Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 July 1984 |
| Docket Number | 68008,Nos. 68007,s. 68007 |
| Parties | TROY v. INTERFINANCIAL, INC. et al. INTERFINANCIAL, INC. et al. v. TROY. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Eugene D. Butt, James L. Ford, Atlanta, for appellant.
William H. Major, George H. Myshrall, Jr., Atlanta, for appellees.
Wendell N. Troy, Sr. was employed for a number of years by United Family Life Insurance Company. His employment was subsequently terminated "after over 19 years of service," (admitted facts). Whereupon he brought this action in 10 counts against Interfinancial, Inc. (Interfinancial) (United's parent company), United Family Life Insurance Company (United), and individually against the president of the defendant United, Robert Denham (later dismissed without prejudice upon the suggestion of his death having been filed of record), and another employee, Bernard E. Wilson, a non-resident who allegedly had committed an alleged tortious act in the State of Georgia. Plaintiff contends that his firing was due to a conspiracy by and between the parties in that he refused to depose certain false facts with reference to a lawsuit against United. In Count 1 plaintiff contends he refused to perjure himself with reference to the deposition as instructed by Wilson and that his firing contravened a substantial principle of Georgia public policy. In Count 2 he contends he had a contract for employment with the defendant United and the defendant Wilson maliciously and without lawful justification induced the defendant United to breach its contract with the plaintiff and Wilson did not have the requisite authority to discharge him thereby terminating a recognized contractual relationship and thereby tortiously interfered with a contractual, proprietary, and economic interest. In Count 3 he alleges conspiracy between defendants Denham and Wilson in an attempt to procure and/or induce him to perjure himself for the benefit of the defendants United and Interfinancial. In Count 4 he alleges the defendants trespassed upon his rights to privacy in their conduct in attempting to suborn perjury for their own benefit which was demeaning to the plaintiff and an affront to his personal dignity. In Count 5 he contends the acts of the defendants were wilful, wanton and malicious thereby causing him emotional distress and damage. In Count 6 he contends the defendants published or caused to have published false and defamatory statements regarding him which were disseminated and made known to others thereby defaming, libeling and slandering him and injuring his reputation, as well as causing him economic loss. In Count 7 he alleges that he was to be paid a $1,000 bonus to write a profile and job description, that he fully performed his contract in doing so, and the defendant United failed and refused to pay the $1,000 which is still owing to him. In Count 8 he contends the defendants acted wilfully, maliciously, wantonly and intentionally "with a conscious indifference to the circumstances," seeking to recover, in addition to his compensatory damages, exemplary damages in order to deter said malicious and illegal conduct in the future. In Count 9 he alleges the defendants acted in bad faith, had been stubbornly litigious and had caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense seeking expenses of litigation including reasonable attorney fees. In Count 10 he pleaded in the alternative that he had suffered injury to his peace, happiness and feelings as the result of the tortious conduct of the defendants and was entitled to damages as provided in Code § 105-2003 (now OCGA § 51-12-6) as to vindictive damages.
The defendants answered, in substance, denying the claims, the non-resident also denying jurisdiction. The others admitted jurisdiction, the plaintiff's former employment by United, the lawsuit in which he was requested to give a deposition and his subsequent termination from employment, but otherwise denied the averments with reference to the circumstances as to his termination.
Prior to trial the plaintiff amended and recast his complaint wherein it was reduced to five counts against only United and Bernard E. Wilson as the remaining defendants. Count 1 therein sought relief, jointly and severally, for compensatory damages sustained as the result of defendants' wrongful acts including damages for emotional distress and exemplary damages as a result of defendants' wilful, wanton and malicious conduct seeking in the alternative vindictive damages for the defendants' intentional injury to plaintiff's peace, happiness and feelings; also expenses of litigation including reasonable attorney fees. Count 2 involved the malicious and wilful and without lawful justification acts of defendant Wilson inducing the corporate defendant to breach its contract thereby tortiously interfering with plaintiff's contractual, proprietary and economic interest, seeking also in addition to his compensatory damages an award of vindictive damages to deter defendants from repeating such wilful acts; and in the alternative pecuniary loss and injury to his peace, happiness and feelings as a result of the wrongful acts of the defendants performed necessarily in bad faith, entitling him also to recover necessary expenses of litigation including attorney fees. Count 3 involved a trespass upon the plaintiff's right to privacy and Count 4 with reference to the libel in which the defendants published false and defamatory statements regarding the plaintiff. Count 5 involved the special $1,000 bonus with reference to a proposed program the plaintiff was contracted to prepare.
The case proceeded to trial and the trial court granted motions for directed verdict as to Counts 2, 3 and 4 which were removed from the jury's consideration. The only remaining matter presented to the jury was plaintiff's Count 1 as to wrongful discharge in refusing to perjure himself at a deposition and Count 5 seeking a $1,000 recovery for breach of an independent bonus contract from the defendant United. The jury returned special verdicts that the plaintiff had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he had been instructed by Wilson to lie at the deposition hearing, that Wilson was acting upon authority of the defendant United, that plaintiff was discharged due to the fact that he did not lie on that deposition and awarded actual damages to the plaintiff in the amount of $50,000. The jury also found there were aggravating circumstances in either the act or the intention and awarded an additional $70,000 to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the trespass or for compensation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff. The jury also found there were attorney fees due in the amount of $20,000 and that the defendant United had breached an independent contract to the plaintiff with reference to the $1,000 bonus (Count 5).
The trial court rendered judgment against the defendants United and Bernard E. Wilson with respect to Count 1, jointly and severally, for $50,000 actual damages and $70,000 exemplary damages and attorney fees in the sum of $20,000. As to Counts 2 and 3 since the court had directed a verdict in favor of defendants, a judgment was rendered in their favor. The court also directed a verdict in favor of the defendant Wilson as to Count 4 and a judgment was entered in his favor as to the claims of libel. As to Count 5 the court followed the verdict of the jury finding in favor of the plaintiff against United in the sum of $1,000.
The defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for new trial. After a hearing the trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict that the plaintiff was not entitled as a matter of law to claim wrongful discharge when his contract was terminable at will and the court determined after considering the motion for directed verdict at the completion of the trial and in the consideration of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the defendants instructed him to lie at the deposition hearing and all reasonable deductions from the evidence offered do not support that position, thereby granting the defendants a verdict with reference to Count 1. The motion for new trial was therein denied, the judgment on Count 5 remaining as the defendants had made no motion with respect to that judgment.
In Case No. 68007 the plaintiff appeals the granting of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to Count 1 and the judgment of the trial court directing a verdict as to Counts 2 and 3 of his amended and recast complaint. In Case No. 68008 the defendants appeal the denial of their timely alternative motion for new trial. Held:
1. An employee, employed at will and not by contract, cannot bring an action against his employer for wrongful discharge from employment or wrongful interference with the employment contract when and where he is an at will employee with no definite and certain contract of employment. But another employee who does not have the absolute right to discharge that employee without consulting his superiors may be liable for the wrongful discharge of that employee. See Code § 66-101 (now OCGA § 34-7-1). Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613-614 (1, 2) 250 S.E.2d 442; Ely v. Stratoflex, Inc., 132 Ga.App. 569, 570(1) 208 S.E.2d 583; Andress v. Augusta Nursing Facilities, 156 Ga.App. 775, 275 S.E.2d 368; Straynar v. Jack W. Harris Co., 150 Ga.App. 509, 258 S.E.2d 248, and cases cited therein. Consequently, the Supreme Court in the Busbin case has created case law that in the absence of a controlling contract, such terms as " 'permanent employment,' " " 'employment for life,' " " 'employment until retirement' " amount to employment for an indefinite period terminable at will of either party and "no cause of action against the employer for...
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