Tomahawk Resources, Inc. v. Craven, 2005 OK 82 (OK 1/31/2006)
| Citation | 2005 OK 82 |
| Decision Date | 31 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 100, 437,100, 437 |
| Parties | TOMAHAWK RESOURCES, INC., Appellee, v. DON L. CRAVEN and INGEBORG CRAVEN, Appellants, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel., SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Oklahoma |
¶1 Both Tomahawk Resources, Inc. and the Cravens have filed a petition for rehearing. Generally, rehearing is granted: (1) to correct an error or omission, see Sooner Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Mobley, 1981 OK 124, supp. op. ¶¶ 1-11, 645 P.2d 1000, 1003-04; Davis v. Fieker, 1997 OK 156, supp. op. ¶ 1, 952 P.2d 505, 516-17; Sharp v. Tulsa, 1994 OK 104, supp. op. ¶ 3, 890 P.2d 836, 846; I.C. Gas Amcana, Inc. v. Hood, 1992 OK 119, supp. op. ¶2, 855 P.2d 597, 601; (2) to address an unresolved jurisdictional issue, see Sholer v. State ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 1995 OK 152, supp. op. ¶ 3, 945 P.2d 469, 478; or (3) to clarify the opinion, see City of Oklahoma City v. State ex rel. Okla. Dept. of Labor, 1995 OK 107, supp. op. ¶ 1, 918 P.2d 26, 31. Rehearing is not for rearguing a question which has been previously presented and fully considered by this Court. See Draper v. State, 1980 OK 117, supp. op. ¶¶ 1-2, 621 P.2d 1142, 1147. Likewise, it is not for presenting points which the losing party overlooked, misapprehended, or failed to fully address.
¶2 In its petition for rehearing, Tomahawk argues the same issue addressed in its brief, even though in a more developed manner, and resolved by this Court's opinion. Tomahawk presents nothing in its petition for rehearing that it could not have presented in its brief. Therefore, Tomahawk's petition for rehearing should be denied.
¶3 The Cravens' petition for rehearing asserts that this Court's opinion failed to address their quest for trial-related costs, which they argue were properly raised in the trial court and preserved for appellate review in the petition in error and the petition for certiorari. See Markwell v. Whinery's Real Estate, 1994 OK 24, ¶ 8 & n.9, 869 P.2d 840, 843 & n.9. In its response to the petition for certiorari, Tomahawk states this cost issue was missing from the petition for certiorari. Tomahawk's statement is not determinative. In reviewing the petition for certiorari, we find that the Cravens sufficiently preserved the issue for our review. Id.
¶4 Unlike title 12, section 936, which allows a prevailing party to recover attorney fees, title 12, section 928 allows costs to the plaintiff upon a favorable judgment. Section 928 provides:
Where it is not otherwise provided by this and other statutes, costs shall be allowed of course to the plaintiff, upon a judgment in his favor, in actions for the recovery of money only, or for the recovery of specific, real or personal property.
Here the Cravens are the plaintiffs on the counterclaim, satisfying section 928's first requirement. We next turn to section 928's second requirement: whether the Cravens were given judgment on their counterclaim within the meaning of section 928.
¶5 In construing a statute, the legislative intent controls. Villines v. Szczepanski, 2005 OK 63, ¶ 9, 122 P.3d 466, 470-71. Generally, the plain language of a statute dictates its meaning. McNeill v. City of Tulsa, 1988 OK 2, ¶ 9, 953 P.2d 329, 332. However, it is proper and sometimes necessary to consider the history to accurately understand the legislative policy underlying a statute. Id. This Court will look at the particular problem the statue was intended to address. Christian v. Shideler, 1963 OK 129, ¶ 10, 382 P.2d 129, 132. This Court will not adopt a construction which defeats the legislative intent as shown by other related enactments. See McNeill, 1988 P.2d 2, ¶ 9, 953 P.2d at 332.
¶6 An understanding of title 12, section 696.1 is necessary to discerning the legislative intent underlying section 928. Since at least 1909, section 928 of title 12 has been in effect, as has section 696.1 of title 12. See Comp. Laws of Okla. §§ 5931, 6115 (1909). Even though the legislature repealed section 696.1 in 1993 and left section 928 unchanged, section 696.1 impacts our analysis as part of section 928's history. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws 2053 (ch. 351, § 29); see 12 O.S.2001, § 928.
¶7 The now repealed title 12, section 696.1 provided:
When a trial by jury has been had, judgment must be entered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict, unless it is special, or the court order the case reserved for future argument or consideration.
Under section 696.1, a judgment on a general unreserved jury verdict was rendered by operation of law. Rodgers v. Higgins, 1993 OK 45, ¶ 12, 871 P.2d 398, 404 ( limited).1 A party receiving an unreserved verdict was entitled to a favorable entry of judgment the day the verdict was returned and accepted without reservation. Id.
¶8 We examine the journal entry of judgment in light of section 928's history. The journal entry of judgment recites that a verdict was rendered in favor of the Cravens on their counterclaim. Before 1993 and by operation of law, this favorable unreserved verdict would have resulted in an entry of judgment in the Cravens' favor. Before 1993, the legislative intent behind and plain language of section 928 would have resulted in the Cravens being entitled to recover their trial-related costs. This legislative intent is unchanged by the repeal of section 696.1 in 1993. The Cravens' jury verdict on their counterclaim brings them within the terms of section 928 for the purposes of recovering costs. We find that the trial court erred in denying the Cravens' application to recover trial-related costs.
¶9 The appellants' petition for rehearing is granted. The denial of trial-related costs to the Cravens is reversed. In addition to recovering their attorney fees, the Cravens are entitled to their trial-related costs apportioned to those taxed in successfully litigating their counterclaim and to their appeal-related costs. The appellee's petition for rehearing is denied. On...
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