Velazquez v. Chardon
Decision Date | 14 December 1983 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 80-2333(PG),81-1419(PG). |
Citation | 576 F. Supp. 476 |
Parties | Juan A. Valles VELAZQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. Carlos CHARDON, et al., Defendants. Enelida Rios SALAS, Plaintiff, v. Carlos CHARDON, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Cancio, Nadal & Rivera, Jesús R. Rabell Méndez, San Juan, P.R., for plaintiffs.
Armando Lasa Ferrer, Lasa, Vicente & Jiménez, Santurce, P.R., Inés Eguia Miranda, Dept. of Justice, Roberto Córdova, San Juan, P.R., for defendants.
These cases are before the Court upon plaintiffs' motions to vacate our Order of October 21, 1983. In said Order we granted the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants in each of the above-captioned cases. Plaintiffs assert in their motions to vacate that the Court failed to consider the allegations and arguments based on the "continuing violation" theory, which were raised by them in their respective oppositions to defendants' motions for summary judgment. After renewed consideration of plaintiffs' allegations of continuing violations, the Court still believes that the granting of defendants' motions for summary judgment was proper for the reasons stated hereafter.
We agree with plaintiffs that if the alleged violations of their civil rights are found to constitute a pattern of continuing discrimination, rather than single acts of discrimination, these cases would not be time barred. Where a plaintiff alleges claims which may be classified as "continuing" acts of discrimination, the complaint will not be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See generally, Goldman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 607 F.2d 1014 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929, 100 S.Ct. 1317, 63 L.Ed.2d 762 (1980); Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 302, 74 L.Ed.2d 283 (1982); Tarvesian v. Carr Division of TRW, Inc., 407 F.Supp. 336 (D.Mass.1976). However, plaintiffs herein have failed to state a continuing violation with the required specificity.
In Goldman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit announced the standard for determining when a continuing violation is stated:
607 F.2d at 1018 (emphasis added). In Goldman, the Court of Appeals held that where plaintiff's complaint alleged that employer's transfer of plaintiff to various departments in employer's department store constituted violations of Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, reference to plaintiff's repeated unavailing requests to be transferred back to his original department and employer's alleged refusal to honor those requests was insufficient to state a continuing violation of the statute.
The Goldman court explained that if plaintiff meant to claim that the employer's alleged refusals to transfer him to his original department formed part of a continuous chain of misconduct, "it was incumbent upon him to allege facts giving some indication that the ... refusals were themselves separate civil rights violations." Id. (emphasis added). The court added:
Id., at 1018-1019 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). It thus seems clear that a plaintiff alleging a continuing violation would have to outline the facts constituting the alleged present violation. See, United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S., at 558, 97 S.Ct., at 1889 () (emphasis added).
Moreover, a plaintiff may not circumvent the applicable limitations period merely by labeling an act a "continuing" violation. Corbin v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 432 F.Supp. 939, 944 (N.D.Cal. 1977); Tarvesian v. Carr Division of TRW, Inc., supra, at 340. As noted in Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1234 (8th Cir.1975), "to construe loosely `continuing' discrimination would undermine the theory underlying the statute of limitations."
Thus, a plaintiff in a civil rights case alleging a continuing violation must do more than simply state conclusions or subjective characterizations, or merely label an act a "continuing" violation. See generally, Fisher v. Flynn, supra, at 665; Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 233 (1st Cir.1977). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit insists on at least the allegation of a minimal factual setting. Dewey v. University of New Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1982). In Dewey, the court stated:
694 F.2d at 3. Specifically, referring to cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.1983, the court stated:
Id. (emphasis added)
The complaint in Dewey alleged in Count I that plaintiff, over a period of six years prior to the decision by co-defendant Spitz that plaintiff would have to retire at the end of the 1977-78 academic year because of University policy requiring retirement at age 65, spoke on a number of issues of public interest involving the University, disagreeing with co-defendant Spitz. Plaintiff alleged that the enforcement of the University retirement policy in his case was in retaliation for past exercise of his First Amendment rights. The court found that despite the fact that nearly eight months elapsed from the filing of the complaint (July 29, 1981) to the filing of a second motion to amend it (March 12, 1982), during which time the complaint had been challenged for lack of specificity, plaintiff made "no effort to fill in the gaps as to the nature of the issues discussed, the particular occasions, their recentness or remoteness, the position of the University, the importance of the controversy, the prominence or lack of prominence of plaintiff's comments." Dewey, 694 F.2d, at 4. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Count I of the complaint for failure to state a claim, emphasizing that:
In addition, the Dewey court affirmed ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Serrano-Nova v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico, Inc.
...the discrimination, is in fact on-going." Goldman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 607 F.2d 1014, 1018 (1st Cir.1979); Velazquez v. Chardon, 576 F.Supp. 476, 477 (D.Puerto Rico 1983). A serial violation is "composed of a number of discriminatory acts emanating from the same discriminatory animus, e......
-
Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico
...but the discrimination, is in fact on-going." Goldman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 607 F.2d 1014, 1018 (1st Cir.1979); Velázquez v. Chardón, 576 F.Supp. 476, 477 (D.P.R.1983). Sufficient facts must be alleged to establish that a valid section 1983 claim does exist. Dewey v. University of New Ha......
-
Gonzalez Garcia v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth.
...but the discrimination, is in fact on-going." Goldman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 607 F.2d 1014, 1018 (1st Cir.1979); Velázquez v. Chardón, 576 F.Supp. 476, 477 (D.P.R.1983). Continuing violations are of two types: serial or systemic. Kassaye v. Bryant Coll., 999 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir.1993). ......
-
Velazquez v. Chardon, s. 83-1893
...The district court granted appellees' motions for summary judgment on the ground that the suits were time-barred. Velazquez v. Chardon, 576 F.Supp. 476 (D.P.R.1983). Appellants do not dispute that their actions are subject to the one-year limitations period of P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 31, Sec. 52......