U.S. v. Taylor
Decision Date | 31 July 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 01-2874.,No. 01-3872.,01-2874.,01-3872. |
Citation | 338 F.3d 947 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Francis TAYLOR, Defendant, Mary E. Taylor, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Peter D. Gray, argued, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
Marion E.M. Erickson, Washington, DC (Eileen J. O'Connor, Teresa E. McLaughlin, on the brief), for appellee.
Before LOKEN, BYE, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.
This case arises out of an April 1996 Northwest Airlines (Northwest) interpleader of the United States and Mary Taylor (Mary) to determine whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or Mary has priority and is entitled to the benefits of three Northwest sponsored employee benefits plans. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled generally for the IRS and against Mary, finding Mary's right to the plans under a Texas domestic relations order (DRO) was subject to a prior federal tax lien. We disagree and reverse.
As is often the case, the sequence of events is critical. Francis Taylor (Francis) worked as a pilot for Northwest from 1966 to 1994. During his employment, Francis participated in a retirement plan, a stock plan, and a savings plan administered by Northwest under ERISA.1 Francis retired from Northwest in September 1994, at which time he filed in a Texas state court for divorce from Mary, his wife of more than thirty years. The following month, in October 1994, a tax court concluded that Francis had not filed tax returns from 1981 through 1985. On May 1, 1995, the IRS assessed deficiencies totaling approximately $984,310 (including penalties and interest) for those tax years. On July 28, 1995, the Texas court entered a divorce decree and approved a marital settlement agreement. The agreement provided that "to settle all obligations of the marriage," Mary would receive a 90 percent interest in Francis's Northwest employee benefits proceeds (plan proceeds). Also in July, the court entered a purported qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), directing the plan administrator to distribute Mary's interest in the plan proceeds directly to her. The Texas court, in the July order, retained jurisdiction to amend or reform the order as necessary to conform with plan requirements and qualify as a QDRO.
In October 1995, Northwest informed Mary and Francis that the July DRO did not qualify as a QDRO. In December 1995, the IRS filed a lien against the plan proceeds in Texas, where Francis claimed he resided at the time of the divorce, and where the DRO issued. In October 1996, the IRS filed another lien in Minnesota, where the plans were administered. Meanwhile, Mary and Francis attempted to correct the DRO's identified deficiencies. Among other things, the order: (1) did not specify the period to which it applied; (2) did not address how to treat amounts accrued, but had not yet been credited to the account; and (3) would have required Northwest to make an extra payment. Twice the Texas court, at Mary's request, reformed the DRO to address Northwest's concerns. Northwest finally pronounced the DRO a QDRO in January 1997.
The district court dismissed Northwest from the interpleader action, and the IRS and Mary were left to determine who was entitled to the plan proceeds. The IRS claimed its interest in the plan proceeds was first in time, while Mary argued her interest had priority because she was both a "judgment lien creditor" and a "purchaser" under 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a),2 a statute that in certain situations requires the IRS to file notice of its lien to obtain priority.
The district court concluded Mary was neither a purchaser nor a judgment lien creditor under section 6323(a). Specifically, the court determined Mary was not a purchaser because her consideration was not "adequate and full," as defined in 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h)-1(f)(3) (2001) ( ). Further, the district court found Mary was not a judgment lien creditor because there was no evidence she had perfected her lien by executing the judgment as required under Texas law. Because Mary was not entitled to the protections of section 6323, the district court held the IRS tax liens assessed on May 1, 1995, became effective against Mary as of that date and were first in time and entitled to priority.
On appeal, Mary argues: (1) the Texas divorce court had exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute; thus, there was no federal question and the interpleader action was not proper; (2) under Texas community property law, Mary had substantial property rights in the plan proceeds even before the divorce; (3) she was a purchaser under section 6323(a); and (4) she was a judgment lien creditor under section 6323(a).
This court reviews de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Mayberry v. United States, 151 F.3d 855, 858 (8th Cir.1998). Initially, we reject Mary's first two arguments: (1) federal jurisdiction does exist, see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) ( ); and (2) Texas community property law does not vest her with an interest in the plan proceeds. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) ( ); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 850, 117 S.Ct. 1754, 138 L.Ed.2d 45 (1997) ( ).
We turn next to whether Mary became a judgment lien creditor under section 6323(a) within sufficient time to have priority over the IRS.3 An IRS lien attaches automatically on the date a penalty is assessed, 26 U.S.C. § 6322 ( ), and is enforceable as of that date against creditors except any "purchaser," "holder of security interest," "mechanic's lienor," or "judgment lien creditor," within the meaning of section 6323(a). If the creditor falls into one of these categories, then the IRS must provide adequate notice to establish the priority of its lien. See 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a); Rodeck v. United States, 697 F.Supp. 1508, 1511 (D.Minn.1988) ( ).
A Treasury Regulation defines "judgment lien creditor" as follows:
... a person who has obtained a valid judgment, in a court of record and of competent jurisdiction, for the recovery of specifically designated property or for a certain sum of money. In the case of a judgment for the recovery of a certain sum of money, a judgment lien creditor is a person who has perfected a lien under the judgment on the property involved. A judgment lien is not perfected until the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established. Accordingly, a judgment lien does not include an attachment or garnishment lien until the lien has ripened into judgment, even though under local law the lien of the judgment relates back to an earlier date.
. . .
If under local law levy or seizure is necessary before a judgment lien becomes effective against third parties acquiring liens on personal property, then a judgment lien under such local law is not perfected until levy or seizure of the personal property involved.
A state law created lien's priority depends on when it attaches and becomes choate, and federal law will determine when the lien has acquired sufficient substance and becomes so perfected as to defeat a later federal tax lien. United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 88, 83 S.Ct. 1651, 10 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). Liens are perfected, under the federal rule, when there is nothing more to be done to have a choate lien, that is, "when the identity of the lienowner, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established." Id. at 89, 83 S.Ct. 1651 (citations omitted). Here, Mary obtained a valid judgment from a Texas divorce court for 90 percent of Francis's plan proceeds creating an exclusive property interest in the plan proceeds for Mary. On the date the Texas court granted the DRO, Mary's identity was clear, the subject property was identified, and the amount (90 percent) was fixed.
Mary was not required to comply with any state law requirements for purposes of establishing lien priority over the IRS's interest in the plan proceeds. ERISA provides a mechanism for enforcing QDROs, and this mechanism supersedes any contrary state law. See U.S. Constitution art. VI, cl. 2, Heart of Am. Grain Inspection Serv., Inc. v. Mo. Dep't of Agric., 123 F.3d 1098, 1103 (8th Cir.1997) ( ); cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council. Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ( ). Specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) provides for alienation of pension plan benefits in accordance with a QDRO, and gives plan administrators or courts eighteen months to determine whether a DRO qualifies as a QDRO, directing the plan administrator to segregate the amounts in question during that period. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H).4
In this case, Northwest determined, within eighteen months of the date the first payment would have been made under the DRO, that the DRO, as modified, was a QDRO. Thus, Mary satisfied ERISA's requirements for alienating pension plan proceeds. Requiring Mary to satisfy state law perfection requirements would conflict with ERISA's policy of ensuring that plan sponsors are subject to a uniform body of law. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148, 121 S.Ct. 1322, 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
United States v. Frank
...ERISA's. See Hosking , 567 F.3d at 335 (collecting cases from Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Taylor , 338 F.3d 947, 950 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) ; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(2) (stating tax levies can be enforced against qualified retirement plans). And wh......
-
U.S. v. Novak
...broad substantive coverage of the tax levy provision also accords with that adopted by other federal courts. See United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 947, 950 n. 3 (8th Cir.2003) ("The IRS has authority to proceed against [pensioner's] interest in any ERISA plan benefits and is not constrained......
-
United States v. Beulke
...interests in pension plans consistent with ERISA”). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 947 (8th Cir.2003), rejected the argument that state property law vests a non-divorced spouse with an interest in an ERISA-qualified plan. Id. a......
-
Drexler v. Bruce
...See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 846-48. State laws may not conflict with ERISA provisions governing such QDROs, however. See United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 947, 951 (8th Cir. 2003) (“ERISA provides a mechanism for enforcing QDROs, and this mechanism supersedes any contrary state law.”). ¶ 16Under......
-
Table of Cases
...Distrib. Co. v. Haines, 31 Wn. App. 360, 641 P.2d 1204 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.04[1][a] Taylor; United States v., 338 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.11[8] Teela H., In re Interest of, 4 Neb. App. 608, 547 N.W.2d 512 (1996) . . . .......
-
§35.11 Tax Treatment of Distribution to Alternate Payee and Participant (As It Relates to Qdros)
...the IRS lien has priority over the claim of such party. I.R.C. § 6323. This issue can arise with a QDRO. In United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2003), a federal government tax lien on the participant's retirement benefits did not take priority over an interest in such benefits g......