything to do with it. R. S. 1889, secs. 8039, 8043; Summers v. Tice, 1 Mo. 349; Carpenter v. Town of Lathrop, 51 Mo. 483; State ex rel. v. Luce et al., 62 F. p. 417. (2) A judgment against Crumb would be void, because indispensably necessary parties were not before the court, the same as a judgment against the landlord without making the tenant a party to the action in ejectment. Charter Oak Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 90 Mo. 267; Mallow v. Hind, 12 Wheaton 198; Shields v. Barrow, 17 Howard 139; Barney v. Baltimore, 16 Wallace 286; Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U.S. 586. (3) The attack of appellant upon the sheriff's deed is unwarranted, and is based upon the false premise and assumption that the judgment recited therein was based upon a general indebtedness, and hence a general judgment against the county, in direct contradiction of Exhibit "C," on pages 19-22 of the record, which says: and the swamp lands were donated to the States and counties primarily to drain and reclaim the same, and it was only the net proceeds, after defraying all the expenses, that should go into the school fund, and with this fund we have nothing to do in this action. R. S. 1855, pp. 1005, 1006, secs. 1, 2, 3 and 6; R. S. 1865, pp. 278, 279, secs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6; R. S. 1889, sec. 6461; State ex rel. v. Wayne County Court, 98 Mo. 362; Hall v. Gregg, 138 Mo. 286; Laws 1854, 1855, p. 154, secs. 8-12 and Laws 1855, p. 351, sec. 4; American Emigrant Co. v. Adams Co., 100 U.S. 61; 9 U. S. Statutes at Large, p. 519. (4) The sheriff's deed to D. Starks Crumb et al. conveyed the absolute title to the lands described therein, as it was a sale for the reclamation of the swamp lands of said county. State ex rel. v. Wayne Co. Court, 98 Mo. 362; Railroad v. Hatton, 102 Mo. 45. (5) The trusts reposed in the county and State are personal trusts, and do not run with the land; hence, Farlow is an innocent purchaser of the land and took the absolute title under his warranty deed. Linville et al. v. Bohanan, 60 Mo. 554; Pool v. Brown, 60 Mo. 675; American Emigrant Co. v. Adams Co., 100 U.S. 61; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 186, 111 U.S. 701; Butler Co. v. Boatmen's Bank, 143 Mo. 13, 27. (6) The compromise between the purchasers at the sheriff's sale, after the lands had been sold for drainage and reclamation of the swamp lands of the county, is in all things valid, as has been held by the United States Supreme Court. Mills Co. v. Railroad, 107 U.S. 567. (7) The county is estopped or barred by laches and by limitation by collecting money and taxes, always disclaiming ownership of the lands, etc., from denying the validity of the title vested formerly in Crumb, and now vested in Himmelberger, one of the defendants (respondents). County v. Post, 93 U.S. 502; County v. American Emigrant Co., 93 U.S. 124; Iowa Land Co. v. County, 36 Iowa 48; Audubon Co. v. Emigrant Co., 40 Iowa 460; Smith v. City of Osage, 80 Iowa 84; Indiana v. Milk, 11 F. 389; Hough v. Buchanan, 27 F. 328; Pengra v. Munz, 29 F. 830; U. S. v. Willamet Co., 42 F. 389; Reuter v. Lawe, 34 L. R. A. 733 (Wis.); United States v. Willamet Co., 54 F. 807; Murphy v. Packer, 152 U.S. 398; St. Louis v. Consol. Coal Co., 113 Mo. 83; Curnen v. Mayor, 79 N.Y. 511; Joliet v. Woerner, 166 Ill. 34; Railroad v. Joliet, 79 Ill. 25; Michigan v. Railroad, 89 Mich. 481; Michigan v. Railroad, 69 F. 1161; Colonial Co. v. Tubbs, 45 S.W. 623; Dunklin Co. v. Chouteau, 120 Mo. 577; Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler Co., 121 Mo. 641; Elliott v. Buffington, 149 Mo. 663; Wilson v. Beckwith, 140 Mo. 369; Board of Coms. of Johnson Co. v. January, 94 S.W. 202.
This is a proceeding in equity to remove a cloud upon the title to eighty thousand, one hundred and seventy-two acres of land in Stoddard county, being a part of the land granted to the State of Missouri by the United States, by the Act of Congress of September 28, 1850, relating to swamp and overflowed land, and thereafter by various acts of the General Assembly of Missouri conveyed by the State to Stoddard county, to be held by it for reclamation, drainage and sale, and the net proceeds to go to the public school fund of the county.
The controversy arises in this wise: On the 13th of March, 1868, Louis M. Ringer obtained a general judgment against Stoddard county for $ 1,136.90, and in August following caused an execution to be issued and levied upon one hundred and seven thousand acres of the swamp and overflowed lands conveyed by the State to Stoddard county, for the purposes above stated, had the land sold under the execution on September 16th, 1868, and purchased at that sale eighty thousand one hundred and seventy-two acres thereof for six hundred and sixty-three dollars and ninety-five cents, other persons purchasing the remainder thereof. Afterwards on the 28th day of April, 1869, Ringer conveyed the land in controversy, so purchased by him, to the defendant D. Starks Crumb, by a quit-claim deed. At the February term, 1869, the county court of Stoddard county employed attorneys to have the sale of the land aforesaid set aside and agreed to give them fifty thousand acres of the land if they succeeded. Exhibit C attached to the petition shows that at a special term in April, 1869, the county court entered of record an order which recited the obtaining of the Ringer judgment against the county "upon warrants on the swamp land fund of said county," the execution thereon, the sale thereunder to Ringer and others, the employment of attorneys to have the sale set aside, the fact that the suit would continue for years and the result be uncertain, and that "it is therefore considered by the court that a compromise of the same would be for the benefit of said county of Stoddard if made with the parties who bought said lands at said sale [Ringer and others], and whereas, said purchasers agreed and covenant to pay to the said county the sum of thirteen thousand five hundred dollars, in Stoddard county warrants, which sum is to be paid into the county treasury on the following terms and the following manner, to-wit: Said parties either paying as aforesaid, or executing their promissory notes, bearing six per cent interest, one-half of said sum shall be paid as aforesaid, on or before the first day of January, A. D. 1870, and the remaining half on the first day of January, A. D. 1871." The order then proceeds in the shape of a judgment directing letters patent to be issued to the purchasers conveying all the right, title, interest and claim of the county in and to the lands sold under such execution, and appointed a commissioner to execute and deliver the patents upon the purchasers producing the treasurer's receipt for the $ 13,500. The commissioner issued patents accordingly, on the 1st day of May, 1869, reciting that the patentee had "made full payment to the said county of Stoddard." Thereafter Crumb conveyed the whole or a part, it is not clear which, to John S. Farlow, and Farlow conveyed the whole or a part, it is not altogether clear which, to Himmelberger.
Upon demand of the citizens of the county and of the attorney of...
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