United States v. Sampson
| Decision Date | 28 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Cr. No. 01-10384-MLW |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. GARY LEE SAMPSON |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
WOLF, D.J.
A. Law of the Case Doctrine .................................. 6
B. The Role of the District Court in Eighth Amendment Litigation ................................................ 9
C. Evidentiary Hearings ..................................... 11
A. Legal Standard ........................................... 13
B. Unguided Discretion ...................................... 16
C. Proportionality Review ................................... 16
D. Manner of Execution ...................................... 17
A. Facial Challenge to the Death Penalty .................... 18
B. Execution of the Mentally Ill ............................ 32
C. Geography-Based Challenge ................................ 36
A. Legal Standard ........................................... 39
B. Racial Disparity ......................................... 41
C. Rate of Error ............................................ 46
D. General Arbitrariness .................................... 56
VII. JUROR CONFUSION AND IMPAIRMENT IN CAPITAL PROCEEDINGS .... 59
A. Legal Standard ........................................... 59
B. Analysis ................................................. 61
VIII. THE GOVERNMENT'S PURSUIT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN MASSACHUSETTS AND IN THIS CASE SPECIFICALLY ............. 66
A. Government's Decisionmaking Process ...................... 67
B. Government's Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in Massachusetts ............................................ 70
IX. APPRENDI CHALLENGES ...................................... 74
A. Legal Standard ........................................... 75
B. Standard of Proof ........................................ 76
C. Grand Jury Presentment ................................... 78
X. DELAY MOTION ............................................. 80
XI. CATCH-ALL CONSTITUTIONAL MOTION .......................... 84
XII. MOTIONS TO PRESERVE THE RIGHT TO FILE FUTURE MOTIONS ..... 84
XIII. ORDER ................................................... 85
For the reasons explained in the December 2, 2015 Memorandum and Order Regarding Amendment of October 28, 2015 Decision (Docket No. 2113), this Amended Memorandum and Order replaces the original. The amended language replaces the discussion of jury verdicts in the analysis of Evolving Standards of Decency in §V, and adds footnote 28 concerning Delay in §X.
* * * *
In August 2014, defendant Gary Sampson filed twenty-six motions raising constitutional challenges to his capital sentencing retrial under the Federal Death Penalty Act (the "FDPA").1 After receiving written responses from the government,and allowing the defendant the opportunity to submit reply briefs, the court held hearings on these motions on December 3, 4, 5, 17, and 18, 2014. For the reasons explained below, each of Sampson's constitutional motions is being denied.2
On July 24, 2001, Phillip McCloskey, a 69-year old retiree, picked up Sampson, who was hitchhiking. Sampson murdered Mr. McCloskey with a knife and attempted to steal his automobile.
On July 27, 2001, Sampson was hitchhiking again. He was picked up by Jonathan Rizzo, a college student. Sampson murdered Mr. Rizzo by tying him to a tree and stabbing him to death. Sampson then stole Mr. Rizzo's automobile.
On July 30, 2001, Sampson encountered Robert Whitney in New Hampshire. Sampson tied Mr. Whitney to a chair and strangled him to death. Sampson then stole Whitney's automobile.
Sampson was arrested in Vermont. On August 1, 2001, he was returned to Massachusetts. Later that month, he was charged by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the murders of Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Rizzo. On October 24, 2001, Sampson was also indicted in federal court for carjacking resulting in the deaths of Mr.McCloskey and Mr. Rizzo, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2119. The Massachusetts charges against Sampson were dismissed in deference to that federal prosecution. On November 19, 2002, after receiving approval from the Attorney General, the government filed a Notice of Intent to seek the death penalty in this case.
In 2003, Sampson filed pretrial motions challenging the constitutionality of various provisions of the FDPA. In United States v. Sampson, 245 F. Supp. 2d 327 (D. Mass. 2003) and United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. Mass. 2003) ("Sampson I"), the court rejected those challenges.
On September 9, 2003, Sampson pled guilty to both charges. The court subsequently impaneled a jury to determine the penalty. See 18 U.S.C. §3593(b)(2)(A). On December 23, 2003, the jury returned its verdicts requiring that the death penalty be imposed on both counts. See 18 U.S.C. §3593(e). The court denied Sampson's motion for a new sentencing trial. See United States v. Sampson, 332 F. Supp. 2d 325 (D. Mass. 2004) ("Sampson II"). On January 29, 2004, the court sentenced Sampson to be executed. See United States v. Sampson, 300 F. Supp. 2d 275, 276 (D. Mass. 2004); 18 U.S.C. §3594.
Sampson appealed his death sentences. On August 26, 2004, the court issued a Memorandum and Order memorializing and explaining some of the oral decisions it made during the pretrial proceedings and the trial. See United States v. Sampson, 335 F.Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004) ("Sampson III"). In 2007, the First Circuit affirmed the sentences. See United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Sampson IV"). The United States Supreme Court denied Sampson's petition for a writ of certiorari. See Sampson v. United States, 553 U.S. 1035 (2008).
In 2009, Sampson sought relief from his death sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255. In 2010, the court allowed Sampson to file an amended §2255 petition. After several hearings and substantial briefing, the court concluded that it was compelled to vacate Sampson's death sentence because of misconduct by a juror. See United States v. Sampson, 820 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D. Mass. 2011). Over Sampson's objection, the court subsequently exercised its discretion to authorize an immediate appeal of that decision to the First Circuit. See United States v. Sampson, 58 F. Supp. 3d 136 (D. Mass. 2012). On July 23, 2013, the First Circuit agreed that Sampson's "death sentence must be vacated and a new penalty-phase hearing undertaken." United States v. Sampson, 724 F.3d 150, 170 (1st Cir. 2013). Therefore, it dismissed the government's appeal. Id.
On November 15, 2013, mandate issued and the case was returned to this court. The court provided the parties opportunities to address scheduling issues in written submissions and at hearings. On June 6, 2014, the court established a deadline of August 1, 2014, for Sampson to file dispositive motions challenging theconstitutionality of the FDPA or the lawfulness of this prosecution. The court extended that deadline to August 4 or 7, 2014, for certain motions.
In August 2014, Sampson filed twenty-six motions raising constitutional issues. After receiving written responses from the government and permitting the defendant to submit reply briefs, the court held hearings on these motions in December 2014.3
A. Law of the Case Doctrine
Sampson makes several constitutional challenges that he presented in 2003. This court and the First Circuit denied each of those challenges. The government argues that the re-litigation of these challenges is barred by the law of the case doctrine. As the court has previously explained in this case, because of the equitable nature of habeas corpus relief, the First Circuit has emphasized "'the broad leeway traditionally afforded district courts in the exercise of their §2255 authority.'" United States v. Sampson, 82 F. Supp. 3d 502, 512 (D. Mass. 2014) (quoting United States v. Torres-Otero, 232 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2000)). Thecourt concludes that it is inappropriate to exercise its equitable authority to apply a stringent rule of law of the case to limit the issues that Sampson is now allowed to raise.
The law of the case doctrine provides that:
[A] legal decision made at one stage of a civil or criminal case, unchallenged in a subsequent appeal despite the existence of ample opportunity to do so, becomes the law of the case for future stages of the same litigation, and the aggrieved party is deemed to have forfeited any right to challenge that particular decision at a subsequent date.
United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 250 (1st Cir. 1993). Generally, to reopen an issue, a party must do "one of three things: show that controlling legal authority has changed dramatically; proffer significant new evidence, not earlier obtainable in the exercise of due diligence; or convince the court that a blatant error in the prior decision will, if uncorrected, result in a serious injustice." Id. at 251.
The law of the case doctrine may not apply to an FDPA sentencing retrial ordered by the district court in a §2255 proceeding. The Eighth Circuit has held that when a defendant receives a de novo resentencing under §2255, the law of the case doctrine "does not apply to the resentencing." United States v. Parker, 762 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2014). Therefore, in the Eighth Circuit at least, if the district court grants a "plenary resentencing, . . . the district court '[is] not bound by the law of the case doctrine . . . .'" Id. (quoting Pepper v. UnitedStates, 562 U.S. 476, 508 (2011)). The Second Circuit has held that the law of the case doctrine does apply, however, if the...
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