Vickery v. State

• Decision Date: 16 February 1972
• Docket Number: No. 19371,19371
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Joel VICKERY, Respondent, v. The STATE of South Carolina, Appellant.

Page 827

186 S.E.2d 827

258 S.C. 33

Joel VICKERY, Respondent, v. The STATE of South Carolina, Appellant.

No. 19371.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 16, 1972.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, and Asst. Attys. Gen. Emmet H. Clair and John P. Wilson, Columbia, for appellant.

John F. Beasley, Greenwood, for respondent.

BUSSEY, Justice:

On February 3, 1970, in the Court of General Sessions for Abbeville County, the respondent Vickery, while represented by two retained attorneys, entered a plea of guilty to the crime of murder and was thereafter sentenced to life imprisonment, a jury having recommended him to the mercy of the court. On the following June 29th, he filed an application for post-conviction relief asserting various grounds therefor which have not been substantiated. Counsel was appointed to represent him and the matter was scheduled to be heard on September 4, 1970, but postponed on motion of respondent and not heard until January 6, 1971. At such hearing respondent was permitted to orally amend his application to allege the additional ground that his plea of guilty was involuntarily and unintelligently made. After full hearing, the court found as a fact that respondent had voluntarily and understandingly entered a plea of guilty, and stated that the court was satisfied that such fact 'undoubtedly could have been easily confirmed by the application of the appropriate procedure' at the time of the entry of the plea.

The record made in the trial court at the time of the entry of the guilty plea does not contain an affirmative showing that such plea was intelligent and voluntary, in keeping with the procedure indicated in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. Because of such, the lower court concluded that respondent was entitled to a new trial, despite the court's finding that his plea was, in fact, voluntarily and intelligently entered. The State appeals challenging such holding.

The evidence adduced upon the post-conviction hearing abundantly supports the finding of fact by the lower court that undoubtedly respondent's plea of guilty was voluntarily and intelligently entered, and such finding is binding upon this Court. Dixon v. State, 253 S.C. 41 168 S.E.2d 770. The trial court, of course, in keeping with Boykin, should have canvassed the matter with the accused to make sure that he had a full understanding of what his plea connoted and of its consequences, and then established a record affirmatively showing that such plea was intelligent and voluntary before accepting it. In the circumstances and present posture of this case, however, we conclude beyond any reasonable doubt that the failure to do so was harmless error and that the rights of the accused were not prejudiced thereby. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.

We do not read or construe Boykin to hold that the failure of the trial judge to canvas the matter and make a full record, affirmatively showing the voluntariness of a...