Vilhauer v. HORSEMENS'SPORTS, INC.

• Decision Date: 21 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. 20395.,20395.
• Citation: 598 N.W.2d 525,1999 SD 93
• Parties: Mitchell Alan VILHAUER, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. HORSEMENS' SPORTS, INC., Defendant and Appellant, and Corn Palace Stampede, Inc., Ray Henderson, Sutton Rodeos, Inc., and Mark Barnett, South Dakota Attorney General, Defendants.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

598 N.W.2d 525

1999 SD 93

Mitchell Alan VILHAUER, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. HORSEMENS' SPORTS, INC., Defendant and Appellant, and Corn Palace Stampede, Inc., Ray Henderson, Sutton Rodeos, Inc., and Mark Barnett, South Dakota Attorney General, Defendants.

No. 20395.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued January 14, 1999.

Reassigned May 19, 1999.

Decided July 21, 1999.

Wilson Kleibacker of Lammers, Lammers & Kleibacker, Madison, South Dakota, for plaintiff and appellee.

James L. Hoy of Hoy and Hoy, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, for defendant and appellant.

GILBERTSON, Justice (on reassignment).

[¶ 1.] Mitchell Vilhauer (Vilhauer) was injured after being struck in the face by a gate while working at the Corn Palace Stampede. Vilhauer brought suit against defendants Horsemens' Sports, Inc. (Horsemens' Sports), Corn Palace Stampede, Inc. (Stampede), Ray Henderson (Henderson), Sutton Rodeos, Inc. (Sutton), and Mark Barnett, South Dakota Attorney General, alleging numerous counts of negligence. Defendants asserted the defense of immunity provided by SDCL 42-11-2. The trial court found SDCL 42-11-1(6)(e) violated Article VI, Section 20 of the South Dakota Constitution. Due to the importance of this constitutional question we granted Horsemens' Sports' petition for an intermediate appeal. We now reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

[¶ 2.] Horsemens' Sports owns the land in Mitchell, South Dakota where the Corn Palace Stampede is held. Stampede sponsors this annual rodeo and Sutton provides the stock. Henderson designed the gate. In his spare time, Vilhauer worked as a laborer at rodeos. He had worked at approximately eighty rodeos prior to this incident.

[¶ 3.] On July 16, 1994, Vilhauer was assigned to work the saddle bronc event at the Corn Palace Stampede. Following each individual saddle bronc event, the horse is led out of the main arena and into a catch pen. At the time of the incident, Henderson was operating the gate of the catch pen. After the horse is allowed into the catch pen, the horse enters a stripping chute where the saddle and halter are removed. Two sliding gates control this stripping chute, one toward the catch pen and the other away from the arena. Vilhauer's duty was to open and close the small gate leading into the stripping chute.

[¶ 4.] While other workers were removing the saddle and halter from the horse in the stripping chute, Vilhauer walked over toward the closed gate to see when the next horse was approaching. This gate was not normally opened or closed during the saddle bronc event and was used to form one of the fences making up the catch pen leading into the stripping chute.

[¶ 5.] When the next saddle bronc left the main arena and entered the catch pen, it ran into the gate. The gate popped open, striking Vilhauer in the face and causing personal injuries. Vilhauer does not know why the gate popped open.

[¶ 6.] Vilhauer filed suit on December 20, 1995, against the defendants, alleging a number of negligence counts. In addition, Vilhauer asked the court to declare SDCL ch 42-11 unconstitutional. The defendants raised the defense of immunity provided by SDCL 42-11-2. All of the parties moved for summary judgment. On January 30, 1998, the trial court issued a declaratory judgment and order denying motions for summary judgment. Among other things, this order declared that SDCL 42-11-1(6)(e) violated Article VI, Section 20 of the South Dakota Constitution commonly referred to as the "open courts" provision. Horsemens' Sports appeals raising the following issue:

Did the circuit court err by declaring SDCL 42-11-1(6)(e) unconstitutional.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 7.] Our review of the constitutionality of a statute is de novo. Green v. Siegel, Barnett & Schutz, 1996 SD 146, ¶ 7, 557 N.W.2d 396, 398 (citing Kyllo v. Panzer, 535 N.W.2d 896, 897 (S.D.1995)).

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

[¶ 8.] Did the circuit court err in declaring SDCL 42-11-1(6)(e) unconstitutional.

[¶ 9.] Article VI, Section 20 of the South Dakota Constitution provides: "All courts shall be open, and every man for an injury done him in his property, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice, administered without denial or delay."

[¶ 10.] SDCL ch 42-11 pertaining to equine activities, appears to be a legislative response to the difficulties experienced by rodeos and their sponsors due to liability claims and the cost of insurance. Whether gigantic leaps in the cost of insurance coverage are justified to offset increased claims has been the subject of substantial debate both in the judicial and legislative arenas of this state. See generally Matter of Cert. of Questions of Law (Knowles), 1996 SD 10, ¶¶ 56-70, 544 N.W.2d 183, 195-99

.

[¶ 11.] However, in analyzing the constitutionality of statutes partially limiting liability we have consistently held:

Where the constitutional validity of a statute depends upon the existence of facts, courts must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them contrary to that reached by the legislature; and if the question of what the facts establish be fairly debatable one, it is not permissible for the judge to set up his opinion in respect of it against the opinion of the lawmaker. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294, 44 S.Ct. 325, 326, 68 L.Ed. 690, 694 (1924).

Wegleitner v. Sattler, 1998 SD 88, ¶ 30, 582 N.W.2d 688, 697 (quoting Knowles, 1996 SD 10 at ¶ 67, 544 N.W.2d at 197).

[¶ 12.] The errors committed by the trial court in arriving at its conclusion are twofold. First, it failed to construe the entire chapter of SDCL ch. 42-11, but instead improperly examined SDCL 41-11-1(6)(e) in isolation. Second, it failed to consider the proper parameters of Article VI, Section 20.

[¶ 13.] Horsemens' Sports provided the rodeo grounds and thus qualified as an "equine activity sponsor" under SDCL 42-11-1(4). Vilhauer was a "person assisting a participant or show management," in a rodeo or "equine activity" pursuant to SDCL 42-11-1(1). As such, SDCL 42-11-2 granted the following protection: "[n]o equine activity sponsor ... or any other person, is liable for an injury to ... a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities." Thus, Horsemens' Sports was able to invoke the protection of SDCL 42-11-1(6)(e), which via SDCL 42-11-2 provided a limited form of partial immunity for the following activity:

The potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, such as failing to maintain control over the animal or not acting within the participant's ability.

SDCL 42-11-1(6)(e).

[¶ 14.] The trial court erroneously concluded SDCL 42-11-1(6)(e) provides complete immunity against the claims of Vilhauer. In so doing, it failed to consider the exclusions created by SDCL 42-11-3. SDCL 42-11-3 removes the protection of partial immunity incorporated in 42-11-1(6)(e) and SDCL 42-11-2 for the following conduct:

1. Providing faulty equipment or tack;

2. Failing to properly ascertain the participant's ability and/or provide an inappropriate animal;

3. Providing land or facilities with a known, dangerous latent condition without conspicuous warnings;

4. Committing acts in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, and;

5. Intentionally injuring the participant.

SDCL 42-11-3(1), (2), (3) & (4).

[¶ 15.] Based on the allegations in Vilhauer's complaint, he does not become nonsuited should SDCL 42-11-1(6)(e) be held constitutional. As conceded by Horsemens' Sports at oral argument, it still must be determined if Vilhauer falls within the category of having his injuries caused by faulty equipment,¹ or if they were caused in a willful or wanton disregard for his safety. If he can show either or both, he may pursue this action against Horsemens' Sports.

[¶ 16.] Thus, the Legislature has not placed a blanket immunity in favor of those who operate rodeos. It has rather placed a heightened burden of proof² for certain types of claims or excluded the partial immunity protection altogether for specific causes of injury. The actual issue before this Court is whether the Legislature may constitutionally take such action within the parameters of Article VI, Section 20.

There is a strong presumption that the laws enacted by the legislature are constitutional and the presumption is rebutted only when it clearly, palpably and plainly appears that the statute violates a provision of the constitution. Further, the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates a state or federal constitutional provision.

Green, 1996 SD 146 at ¶ 7, 557 N.W.2d at 398 (quoting State v. Hauge, 1996 SD 48, ¶ 4, 547 N.W.2d 173, 175 (other citations omitted)). Any reasonable and legitimate construction of a statute that does not violate constitutional principles must be adopted. Harding County v. South Dakota State Land Users Ass'n, 486 N.W.2d 263, 265 (S.D.1992).

[¶ 17.] The trial court relied on Daugaard v. Baltic Co-op. Bldg. Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D.1984) as the basis for its analysis. However, subsequent historical research and analysis by this Court in Green and Wegleitner³ has concluded the proper scope of Article VI, Section 20 to be:

Given the above nature of the understanding of the drafters of the constitutional provisions and its contemporary judicial interpretations, it is clear that these provisions in South Dakota and surrounding states were meant to allow unhindered access to the courthouse by a person who had a valid cause of action based on existing statute or the common law, timely and properly brought, who then would be allowed to present their case to a human fact finder. In other words under those conditions, a litigant was guaranteed its day in court.... In Green, we analyzed our case law from McClain in 1897 up to Knowles in 1996 and found no basis for a claim that Art. VI, § 20

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