University of Connecticut v. Freedom of Information Com'n

Decision Date05 February 1991
Docket NumberNo. 13803,13803
Citation217 Conn. 322,585 A.2d 690
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
Parties, 65 Ed. Law Rep. 786, 18 Media L. Rep. 1780 UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION.

Paul M. Shapiro, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Carolyn K. Querijero, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant (plaintiff).

Victor R. Perpetua, Com'n Counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Mitchell W. Pearlman, Gen. Counsel, for appellee (defendant).

Before SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and BORDEN, JJ.

SHEA, Justice.

This is an administrative appeal from a decision of the freedom of information commission (FOIC) ordering the University of Connecticut (UConn) to disclose the names of students employed in its public safety division to reporters for the university student newspaper. The dispositive issue is whether General Statutes § 1-19(b)(11) 1 permits the university to withhold such information. We hold that when students' names are sought based on their student status, § 1-19(b)(11) allows the university to withhold that information.

The FOIC found the following facts, which are not in dispute. On November 5, 1987, Karen Ali, a reporter for The Daily Campus (the UConn student newspaper) wrote to the UConn police department to request a list of UConn students employed with the police department during September 1 through November 5 of 1987. The department's executive director then asked its fifty-five student employees for permission to release their names. Forty-two objected, four indicated no preference, and nine did not respond. The director offered Ali the opportunity to review only the names of the thirteen student employees who did not object to disclosing their names. Ali and The Daily Campus thereafter filed a complaint with the FOIC. The FOIC ordered the university to disclose the names, UConn appealed to the Superior Court, but the trial court dismissed the appeal. This appeal followed.

The administrative record shows that the fifty-five student employees received hourly wages in exchange for duties which included giving parking tickets, escorting other students across campus, operating security and information booths, and supplementing dormitory security. They received no academic credit for their employment. The positions they held were, however, limited to students of the university.

The Connecticut Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), General Statutes §§ 1-7 through 1-21k, lists a number of exemptions from its broad mandate of disclosure. One such exemption is § 1-19(b)(11), which provides that "[n]othing ... shall be construed to require disclosure of ... (11) names or addresses of students enrolled in any public school or college without the consent of each student whose name or address is to be disclosed who is eighteen years of age or older and a parent or guardian of each such student who is younger than eighteen years of age...." The FOIC construed the term "students" to include only those persons whose sole affiliation with an educational institution is as students or, possibly, whose affiliation includes employment directly related to a program of study. Accordingly, the FOIC concluded that because the students in question were hourly employees whose employment was unrelated to their educational experience, § 1-19(b)(11) did not permit the university to withhold their names from the student reporter who sought them.

The FOIC then considered the university's contention that § 1-19(a), which requires disclosure "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute," exempted it from disclosing the names requested because 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, 2 the "Buckley Amendment," prohibits federal funding of educational institutions that disclose such information about students. The FOIC concluded that because the Buckley Amendment merely conditioned funding on nondisclosure and did not prohibit disclosure, it did not come within the § 1-19(a) "federal law" exemption to disclosure. Because we hold that § 1-19(b)(11) permits the university to withhold the requested information, we do not address this second issue. 3

The trial court limited its review of the FOIC decision to whether the FOIC's interpretation of § 1-19 was "reasonable." While we ordinarily accord deference to an agency's interpretation of the legislation it is charged with enforcing; Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, 217 Conn. 110, 119-20, 584 A.2d 1172 (1991); the agency's interpretation is only persuasive, not dispositive. "The interpretation of statutes presents a question of law"; Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 153, 158, 585 A.2d 82 (1991); which is ultimately for the court to decide.

If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to construction. Cilley v. Lamphere, 206 Conn. 6, 9-10, 535 A.2d 1305 (1988). When application of the statute to a particular situation reveals a latent ambiguity in seemingly unambiguous language, however, we turn for guidance to the purpose of the statute and its legislative history to resolve that ambiguity. See State v. Champagne, 206 Conn. 421, 428, 538 A.2d 193 (1988). Despite the "parade of horribles" suggested by the FOIC, 4 no such latent ambiguity is suggested by the record before us.

It is undisputed that the students whose names were sought were enrolled in the university. The plain language of § 1-19(b)(11) applies, therefore, to protect them from the mandatory disclosure requirements of the FOIA. The FOIC contends, however, that the students were the subject of inquiry in their capacity as employees, not in their capacity as students, and that this difference renders § 1-19(b)(11) ambiguous and subject to the rule of construction that exemptions from the FOIA will be narrowly construed. Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 217 Conn. at 160, 585 A.2d 82. We disagree.

The facts before us do not indicate that student status was merely incidental to the claimant's request. Ali's letter specifically sought "a list of all those UConn students that have been employed by the police department from September 1 through November 5," 1987. (Emphasis added.) Regardless of the limitation of the request to students who were employees, we construe § 1-19(b)(11) to permit withholding of the names of those employees whose student status was a condition of their employment. Uncontroverted testimony made clear that the students employed by the department held positions reserved exclusively for students of the university. These facts suggest no reason for us to depart from the plain meaning of the statute, which exempts from the disclosure requirement the "names [and] addresses of students enrolled in any public ... college." As there is no ambiguity in the statute as applied to this request, the FOIC's ruling was based on an error of law and should have been reversed. 5

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment sustaining the appeal.

In this opinion the other Justices concurred.

1 General Statutes § 1-19 provides in pertinent part: "ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS. EXEMPT RECORDS. (a) Except as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to inspect such records promptly during regular office or business hours or to receive a copy of such records in accordance with the provisions of section 1-15....

"(b) Nothing in sections ... 1-19 ... shall be construed to require disclosure of ... (11) names or addresses of students enrolled in any public school or college without the consent of each student whose name or address is to be disclosed who is eighteen years of age or older and a parent or guardian of each such student who is younger than eighteen years of age, provided this subdivision shall not be construed as prohibiting the disclosure of the names or addresses of students enrolled in any public school in a regional school district to the board of selectmen or town board of finance, as the case may be, of the town wherein the student resides for the purpose of verifying tuition payments made to such school...."

2 Title 20 of the United States Code § 1232g provides in pertinent part: "(a) Conditions for availability of funds to educational agencies or institutions; inspection and review of education records; specific information to be made available; procedure for access to education records; reasonableness of time for such access; hearings; written explanations by parents; definitions

"(5)(A) For the purposes of this section the term 'directory information' relating to a student includes the following: the student's name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth, major field of study, participation in officially recognized activities and sports, weight and height of members of athletic teams, dates of attendance, degrees and awards received, and the most recent previous educational agency or institution attended by the student.

"(B) Any educational agency or institution making public directory information shall give public notice of the categories of information which it has designated as such information with respect to each student attending the institution or agency and shall allow a reasonable period of time after such notice has been given for a parent to inform the institution or agency that any or all of the information designated should not be released without the parent's prior consent.

"(b) Release of education records; parental consent requirement; exceptions; compliance with judicial orders and subpoenas; audit and evaluation of federally-supported education programs; recordkeeping.

"(1) No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any...

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