Thornton v. Carlson

• Decision Date: 25 March 1992
• Citation: 4 Cal.App.4th 1249,6 Cal.Rptr.2d 375
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Shirley THORNTON, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Lonnie M. CARLSON, as Interim Director, etc., Defendant and Appellant. A051466.

Page 375

6 Cal.Rptr.2d 375

4 Cal.App.4th 1249

Shirley THORNTON, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Lonnie M. CARLSON, as Interim Director, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

A051466.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

March 25, 1992.

Rehearing Denied April 15, 1992.

Review Denied June 11, 1992.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., Charlton Holland, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Stephanie Wald, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Harlan E. Van Wye, Deputy Atty. Gen., Oakland, and Victor G. Binsacca, California Dept. of Social Services, Sacramento, for defendant and appellant.

Alan Lieberman, Legal Services of Northern California, Butte Regional Office, Chico, Clare Pastore, Melinda R. Bird, Los Angeles, and Tanya Broder, Legal Aid Soc. of Alameda County, Oakland, for plaintiffs and respondents.

WHITE, Presiding Justice.

Lonnie M. Carlson, as Interim Director of the California Department of Social Services (Department), appeals from an order granting a preliminary injunction. The injunction prevents the Department from enforcing certain administrative regulations which implement a state program providing emergency payments to Supplemental Security Income recipients. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 12550.) ¹ We reverse in part and affirm in part.

I FACTS

In California, eligible aged, blind or disabled persons receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) which is funded jointly by the federal and state governments. ² (§§ 12000 to 12351; 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq.) The maximum monthly SSI payment for an aged or disabled person is $630. Blind recipients receive $704. (§ 12200, subds. (a) & (c).)

In 1973, the California Legislature also established a fully state-funded program to provide additional emergency payments to SSI recipients. (Stats.1973, ch. 1216.) The enabling legislation states that the purpose of the program is to "meet the needs of [SSI] recipients ... under emergency or special circumstances in the event that the federal government makes no provision for such payment...." (§ 12500.) The law defines "special circumstances" as "those which are not common to all recipients and which arise out of need for certain goods or services, and physical infirmities or other conditions peculiar on a nonrecurring basis, to the individual's situation. Special circumstances shall include replacement of essential household furniture and equipment, or clothing when lost, damaged or destroyed by a catastrophe, necessary moving expenses, required housing repairs and unmet shelter needs." (§ 12550, emphasis added.)

The present case focuses on the meaning of the phrase "unmet shelter needs." Shortly after the statute was enacted, the Department adopted regulations (effective January 1, 1974) which severely limited the circumstances under which payments would be provided for "unmet shelter needs." (Eligibility assistance standard (EAS) 46-425.) In particular, the regulations only permitted expenses for relocation where the recipient already had housing and was required to move "because of eviction or current housing is unsafe or unhealthful as determined by the county welfare department, ..." (EAS 46-425.232.) ³ Although the regulations were amended in November of 1988, they still restricted relocation payments to those cases where it was "necessary because of eviction or because current housing i[s] unsafe or unhealthful as determined by the [county welfare department]." (EAS 46-425.66.) ⁴ In short, the regulations contemplated that the special circumstances program was designed to meet the "unmet shelter needs" of persons who had lost housing for specific reasons, not the needs of persons who had no housing in the first instance (what we would today call the "homeless").

In April of 1990, several SSI recipients and the Homeless Union of Oakland (hereafter "plaintiffs") filed a class action suit challenging the regulations promulgated by the Department. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that the regulations too narrowly defined the circumstances in which benefits could be paid for "unmet shelter needs." The plaintiffs claimed the regulations were too restrictive in the following respects: First, assistance for securing permanent housing is improperly limited to costs "necessary because of eviction or because current housing is unsafe or unhealthful as determined by the [county welfare department]." Second, no assistance is available to pay for temporary housing. Third, there is no provision for payment of costs necessary to prevent eviction. And fourth, the $300 maximum payment for required deposits to secure rental housing is inadequate. In addition, the suit alleged that the Department had not provided SSI recipients with reasonable and effective notice of the benefits available through the special circumstances program.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The court's order enjoined the Department from: "1. Denying Special Circumstances assistance to otherwise eligible SSI recipients who have unmet shelter needs on the grounds that they are unable to provide independent documentation of an eviction or a forced move from unsafe or unhealthful housing; [p] 2. Denying Special Circumstances assistance to otherwise eligible SSI recipients who are unable to immediately secure permanent housing and whose unmet shelter need is for temporary shelter; [p] 3. Denying Special Circumstances assistance to otherwise eligible SSI recipients who reside in rental housing to enable such persons to prevent eviction and remain in their present housing; [p] 4. Failing to employ reasonable means of giving notice of the availability [of] Special Circumstances assistance to all SSI recipients...." The order specifically compelled the Department to meet with plaintiffs' counsel and to prepare a plan for providing effective notice of the special circumstances program within 30 days of the date of the order.

The Department has appealed from this order. ⁵

II

The decision to grant a preliminary injunction generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. (DeYoung v. City of San Diego (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 16, 194 Cal.Rptr. 722.) Normally, the trial court must determine whether defendants would suffer greater harm from issuance of the preliminary injunction than the plaintiffs would suffer from its refusal. In making this determination, the court must consider the degree of probability that the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail on the merits. (Id., at p. 17, 194 Cal.Rptr. 722; IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69-70, 196 Cal.Rptr. 715, 672 P.2d 121.) However, where, as here, the trial court's decision to grant an injunction is based solely on an interpretation of a statute, we review the matter as a question of law, and are not bound by the abuse of discretion standard. Instead, we determine whether the trial court's interpretation of the statute is correct as a matter of law, and do not consider the relative harm suffered by the parties. (DeYoung, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 17, 194 Cal.Rptr. 722; City of Santa Monica v. Yarmark (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 153, 161, 249 Cal.Rptr. 732.)

We conclude the trial court erred when it construed the statute to invalidate the Department's regulations.

The rules of statutory construction applicable to this case were recently summarized by Division One of this district: "On the one hand, 'when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, "there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it." ' [Citations.] ... [p] On the other hand, '[t]he meaning of the words of a statute or, to use the alternative approach favored by many courts, the intent of the Legislature, can only be determined with reference to the context in which the words are used; that is, with reference to such purpose as may be discerned from examining the entire enactment of which the words are part.... Thus, "in analyzing the legislative usage of certain words, ' "the objective sought to be achieved by a statute as well as the evil to be prevented is of prime consideration...." ' [Citations omitted.]" ... The courts resist blind obedience to the putative "plain meaning" of a statutory phrase where literal interpretation would defeat the Legislature's central objective.' [Citation.] ... 'The words of a statute will not be literally construed if this would cause an absurd result, or if it would fail to give effect to the manifest purposes of the statute in light of its legislative history.' [Citations.]" (Farnow v. Superior Court (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 481, 485-486, 276 Cal.Rptr. 275.)

Initially, we note that the statutory phrase at issue here--"unmet shelter needs"--is neither clear nor unambiguous. The phrase is so broad that it could be construed to include almost any "need" occasioned by almost any reason. Thus, the phrase demanded administrative interpretation. Viewing the phrase in the context of the legislation in which it appears, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend to meet all "unmet shelter needs" of all SSI recipients. The relevant statute--section 12550--appears as part of a legislative chapter entitled "Emergency Payments and Special Circumstances for Aged, Blind and Disabled." Section 12500 states that "[t]he purpose of this chapter is to provide payment to meet the needs of [SSI] recipients under ... emergency or special circumstances...." Section 12550 defines "special circumstances" as those which are "not common to all recipients" and which are "peculiar on a nonrecurring basis, to the individual's situation." Examples of "special circumstances" include "replacement of essential household furniture and equipment, or clothing when lost, damaged or destroyed by a catastrophe, ..." (§ 12550.) Thus, the legislation appears to contemplate that "special circumstances" are created by some nonrecurring event or change in...