Turner v. Kansas City
| Decision Date | 03 December 1945 |
| Docket Number | No. 39540.,39540. |
| Citation | 191 S.W.2d 612 |
| Parties | BEULAH TURNER, Appellant, v. KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, a Municipal Corporation, JOHN B. GAGE, Mayor of said City, LOWELL R. JOHNSON, W.O. BIXBY, E.M. DOBBS, FREDERICK H. OLANDER, Police Commissioners of said City, RICHARD R. FOSTER, Chief of Police of said City, D.L. DENNISON, Police Lieutenant of said City. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. — Hon. Emory H. Wright, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
N.R. Fischer and E.H. Gamble for appellant.
(1) If, as we contend, the challenge contained in our petition against the provisions of Ordinance No. 10-14 against fortune telling and predicting or attempting to reveal future events shows them to be unconstitutional and void, the trial court had full jurisdiction to enjoin their enforcement. Sec. 1683, R.S. 1939; Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 135 Mo. 323, 32 S.W. 649; Jewel Tea Co. v. Carthage, 257 Mo. 383, 165 S.W. 743; Hayes v. Poplar Bluff, 173 S.W. 676; Glencoe Lime, etc., Co. v. St. Louis, 108 S.W. (2d) 143. (2) Cities are creatures of the state. They have no powers which are not derived from and subordinate to the state. All such powers must come from either a constitutional or legislative grant. 19 R.C.L. 479, sec. 54; St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623, 10 S.W. 197; City of Nevada v. Eddy, 123 Mo. 456, 27 S.W. 471; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 147 S.W. 998; Hays v. Poplar Bluff, 263 Mo. 516, 173 S.W. 676; State ex rel. City of Blue Springs v. McWilliams, 74 S.W. (2d) 363; Kansas City v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 87 S.W. (2d) 195. (3) The powers of Missouri municipalities are of two kinds, corporate and governmental. The corporate powers of a special charter city, such as Kansas City, are conferred by a constitutional grant, Art. IX, Sec. 16. All its governmental powers come from legislative grants through statutes. Mo. Const., Art. IX, Sec. 16; State ex rel. Garner v. Telephone Co., 88 S.W. 49; Healy v. Kansas City, 211 S.W. 59; Kansas City v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 87 S.W. (2d) 195; Kansas City v. Frogge, 175 S.W. (2d) 498. (4) Ordinance No. 10-14, being a police measure, is an assertion of police power, which is not a corporate power, but entirely governmental; and in the absence of any statute delegating to the city power to suppress fortune telling or attempts to predict the future, the provisions of said ordinance with respect thereto are void. Healy v. Kansas City, 211 S.W. 59; State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 2 S.W. (2d) 713; Kansas City v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 87 S.W. (2d) 195; Kansas City v. Frogge, 176 S.W. (2d) 498. (5) As Ordinance No. 10-14 does not purport to assert any corporate power of Kansas City, but only a police power, which is purely governmental, it follows that no provision of the city charter can operate as the equivalent of a statute delegating to the city the powers which the ordinance purports to assert. State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason, 54 S.W. 524; State ex rel. Garner v. Telephone Co., 88 S.W. 41; State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 2 S.W. (2d) 713; Kansas City v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 87 S.W. (2d) 195; Kansas City v. Frogge, 176 S.W. (2d) 498. (6) The police powers of special charter cities for suppressing nuisances and denouncing acts as unlawful are R.S. 1939, Secs. 7358 and 7644, and they stop short of delegating power to enact or enforce the challenged provisions of Ordinance No. 10-14 which are not common law offenses and are not within the scope of either of said statutes. 23 Am. Jur., p. 711. (7) As to Section 7358; 46 C.J. 645; St. Louis v. King, 126 S.W. 495; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 147 S.W. 998. (8) As to Section 7644; 23 Am. Jur., p. 711; Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 133 So. 13; City of Chicago v. Ross, 100 N.E. 159; 26 West's Missouri Digest, Sec. 194; McClaren v. S.G. Robins & Co., 162 S.W. (2d) 856; Hammett v. Kansas City, 173 S.W. (2d) 70; Zinn v. City of Steeleville, 173 S.W. (2d) 398. (9) Courts will nullify ordinances for unreasonableness. State ex rel. Musser v. Birch, 85 S.W. 361; Union Cemetery v. Kansas City, 161 S.W. 261; Ex parte Davison, 13 S.W. (2d) 40; State ex rel. Kennedy v. Remmers, 101 S.W. 2d 70. (10) Instances of ordinance held unreasonable. St. Louis v. Roche, 31 S.W. 915; Ex parte Smith, 36 S.W. 628; St. Louis v. Packing Co., 42 S.W. 954; St. Louis v. Flour Mill Co., 42 S.W. 1148; City of Carthage v. Block, 123 S.W. 483; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 147 S.W. 998; City of Lancaster v. Reed, 207 S.W. 868; Ex parte Lerner, 218 S.W. 331; State ex rel. Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey, 256 S.W. 474; State ex rel. Better Home Co. v. McKelvey, 256 S.W. 495; St. Louis v. Evraiff, 256 S.W. 489. (11) The ordinance is not separable. It is bound together in a series of closely connected phrases forming a single sentence. If its provisions against attempts to foretell or predict the future is invalid, so is its provision against fortune telling. City of St. Louis v. Packing Co., 42 S.W. 954; St. Louis v. Flour Mill Co., 42 S.W. 1148; State v. Bengsch, 70 S.W. 710; City of Carthage v. Block, 123 S.W. 483. (12) The court cannot assume that no unreasonable application of the ordinance will be made, when such application is unequivocally authorized by its terms. St. Louis v. Packing Co., 42 S.W. 954; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 147 S.W. 998; St. Louis v. Quarry Co., 148 S.W. 948; Lux v. Milwaukee, etc., Co., 15 S.W. (2d) 343. (13) Plaintiff is entitled to question the validity both of the provision of the ordinance against fortune telling and its provision against attempts to reveal or predict the future, as she is adversely affected as much by the one as by the other. 12 C.J. 764; 16 C.J.S. 165; St. Louis v. Packing Co., 42 S.W. 954; St. Louis v. Flour Mill Co., 42 S.W. 1148; State v. Bengsch, 70 S.W. 710; City of Carthage v. Block, 123 S.W. 483. (14) The enactment of Ordinance No. 10-14 was not subject to any state law, hence it violates Mo. Const., Art. IX, Sec. 16, if that section of the constitution is applicable as well to corporate powers as to governmental powers. Mo. Const., Art. IX, Sec. 16; Kansas City v. Threshing Machine Co., 87 S.W. (2d) 195; Kansas City v. Frogge, 176 S.W. (2d) 498. (15) The ordinance would deprive plaintiff of the gains of her own industry and the right of free speech and thought and of the equal protection of law and of property without due process of law, in violation of Mo. Const., Art. II, Secs. 4, 14 and 30, and is therefore void. St. Louis v. Evraiff, 256 S.W. 489; Ex parte Beckenstein, 104 S.W. (2d) 404; Glencoe Lime, etc., Co. v. St. Louis, 108 S.W. (2d) 143. (16) Any doubt as to the validity of the challenged provisions of Ordinance No. 10-14 should be resolved in favor of plaintiff and against the City. Siemens v. Shreeve, 296 S.W. 415; Taylor v. Dimmitt, 78 S.W. (2d) 841.
Wm. E. Kemp, City Counselor, John J. Cosgrove, Arthur R. Wolfe, Assistant City Counselors, and Franklin D. Glore for respondents.
(1) Kansas City, by its charter, has the power to suppress fortunetelling. Sec. 16-17, Art. IX, Mo. Constitution; Par. 44, Sec. 1, Art. I, Charter of Kansas City; Pars. 29, 61 and 63, Sec. 1, Art. I, Charter of Kansas City; Sec. 7589, R.S. 1939; Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 321 Mo. 969, 13 S.W. (2d) 628; Siemens v. Shreeve, 296 S.W. 415, 317 Mo. 736; Ex parte Williams, 139 S.W. (2d) 485, 354 Mo. 1111; Ex parte Taft, 225 S.W. 457, 284 Mo. 531; J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Kansas City, 87 S.W. (2d) 201, 337 Mo. 913. (2) Sec. 7644, R.S. 1939, is in itself sufficient to confer power on Kansas City to suppress fortune-tellers, even though such power had not been given in its charter. Ex parte Williams, 139 S.W. (2d) 485, 354 Mo. 1111. (3) The ordinance is a reasonable exercise of the City's police power. Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 321 Mo. 969, 13 S.W. (2d) 628; Ex parte Williams, 139 S.W. (2d) 485, 354 Mo. 1111; In re Kansas City Ordinance No. 39946, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404; St. Louis v. Hellscher, 295 Mo. 293, 242 S.W. 652; Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 133 So. 13; Davis v. State, 160 N.E. 473; McMasters v. State, 207 Pac. 566, 29 A.L.R. 292; Annotation in 14 A.L.R., p. 1489; Annotations in 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 203; 17 Words and Phrases, p. 438. (4) The ordinance is constitutional: It does not exercise powers exclusively reserved to the state. It does not deprive plaintiff of the right of free speech or of her right to enjoy the gains of her own industry. Bellerive Investment Co. v. Kansas City, 321 Mo. 969, 13 S.W. (2d) 628; McMasters v. State, 207 Pac. 566, 29 A.L.R. 292; St. Louis v. Ameln, 139 S.W. 429, 235 Mo. 669; State v. Kinsey, 282 S.W. 437; Davis v. State, 160 N.E. 473; J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Kansas City, 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W. (2d) 201; Siemens v. Shreeve, 296 S.W. 415, supra; Ex parte Williams, supra.
The issue for determination is whether an ordinance of the City of Kansas City suppressing and punishing fortune telling as an offense is constitutional and valid. We answer in the affirmative.
Beulah Turner owns and operates a cafe in Kansas City and in connection therewith conducts a business "commonly known as fortune telling" for pay. She instituted this suit to enjoin said City and certain individuals, officers of said City charged with the enforcement of its ordinances, from enforcing the provisions of Ordinance No. 10-14 (*) prohibiting fortune telling for pay. Her bill was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. She thereupon perfected this appeal.
Many issues are presented as bearing on the ultimate conclusion. Some may be eliminated. With commendable frankness counsel for plaintiff stated that if the provisions in the City Charter of Kansas City were valid, then "we are out." The primarily contested issue is the validity of the charter provision.
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