Thompson v. Com.
Decision Date | 15 June 1983 |
Citation | 652 S.W.2d 78 |
Parties | Lewis Earl THOMPSON, Jr., Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Respondent. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Nicholas N. King, Franklin & King, P.S.C., Louisville, for movant.
Steven L. Beshear, Atty. Gen., Linda Carnes Wimberly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for respondent.
CERTIFICATION OF THE LAW
At the outset of this opinion, we note that this case arises from a certification of the law by the Court of Appeals on application therefor by the Commonwealth. Discretionary review was granted by the court, which we have chosen to honor despite the fact that the acquitted movant herein has no standing to seek review by this court. There is simply no issue in which this movant has any interest, nor does our law extend to any acquitted person the right of certification of questions of law.
§ 115 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that "... the commonwealth may not appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case, other than for the purpose of securing a certification of law ..." The Constitution is silent concerning which appellate court has jurisdiction to accomplish this end. The only rule relating to certification of questions of law is CR 76.37, which empowers the Supreme Court of Kentucky to answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, federal Circuit Courts of Appeal, and the highest appellate courts of other states.
Customarily, certifications of questions of law are issued by the highest court of the state. The basis for this is obvious, as intermediate courts are bound by applicable precedents of the highest court and without power to overrule them. See SCR 1.030(8)(a). To apply first to the Court of Appeals and then to this court constitutes an exercise in duplication and a waste of time and effort.
Aware that the Commonwealth should have certified the questions here represented to this court, ab initio; realizing that this movant has no standing before us; and hoping that this problem will not appear again, we affirm the Court of Appeals and adopt and adapt its opinion, to-wit:
Neither the law in this jurisdiction, nor the Federal Rules of Evidence, allow a defendant to prove character by evidence of prior specific acts. FRE 404(a)(3), (b). Such can only be proved by evidence of the individual's reputation in the community, not by personal opinion, nor by specific acts of conduct. See Lawson's, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.15(2), p. 16 (1976). As such, the trial court erred in admitting into evidence prior criminal convictions of the victim.
STEPHENS, C.J., AKER, GANT, STEPHENSON and VANCE, JJ., and VIRGINIA COLLINS BURBANK and ASA M. ROUSE, Special Justices, sitting.
All concur except VIRGINIA COLLINS BURBANK and ASA M. ROUSE, Special Justices, who dissent and file herewith separate dissenting opinions.
Since I reach a different conclusion, I must report my reason. The law is well-settled in Kentucky that evidence bearing on the character of the victim is admissible in limited circumstances, Lucas v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 281, 132 S.W. 416 (1910); Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 477 S.W.2d 159 (1972). It is permitted in cases of self-defense to justify the action of the accused by proving the violent reputation known to the accused prior to the commission of the act for which he is charged. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, Section 2.10(c); Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57 (1959); Wooten v. Commonwealth, Ky., 478 S.W.2d 701 (1972), Amos v. Commonwealth, Ky., 516 S.W.2d 836 (1974).
It appears to me, however, that there are numerous cases in which the victim may be the aggressor, but his violent character and reputation therefor may not be known to the accused. In such instances, the jury is entitled to all material facts from which it can draw logical conclusions. The language of an early Kentucky case, Duke v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 138, 229 S.W. 122 (1921), suggests to this writer that evidence of a prior criminal conviction of the victim would have been admitted to show who was the aggressor, but for the incompetent manner in which it was offered. Justice Hurt, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated:
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