Van Cleave v. City of Louis

• Decision Date: 12 February 1901
• Parties: VAN CLEAVE v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

60 S.W. 1091

159 Mo. 574

VAN CLEAVE v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri, First Division

February 12, 1901

Appeal from the St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Selden P Spencer, Judge.

Affirmed.

B Schnurmacher and Alex. Nicholson for appellant.

The petition or statement filed before the justice was wholly insufficient. It contained no recital of facts whatever from which a cause of action could be gleaned. It consisted entirely of conclusions or allegations of law. While no particular formality is required in pleadings before justices of the peace, nevertheless the statement of a cause of action before a justice must be a statement of facts, as distinguished from a conclusion of law, must advise the other party of the nature of the claim against him, or with what he is charged, and must be sufficiently specific and definite to bar another action. St. Louis v. Babcock, 56 S.W 732; Brashears v. Strock, 46 Mo. 221; Swartz v. Nicholson, 65 Mo. 508; Casey v. Clark, 2 Mo. 11; Wathen v. Farr, 8 Mo. 324; Butts v. Phelps, 79 Mo. 302; Watkins v. Donnelly, 88 Mo. 322. See also: Hill v. Ore & Steel Co., 90 Mo. 103; Butler v. Robinson, 75 Mo. 192; Rosenburg v. Boyd, 14 Mo.App. 429; Nutter v. Houston, 32 Mo.App. 451; Dahlgreen v. Yocum, 44 Mo.App. 277; Rechnitzer v. Candy Co., 3 Mo.App. Rep. 60.

William A. Alderson for respondent.

(1) The statement filed in this cause contains every jurisdictional fact, designates the very spot and day when and on which the appellant's horse was injured, charges negligence and carelessness on the part of the appellant and its co-defendants in the matter of a roadway constructed by defendants across the street railway tracks, which roadway caused the loss of the animal, advised the defendants of the nature of the action and is sufficient to bar another action for the same cause. The sole objection to the statement is that it does not plead the ordinance providing for the reconstruction of Vandeventer avenue, does not specifically set forth the full facts constituting the particular negligence of the appellant, and that a general charge of negligence in an action before a justice of the peace is not sufficient. The statement is fully within the statutory provisions, and all the numerous decisions of this court and the courts of appeals, concerning practice and proceedings before justices of the peace. Mack v. Railroad, 77 Mo. 232; Hale v. Van Dever, 67 Mo. 732; Razor v. Railroad, 73 Mo. 471; Iba v. Railroad, 45 Mo. 470; Early v. Fleming, 16 Mo. 154; Allen v. McMonagle, 77 Mo. 478; Key v. Railroad, 73 Mo. 475; Meyer v. McCabe, 73 Mo. 236; Belcher v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 514; City of Kansas v. Johnson, 78 Mo. 661; Johnson v. Moffatt, 19 Mo. 159; Glenn v. Weary, 66 Mo.App. 75; Force v. Squire, 133 Mo. 306; Bell v. Boyd, 66 Mo.App. 137; Dahlgreen v. Yocum, 44 Mo. 277. (2) Conceding, for the purpose of argument, that the statement is insufficient in the particulars asserted by counsel for appellant, yet, no motion having been filed in the circuit court attacking it, the statement is good after verdict. Meyer v. McCabe, 73 Mo. 236; Busby v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 43; Stanley v. Railroad, 84 Mo. 625. (3) Even in the circuit court, under the strict rules of technical pleading, a general allegation of negligence is good after verdict, and sufficient to sustain a judgment, when no motion to make the petition more specific and definite is filed. Foster v. Railroad, 115 Mo. 177; Dougherty v. Railroad, 9 Mo.App. 478, 81 Mo. 325; Schneider v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 295; Edens v. Railroad, 72 Mo. 213; Mack v. Railroad, 77 Mo. 232.

ROBINSON, J. Brace and Valliant, JJ., concur; Marshall, J., not sitting.

OPINION

ROBINSON, J.

This action was originally begun before a justice of the peace against the city of St. Louis, the Lindell Railway Company, Philip F. Stifel and Henry Ruckert, upon the following petition or statement:

"The plaintiff, complaining of the defendants, alleges that on or about the twenty-second day of August, 1897, he was the owner of a mare, which through the negligence and carelessness of the defendants, was so injured and ruined that said animal was entirely lost to the plaintiff; that said animal was injured in the city of St. Louis, on Vandeventer avenue, just north of Washington avenue, and between said Washington avenue and Delmar avenue, and in front of the livery stable on the west side of said Vandeventer avenue, between said thoroughfares, said livery stable being known and called the "West End Livery Stable;" that said animal was injured while on said Vandeventer avenue at said point and while crossing a roadway constructed by the defendants across the street railway tracks at said point; that by reason of said negligence and carelessness of the defendants the plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $ 300."

At the trial before the justice a judgment was entered against the defendant city of St. Louis, and in favor of the other defendants, and the city of St. Louis appealed the case to the circuit court, where upon a trial anew in that court judgment was again rendered against it for the sum of $ 300, and by the same defendant the case has been brought here on appeal.

But one question is raised by appellant, and that is as to the sufficiency of the statement filed by plaintiff with the justice as his cause of action.

What is or what is not a sufficient statement of a cause of action, before a justice of the peace, has been the source of frequent adjudication in this court. If a comparison of our various adjudications upon the different statements filed before justices of the peace that from time to time have been brought before us for determination, has furnished justification for the suggestion that those adjudications have not at all times been in strict harmony, that want of harmony has not been so much the result of the want of a definite rule or test to be applied to all such statements, as to the want of accuracy in the application of the rule to the particular statement at the particular time before the court.

Without attempting to reconsider the court's disapproval of various statements filed as plaintiff's cause of action with justices of the peace, discussed in a line of authorities cited by appellant, with those cited by respondent wherein the statements filed before the justice have been sustained and held sufficient, we will try to test the question of the sufficiency of the statement filed by the plaintiff in this case, by those general rules announced in both lines of cases without regard to the question of the result of the application made in any particular case or cases.

The statute in express...