Toledo Edison Co. v. Public Utilities Com'n of Ohio
Decision Date | 18 July 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83-840,83-840 |
Citation | 12 Ohio St.3d 143,465 N.E.2d 886 |
Parties | , 12 O.B.R. 183 TOLEDO EDISON CO., Appellant, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO et al., Appellees. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Fuller & Henry, Paul M. Smart, Fred J. Lange and Stephen B. Mosier, Toledo, for appellant.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Robert S. Tongren and Joseph P. Cowin, Columbus, for appellee.
William A. Spratley, Columbus, consumers' counsel, and Bruce J. Weston, Columbus, for intervening appellee.
R.C. 4909.15(D) requires the commission to fix and determine a just and reasonable rate:
In its first proposition of law, appellant argues that the commission's decision to amortize the gain from the debt/equity exchange over twenty years and reduce the annual cost of long-term debt by the annual amortization ($532,250) results in a rate of return based on a hypothetical debt structure in violation of R.C. 4909.15(D)(2)(a).
Appellant relies on General Telephone Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1963), 174 Ohio St. 575, 191 N.E.2d 341 [23 O.O.2d 268]. That case, however, dealt with allowable operating expenses and not an adjustment which affected only rate of return. Id. at 578-579, 191 N.E.2d 341. Our scope of review with respect to rate of return computations is much more limited. Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 71, 79, 413 N.E.2d 799 . See, also, Ohio Suburban Water Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 17, 21-22, 402 N.E.2d 539 ; Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 303, 310, 423 N.E.2d 1082 . As we noted in Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1980), supra 640 Ohio St.2d at 79, 413 N.E.2d 799:
This rationale applies with equal force to the commission's treatment of the gain from the debt/equity exchange for purposes of the rate of return calculation. The order of the commission was supported by staff testimony and consistent with the commission's prior practice with respect to similar exchanges.
Appellant does not directly challenge the commission's decision to disallow as an item of expense the costs associated with the cancelled CAPCO nuclear plants. The disallowance of these costs was originally mandated by the court in Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 , and subsequently reaffirmed in Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 22, 437 N.E.2d 586; Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 107, 447 N.E.2d 746; and Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 91, 447 N.E.2d 733.
However, appellant argues that the disallowance of these costs as operating expenses and the treatment of the gain from the debt/equity exchange result in a rate of return which is confiscatory in violation of Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
We recently addressed a similar issue in Dayton Power & Light Co., supra, and Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., supra. In both cases, we held that the rate orders did not amount to a confiscation of private property. The following was enunciated in Dayton Power & Light Co. and also adopted in Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., supra, 4 Ohio St.3d at 109, 447 N.E.2d 746:
The commission approved a range of 12.80 percent to 13.19 percent for rate of return and determined that appellant was entitled to a rate of return of 13.09 percent. Appellant argues that if the allowable return computed on the basis of the 13.09 percent rate of return is reduced by the disallowed expenses, adjusted to reflect a possible writeoff as a result of their disallowance, 1 and the debt is set off by the annual amortization of its gain, it produces an "effective" rate of return of 8.86 percent. Since...
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