Ventura v. State
Decision Date | 18 February 2010 |
Docket Number | No. SC08-483.,SC08-483. |
Citation | 29 So.3d 1086 |
Parties | Javier Dejesus VENTURA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, Roy A. Hiemlich and Andrew Stanton, Assistant Public Defenders, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Richard L. Polin, Bureau Chief, Angel L. Fleming and Rolando A. Soler, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, FL, for Respondent.
We have for review Ventura v. State, 973 So.2d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), in which the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the admissibility of a Department of Corrections release-date letter as a permissible means of establishing the defendant's status as a prison-releasee reoffender. See id. at 638. In the process, the Third District relied upon the reasoning and rule of law articulated in Yisrael v. State, 938 So.2d 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (en banc) (Yisrael I), disapproved in part, 993 So.2d 952 (Fla.2008). See Ventura, 973 So.2d at 638. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
We stayed proceedings in this case pending our disposition of Yisrael, in which we (1) approved the decision of the First District in Gray v. State, 910 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), and (2) disapproved the reasoning and rule of law articulated by the Fourth District in its underlying decision, but ultimately approved the result reached by that court on other grounds. See Yisrael v. State, 993 So.2d 952, 960-61 (Fla.2008) (Yisrael II). We then accepted jurisdiction in this case to resolve the conflict between Ventura and the decisions of this Court in Yisrael II and State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).
With regard to the Yisrael issue, the Third District relied upon the rule articulated in Yisrael I to erroneously state that a Department of Corrections (DOC) release-date letter standing alone is admissible under the public-records exception to the hearsay rule to establish a defendant's criminal history for the purposes of imposition of a prison-releasee-reoffender sentence. This Court disapproved that rule in Yisrael II. However, upon review of the appellate record, it is clear that, although not reflected in the opinion of the Third District, the trial court was actually supplied with a signed release-date letter, written under seal, and an attached Crime and Time Report. In Yisrael II, we held that these DOC records can together be used to render the entire report admissible as a public record. See Yisrael II, 993 So.2d at 960-61 ( ); see also §§ 90.803(6), 90.902(11), Fla. Stat (2003). Further, Ventura concedes that both documents (i.e., the signed release-date letter under seal and the Crime and Time Report) were provided to the trial court. Accordingly, as we did in Yisrael II, we approve the ultimate result reached by the Third District Court of Appeal below because the signed and under seal release-date letter provided in this case was used as a permissible means of authenticating an attached Crime and Time Report, but disapprove its reliance upon the rule expressed in Yisrael I. See Yisrael II, 993 So.2d at 960-61; see also Smith v. State, 990 So.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Parker v. State, 973 So.2d 1167, 1168-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), review denied, 1 So.3d 173, 2009 WL 427313 (Fla. 2009).
Next, the district court improperly utilized an "overwhelming evidence" test when considering whether the impermissible testimony of a witness which clearly undermined and violated the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent constituted harmless error. Unlike some evidentiary errors, such as the admission of a cumulative or irrelevant photograph, a comment on the right to remain silent strikes at the heart of our criminal justice system. This Court has clearly stated that it is constitutional error to penalize an individual for exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege; therefore, the prosecution may not introduce during trial the fact that an individual has relied upon this protection in the face of accusation. See Simpson v. State, 418 So.2d 984, 984-85 (Fla.1982) (quoting Jones v. State, 200 So.2d 574, 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)); see also DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1131. As we stated in DiGuilio:
It is clear that comments on silence are high risk errors because there is a substantial likelihood that meaningful comments will vitiate the right to a fair trial by influencing the jury verdict and that an appellate court, or even the trial court, is likely to find that the comment is harmful under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
491 So.2d at 1136-37. Accordingly, commenting on the silence of an accused is not a viable strategy for obtaining convictions and any comment—direct or indirect—by anyone at trial on this right is constitutional error that should be avoided. See DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1136, 1139.
During the trial proceedings below, a detective made two comments with regard to Ventura's silence, as follows:
(Emphasis supplied.) The Third District determined that the comments were improper and stated: "We fail to see how the detective's comment, twice repeated, could have been anything other than an intentional cheap shot at Ventura's constitutional rights." Ventura, 973 So.2d at 637. The court clearly and correctly recognized the egregious conduct. However, the district court then held that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence of guilt." Id.
Unfortunately, the Third District expressed an incorrect harmless error analysis. In DiGuilio, we fully explicated the application of the harmless error doctrine to a comment on a defendant's right to remain silent. In doing so, we explicitly expressed that the harmless error analysis is not an "overwhelming-evidence test." DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1139.
DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1136, 1138-39 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied) (quoting People v. Ross, 67 Cal.2d 64, 60 Cal.Rptr. 254, 429 P.2d 606, 621 (1967) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 391 U.S. 470, 88 S.Ct. 1850, 20 L.Ed.2d 750 (1968)).
Since restating the test in DiGuilio, this Court has provided further guidance on the correct analysis of harmless error. For example, in Rigterink v. State, 2 So.3d 221 (Fla.2009), petition for cert. filed, No. 08-1229, 7 U.S.L.W. 3563 (Mar. 31, 2009), this Court discussed and applied the harmless error analysis in a circumstance where competent, substantial evidence supported the convictions, but the record did not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Davis v. State
...and any comment—direct or indirect—by anyone at trial on this right is constitutional error that should be avoided.” Ventura v. State, 29 So.3d 1086, 1088–89 (Fla.2010) (original emphasis). On the record in this case, however, we conclude that the rule of Burwick and its progeny was not vio......
-
Johnson v. State
...is not a device for the appellate court to substitute itself for the trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence.Id.; see also Ventura, 29 So.3d at 1089–90; Cuervo v. State, 967 So.2d 155, 167 (Fla.2007); Cardenas v. State, 867 So.2d 384, 395 (Fla.2004); Williams, 863 So.2d at 1189–90. Th......
-
Special v. Baux
...approach that the Supreme Court adopted in DiGuilio and reaffirmed in Goodwin v. State, 751 So.2d 537 (Fla.1999) and Ventura v. State, 29 So.3d 1086 (Fla.2010). At least one of our civil cases appears however to apply an “effect on the fact finder” test similar to the one applied in DiGuili......
-
Browning v. FLORIDA HOMETOWN DEMOCRACY
... ... Winship, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL; Lynn C. Hearn, General Counsel, Florida Department of State, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellants ... Ross Stafford Burnaman, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellees ... PER CURIAM ... ...
-
Appeals
...contributed to the defendant’s conviction. (See this case for extensive discussion of the harmless error standard.) Ventura v. State, 29 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. 2010) reversing in part Ventura v. State , 973 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) Where evidence of guilt is wholly circumstantial, the evide......