United States v. Yates

• Decision Date: 03 September 1952
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 14291.
• Citation: 107 F. Supp. 408
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. YATES.

107 F. Supp. 408

UNITED STATES v. YATES.

Civ. No. 14291.

United States District Court S. D. California, C. D.

September 3, 1952.

Walter S. Binns, U. S. Atty., Norman Neukom, Asst. U. S. Atty., Ray H. Kinnison, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., Lawrence K. Bailey, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

Ben Margolis, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.

MATHES, District Judge.

While on trial under an indictment charging conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371, to violate the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670, 1940, 18 U.S.C. 1946 ed. § 10; id. 1948 ed. § 2385, defendant Oleta O'Connor Yates chose to take the witness stand in her own defense. Upon cross-examination she declined to answer certain questions, and repeatedly persisted in her refusal after being instructed by the court to answer.

The criminal trial was interrupted and a hearing had. 85 Tr. 11325-11354, 11367-11477. Upon this hearing counsel for the defense conceded that the questions which the defendant as witness blatantly refused to answer were properly put to her, and that "unquestionably this is exclusively within the court's sound discretion." See United States v. Toner, 3 Cir., 1949, 173 F. 2d 140, 144; Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 52(a), 18 U.S.C.

By way of justification, to paraphrase the language of United States v. Gates, 2 Cir., 1949, 176 F.2d 78, 80, the defendant vigorously urged that the court should establish a rule of public policy to protect her from the embarrassment of disclosing the identity of certain of her associates, and to protect them from fear of economic reprisals so that activities claimed to be of a political nature might be carried on in secret.

The defendant also attempted to justify her refusal upon the claimed moral dictum that a witness should not be compelled to be an "informer" or a "stool pigeon"; that a witness should be permitted in effect to testify as the witness might choose on direct examination, and then be permitted to decline answers on cross-examination upon the ground that the information called for was gained in confidence from friends or others and to compel disclosure would be unsportsmanlike.

Being of the opinion expressed in United States v. Gates, supra, 176 F.2d at page 80, that: "Such a rule would in effect transfer from the court to the witness the management of the trial with respect to the admission and exclusion of evidence, since it would enable the witness to determine what testimony to give and what to withhold" — I ordered the defendant committed "to the custody of the * * * Marshal for imprisonment * * * until such time as she * * * purge herself of the contempts by answering the questions ordered to be answered. * * *"

The criminal trial then proceeded, with the recalcitrant witness Yates continuing to testify and refusing to answer such questions as she chose not to answer. After both prosecution and defense had rested, the court — expressly declining to excuse defendant Yates as a witness in the case — submitted the issues of fact to the jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to defendant Yates and others, a motion for a new trial was presented and denied. United States v. Schneiderman, D.C.S.D.Cal.1952, 106 F.Supp. 906, judgment was pronounced, and an appeal from the judgment in the criminal case has been taken and is still pending.

Defendant Yates now moves to be released from custody under the civil contempt charge, basing her motion upon the ground that since the criminal trial is at an end there is no longer any reason why she should be coerced to answer.

Where as at bar a witness is imprisoned for civil contempt, "imprisonment * * * is not inflicted as a punishment, but is intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he had refused to do. * * * to coerce the defendant to do the thing required by the order for the benefit of the complainant. If imprisoned, as aptly said In re Nevitt, 8 Cir., 117 F. 448 451, `he carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket.' He can end the sentence and discharge himself at any moment by doing what he had previously refused to do." Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 1911, 221 U.S. 418, 442, 31 S. Ct. 492, 498, 55 L.Ed. 797.

This power to coerce performance of legal duty is equitable in character. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, 221 U.S. at page 441, 451, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797; Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 1904, 194 U.S. 324, 327-329, 24 S. Ct. 665, 48 L.Ed. 997; In re Chiles, 1874, 22 Wall. 157, 168-169, 89 U.S. 157, 168-169, 22 L.Ed. 819. It exists for an equitable purpose, and duration of the power in a given instance is co-extensive with existence of the purpose. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, 221 U. S. at page 451-452, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797; In re Debs, 1895, 158 U.S. 564, 594-596, 15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092; Ex parte Kearney, 1822, 7 Wheat. 38, 45, 20 U.S. 38, 45, 5 L.Ed. 391; United States v. Hudson, 1812, 7 Cranch 32, 34, 11 U.S. 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259. That is to say, the power to imprison, in order to coerce an answer from a recalcitrant witness, endures so long as there remains reason to exercise the power in behalf of the litigant for whose benefit it is exerted. Harris v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 7 Cir., 1952, 196 F.2d 88, 90; 3 Bl.Comm. *444-445; 4 id. *283-288.

Hence, if the litigation in the criminal case as between the United States and defendant Yates were now at an end, the pending questions would of course be moot, and the reason for or object of coercive incarceration would have ceased to exist. United States v. United Mine Workers, 1947, 330 U.S. 258, 295, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, 221 U.S. at pages 441-442, 451-452, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797; United States v. International Union, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 341, 190 F.2d 865, 873-874; Parker v. United States, 1 Cir., 1946, 153 F.2d 66, 71, 163 A.L.R. 379.

The defendant, urging that the court misapply the rule and thus shorten the time, advances the argument that termination of the trial — rather than termination of the litigation — marks an end to the value or usefulness of the testimony of a witness. In support of this contention the defendant cites cases in which the courts have declared that after discharge of a grand jury, Howard v. United States, 8 Cir., 1950, 182 F.2d 908, 914, reversed on other grounds, 1950, 340 U.S. 898, 71 S.Ct. 278, 95 L.Ed. 651; Loubriel v. United States, 2d Cir., 1926, 9 F.2d 807, 809; United States v. Collins, D.C.1906, 146 F. 553, 554, or after adjournment of a legislature, Marshall v. Gordon, 1917, 243 U.S. 521, 542, 37 S.Ct. 448, 61 L.Ed. 881, there is no power to hold a witness in civil contempt of their authority.

But the analogy of a grand jury or legislature does not apply at bar. With respect to the latter, as the Court observed in Anderson v. Dunn, 1821, 6 Wheat. 204, 231, 19 U.S. *204, *231, 5 L.Ed. 242, "although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of its adjournment. * * * It follows that imprisonment for civil contempt of that body must terminate with that adjournment."

Likewise with respect to a grand jury. As Judge Learned Hand said in Loubriel v. United States, supra, 9 F.2d at page 809: "Each investigation is separate and independent; it terminates with the grand jury which undertakes it, and the next does not take it up as unfinished business."

While one phase of the case of the United States against defendant Yates — a jury trial resulting in a verdict of guilty — is over, there still remains the pending appeal to the Court of Appeals, and possibly to the Supreme Court; and since the Court of Appeals has held "it...