Union Free School Dist. No. 2 of Town of Cheektowaga v. Nyquist
| Decision Date | 25 November 1975 |
| Parties | , 341 N.E.2d 532, 80 Lab.Cas. P 54,069 In the Matter of UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2 OF the TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA et al., Appellants, v. Ewald B. NYQUIST, as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Stephen H. Kelly and David E. Hall, Buffalo, for appellants.
J. Michael Eadry and Robert D. Stone, Albany, for Edwald B. Nyquist, respondent.
James R. Sandner and Bernard F. Ashe, Albany, for Richard Bieber and others, respondents.
We uphold the determination of the Commissioner of Education that transfer credits granted teachers prior to the repeal of subdivision 6 of section 3102 of the Education Law must be honored for all salary purposes, including longevity increments, and that such credits may not be revoked by the School District. Additionally we hold that provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the School District and the teachers association may not supersede the imperative provisions of former subdivision 6.
At the commencement of their employment by appellant Maryvale School District prior to May 1, 1967, respondent teachers were each granted transfer credits for services performed outside the Maryvale District. The district included such credits in the computation of the teachers' base salary for the two academic years 1968--1969 and 1969--1970, but refused to take such credits into account in the computation of longevity increments on the ground that under the 1968 amendment to the collective bargaining agreement longevity increments were to be based only on years of service actually performed in the district.
The teachers, claiming that they were entitled to the benefits of the transfer credits in computation of longevity increments pursuant to the terms of their amended collective bargaining agreement, took the issue through grievance procedures to arbitration. In an advisory award the arbitrator upheld the position of the School District, without prejudice, however, to the right of the teachers association to pursue the matter further through an appeal to the State Commissioner of Education.
The teachers then appealed to the Commissioner of Education who held that transfer credits must be considered in determining longevity increases and directed the School District to pay the longevity increments for the school years 1968--1969 and 1969--1970 and thereafter in future years. The commissioner's determination was predicated on the last proviso clause of subdivision 6 of section 3102 of the Education Law: 'The school authorities may grant transfer credit to a teacher in their discretion, provided, however, that such authorities shall not thereafter have the power to revoke any such grant heretofore or hereafter made to a teacher, and provided, further, that any year of transfer credit so granted shall be counted as a year of service in the district.'
The School District then instituted the present article 78 proceeding to review the commissioner's determination. Special Term in an initial decision upheld the commissioner in all respects. When that court's attention was invited to the repeal of subdivision 6 of section 3102 by chapter 123 of the Laws of 1971, reargument was permitted and the court's decision was modified to uphold the commissioner's determination with respect to the years 1968--1969 and 1969--1970 but to reverse his determination as to years following the repeal of subdivision 6.
On cross appeals the Appellate Division, in effect, modified the revised decision at Special Term, affirming the commissioner's ruling with respect to the prerepeal school years, reversing Special Term by holding that transfer credits granted prior to repeal must continue to be counted for longevity purposes as to postrepeal school years, and remanding to the commissioner the question whether transfer credits granted (subject to revocation) after repeal should be counted in computing longevity increments.
On remand the Commissioner of Education determined only that transfer credits granted prior to the date of repeal should continue to be counted for all salary purposes, including longevity increments, in years after repeal. No ruling was made by the commissioner with respect to the treatment to be accorded transfer credits granted after the repeal date.
On appeal by the School District from the final determination of the Commissioner of Education pursuant to CPLR 5601 (subd. (d)), we now affirm. In so doing we note that our review is limited to the nonfinal determination at the Appellate Division (CPLR 5501, subd. (b)). Thus the only issues presented for our scrutiny concern the effect to be accorded transfer credits granted prior to April 12, 1971, the effective date of the repeal of subdivision 6 of section 3102. No question is before us with respect to revocable transfer credits which may be granted by the School District after that date.
The disposition of this appeal turns on the resolution of three interrelated issues. First, we agree with the courts below that there is no basis here for disturbing the determination of the Commission of Education that subdivision 6 of section 3102 of the Education Law during the period in which it was effective mandated the recognition of transfer credits by the Maryvale School District in salary computations for all purposes, including longevity increments. The interpretation placed on a statute by the agency charged with its administration if not irrational or unreasonable will be upheld (Matter of Howard v. Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434, 322 N.Y.S.2d 683, 271 N.E.2d 528). It cannot accurately be said that there is anything of the irrational or unreasonable in the interpretation placed by the commissioner on subdivision 6 of section 3102. Even more significant, under section 310 of the Education Law, determinations made by the commissioner are 'subject...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
James v. Board of Ed. of City of New York
...set aside the commissioner's decisions if arbitrary or illegal. (See, e. g., Matter of Union Free School Dist. No. 2 of Town of Cheektowaga v. Nyquist, 38 N.Y.2d 137, 142, 379 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13, 341 N.E.2d 532, 534; Matter of Baer v. Nyquist, 34 N.Y.2d 291, 298, 357 N.Y.S.2d 442, 447, 313 N.E......
-
Professional, Clerical, Technical Employees Ass'n (Buffalo Bd. of Educ.), Matter of
...under the Taylor Law * * * and of consequent arbitration under a broad arbitration clause" (Matter of Union Free School Dist. No. 2 v. Nyquist, 38 N.Y.2d 137, 143, 379 N.Y.S.2d 10, 341 N.E.2d 532). Despite this broad mandate to collectively negotiate and arbitrate labor disputes, we have re......
-
City of Salamanca v. City of Salamanca Police Unit of Cattaraugus County, Local No. 805, CSEA/AFSCME
...(Nomberg) 46 N.Y.2d 623, at 630 and 631, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 389 N.E.2d 456; Matter of Union Free School District No. 2 of Town of Cheektowaga v. Nyquist, 38 N.Y.2d 137 at 143, 379 N.Y.S.2d 10, 341 N.E.2d 532; Matter of Ford v. CSEA, 94 A.D.2d 262, 464 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1st Dept.1983) wherein an ......
-
County of Chautauqua v. Civil Serv.
...v. MacDonald, 87 N.Y.2d 650, 656, 642 N.Y.S.2d 156, 664 N.E.2d 1218 [1996]; Matter of Union Free School Dist. No. 2 of Town of Cheektowaga v. Nyquist, 38 N.Y.2d 137, 143, 379 N.Y.S.2d 10, 341 N.E.2d 532 [1975]). The threshold determination of whether a dispute is arbitrable is well settled.......
-
The misperception and ensuing error concerning the presumption of arbitrability in New York public employment.
...in the collective bargaining agreement was against public policy and therefore unenforceable); Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Nyquist, 341 N.E.2d 532, 535 (N.Y. 1975) (stating that the scope of permitted arbitration is limited by statutory prohibitions and "demonstrable public policy"); New......