Twain Harte Homeowners Assn. v. County of Tuolumne

• Decision Date: 27 December 1982
• Citation: 138 Cal.App.3d 664,188 Cal.Rptr. 233
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: TWAIN HARTE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 6664.

Page 233

188 Cal.Rptr. 233

138 Cal.App.3d 664

TWAIN HARTE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 6664.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Dec. 27, 1982.

[138 Cal.App.3d 670] Alexander Henson, Carmel, for petitioner and appellant.

Stephen Dietrich, County Counsel, Sonora, for defendants and respondents.

OPINION

MORONY ^*, Associate Justice.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal arises out of challenges to the sufficiency of the Tuolumne County General Plan and to the adequacy of the environmental impact report prepared in connection with adoption of the general plan. "The Planning and Zoning Law (Govt.Code, tit. 7, div. 1, commencing with § 65000) require[s] ... that the board of supervisors of each county adopt a general plan for the 'physical development' of the county, pursuant to section 65300; that the plan be prepared and adopted according to standards established in section 65300.5 and 65301; and that it include each of nine 'elements' enumerated and described in section 65302." (Camp v. Board of Supervisors (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 334, 340, fn. omitted, 176 Cal.Rptr. 620.) ¹

The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) mandates that prior to adoption of a general plan the county must prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) "to provide public agencies and the public in general with detailed information about the effect which a proposed project is likely to have on the environment; to list ways in which the significant effects of such a project might be minimized; and to indicate alternatives to such a project." (Public Resources Code, § 21061.)

On August 18, 1980, the Tuolumne County Board of Supervisors held a hearing at which time they certified the completion of the EIR (also referred to as the "MEIR") for the new county general plan. Also on August 18, 1980, the board approved several changes to the wording of the draft general plan and its action was referred back to the planning commission for recommendation. Thereafter, on August 26, 1980, James Nuzum, Tuolumne County planning director, informed the board that the proposals approved by the board for changes in wording of the draft general plan were consistent with the existing environmental impact report which had been certified and approved by the board on August 18. On that date the board adopted the present Tuolumne County General Plan.

On October 1, 1980, appellant Twain Harte Homeowners Association, Inc. filed the instant action in the Tuolumne County Superior Court, seeking a writ of mandate compelling respondent Tuolumne County (hereinafter "County") to rescind its certification of the EIR and to prepare a new EIR in compliance with CEQA. Appellant also sought injunctive relief pending preparation of a new EIR and preventing respondent from approving under the new general plan any projects having a significant impact on the environment. An amended petition was filed on December 30, 1980, amending the allegations concerning the EIR and adding a second cause of action seeking to compel County to set aside the general plan and to prepare and adopt a new one in compliance with Government Code section 65302, and further, seeking to recover attorney fees.

On December 30, 1980, an alternative writ of mandate was issued by the superior court. On March 10, 1981, the hearing on the return of the alternative writ was held, together with the motion for a preliminary injunction.

Following trial and posttrial briefing the trial court on July 30, 1981, entered judgment issuing the writ of mandate commanding the County to reconsider including timberland class 3 on the Arvantis scale in the general plan. The court also retained jurisdiction to consider County's action taken in light of the writ. The remainder of the writ was denied and the alternative writ was discharged.

Twain Harte Homeowners Association, Inc. appeals from the denial of the remainder of the writ.

APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS

Appellant contends:

1. That the EIR is legally inadequate as it was not prepared and certified pursuant to the mandate of CEQA in that (a) it does not disclose the criteria for determining water and sewer availability, (b) County's responses to comments about the draft EIR were inadequate, (c) mitigation measures described in the EIR were not included in the general plan, and (d) alleged environmental impacts of changes made in the draft general plan, after the EIR was certified, were not analyzed prior to the adoption of the general plan.

2. That the general plan is legally inadequate in that its land use, circulation, and housing elements do not substantially comply with the requirements of Government Code section 65302.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The EIR.

This court in Cleary v. County of Stanislaus (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 348, 352-353, 173 Cal.Rptr. 390 discussed the standard of review applicable when reviewing the sufficiency of environmental impact reports as follows:

"The standard for review of the county's action, is whether it prejudicially abused its discretion. Such abuse is established if the County has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the agency's determination is not supported by substantial evidence. ( [Pub. Resources Code,] § 21168.5; People v. County of Kern (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 830, 840 ...; see No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 74 [118 Cal.Rptr. 34, 529 P.2d 66] ....)"

As the court stated in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water Dist. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 695, 705, 104 Cal.Rptr. 197: "The court does not have the duty of passing on the validity of the conclusions expressed in the EIR, but only on the sufficiency of the report as an informative document...." This was further amplified in Karlson v. City of Camarillo (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 789, 804-805, 161 Cal.Rptr. 260 as follows:

"In reviewing an EIR a paramount consideration is the right of the public to be informed in such a way that it can intelligently weigh the environmental consequences of any contemplated action and have an appropriate voice in the formulation of any decision. But the following principles must also be considered. The EIR is not an action document. Its purpose is to inform governmental decision makers and to focus the political process upon their action affecting the environment. ( City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. City Council, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 869, 890 ...) ... The degree of specificity in an EIR will correspond to the degree of specificity involved in the underlying activity which is described in the EIR. ( [Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 14,] § 15147.) 'An EIR should be prepared with a sufficient degree of analysis to provide decision makers with information which enables them to make a decision which intelligently takes account of environmental consequences. An evaluation ... need not be exhaustive.... Disagreement among experts does not make an EIR inadequate. The courts have looked not for perfection but for adequacy, completeness, and a good faith effort at full disclosure.' ( [Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 14,] § 15150.) Even where specific guidelines have been urged upon the courts as requiring a narrow and restricted approach by the governmental agency, the courts have followed the general tenor of the guidelines, indicating that they are subject to a construction of reasonableness and the court will not seek to impose unreasonable extremes or to inject itself within the area of discretion as to the choice of action to be taken. (Residents Ad Hoc Stadium Com. v. Board of Trustees [1979] 89 Cal.App.3d 286, 287 ....)" (Emphasis added.)

The General Plan.

Government Code section 65301.5 provides that, "The adoption of the general plan or any part or element thereof or the adoption of any amendment to such plan or any part or element thereof is a legislative act which shall be reviewable pursuant to Section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure." (Added by Stats.1980, c. 837, p. 2617, § 2.)

As stated in Karlson v. City of Camarillo, supra, 100 Cal.App.3d 789, 798, 161 Cal.Rptr. 260:

"Actions taken by an administrative agency in its legislative capacity are reviewable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, the traditional writ of mandate. Judicial review is limited to an examination of the proceedings before the agency to determine whether its action has been arbitrary or capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether it has failed to follow the procedure and give the notices required by law. (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. [1974] 11 Cal.3d 28, 34, fn. 2 [112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29].)"

Consequently, under CEQA, judicial review of a general plan adopted by a board of supervisors is governed by Public Resources Code section 21168.5 which provides that:

"In any action or proceeding, other than an action or proceeding under section 21168, to attack, review, set aside, void or annul a determination, finding, or decision of a public agency on the grounds of noncompliance with this division, the inquiry shall extend only to whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence."

Our inquiry will thus extend to whether the general plan "substantially complies" with the requirements of the Government Code. (Camp v. Board of Supervisors (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 334, 348, 176 Cal.Rptr. 620.)

" 'Substantial compliance, as the phrase is used in the decisions, means actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute,' as distinguished from 'mere technical imperfections of form.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.)

Since such determination is a matter of law, this court need not give deference to the trial court's findings. (Id. at p. 362, 176 Cal.Rptr. 620.)

It is clear that in...