Versatile v. Kelly

• Decision Date: 07 August 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:12CV332-HEH
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: LORD VERSATILE, Plaintiff, v. LORETTA KELLY, et al., Defendants.

LORD VERSATILE, Plaintiff,

v.LORETTA KELLY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:12CV332-HEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division

Dated: August 7, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Dismissing § 1983 Action)

Lord Versatile, a Virginia state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil rights action. The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

I. BACKGROUND

The Magistrate Judge made the following findings and recommendations:

Preliminary Review

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The first standard includes claims based upon "'an indisputably meritless legal theory,'" or claims where the "'factual contentions are clearly baseless.'" Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v.Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations,however, and "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570, rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 115 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

Summary of Allegations

Versatile, an inmate currently confined in Nottaway Correctional Center, alleges that he worked as a housekeeper from December 27, 2010 until August 14, 2011, while confined at Sussex I State Prison. (Compl. 7.)¹ Versatile alleges that he "was not paid or compensated for any of the hours he worked for approximately eight (8) months."² (Id.)³ Versatile claims he "was threatened onseveral occasion[s] by housing unit staff that if he refused to work he would be charged for failure to perform work assignment." (Id.) Versatile contends that the deprivation of pay for work performed violates "state created rights under the Virginia constitution," due process,⁴ the Eighth Amendment⁵ prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and amounts to slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment.⁶ (Id. at 4.) Versatile names former Warden, Loretta Kelly, former Regional Director, A. David Robinson, and former Unit Manager T. Fowlkes as defendants. Versatile demands "compensatory damages of 25% interest for each month he worked along with the total pay he would have earned for each month from December 27, 2010 to August 14, 2011," and $500 in punitive damages from each defendant. (Id. at 11.)

Analysis

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998).

Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments

A state prisoner possesses no constitutional right to be paid for his labor. Anderson v. Morgan, No. 89-6737, 1990 WL 29173, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 1990) (citing Manning v. Lockhart, 623 F.2d 536, 538 (8th Cir. 1980)); Sigler v. Lowrie, 404 F.2d 659, 661 (8th Cir. 1968) (citations omitted); Borror v. White, 377 F.Supp. 181, 183 (W.D. Va. 1974) (citations omitted). Any compensation provided '"is by the grace of the state.'" Taylor v. Robinson, No. 02-CV-510, 2003 WL 23314150, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 4, 2003) (quoting Hrbek v. Farrier, 787 F.2d 415, 416 (8th Cir. 1986)); see Borror, 377 F. Supp. at 183. Thus, Versatile has no property interest in wages earned under the Due Process Clause. Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179, 184-85 (4th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); Skipper v. SC. Dep't Corr., No. 4:05-3024-HFF-TER, 2008 WL 608575, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 4, 2008) (citations omitted). Nor does the failure to pay an inmate for labor violate the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery. See Mikeska v. Collins, 900 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1990);⁷Newell v. Davis, 563 F.2d 123, 124 (4th Cir. 1977) (citing Borror, 377 F. Supp. at 183; McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297, 311 (E.D. Va. 1972)). Any entitlement to pay for services rendered by Versatile "derive[s] from the laws of Virginia, and is not a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Borror, 377 F. Supp. at 183. Thus, an institution may constitutionally force a validly convicted inmate to perform work, with or without pay, so long as the work assignment amounts to no cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See McLaughlin, 346 F. Supp. at 311 (citing Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970)). Versatile's claim that he failed to receive compensation for his work as a housekeeper while housed in Sussex I states no actionable federal constitutional claim. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Versatile's claims alleging a violation of his rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Eighth Amendment and State Law Claim

To make out an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege facts that indicate (1) that objectively the deprivation suffered or harm inflicted "was 'sufficiently serious,' and (2) that subjectively the prison officials acted with a 'sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Under the objective prong, the inmate must allege facts that suggest that the deprivation complained of was extreme and amounted to more than the "'routine discomfort'" that is '"part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'" Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1380 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)). "In order to demonstrate such an extreme deprivation, a prisoner must allege 'a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.'" De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381). Versatile supplies no factual allegations suggesting that the conditions underwhich he worked violated "the minimum standards of human decency embodied in the Eighth Amendment." McLaughlin, 346 F. Supp. at 311 (citing Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967)); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Versatile alleges no physical or emotional injury, much less a significant one, from his work as housekeeper. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Versatile's Eighth Amendment claim be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Generally, a Court should dismiss pendant state law claims if the federal claims are dismissed before trial. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Because the Court recommends dismissing the federal claims for failure to state a claim, it is RECOMMENDED that Versatile's state law claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

(April 26, 2013 Report and Recommendation.) The Court advised Versatile that he could file objections or an amended complaint within fourteen (14) days after the entry of the Report and Recommendation. Versatile filed an amended complaint. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge's analysis applies with equal force to the claims previously raised. Moreover, Versatile's new equal protection claim lacks merit.

II. AMENDED COMPLAINT

...