Vitol, Inc. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist.
| Decision Date | 03 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | NO. 14-16-00584-CV.,14-16-00584-CV. |
| Citation | 529 S.W.3d 159 |
| Parties | VITOL, INC., Appellant v. HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Emily Brown, Eric C. Farrar, Houston, TX, for Appellee.
Kyle T. Farrar, William F. Ikard, Randy James Bruchmiller, Austin, TX, for Appellant.
Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Brown.
Appellant Vitol, Inc., provided information about its business property for tax year 2014 to appellee Harris County Appraisal District ("HCAD"). Vitol also submitted to HCAD a form requesting an Interstate or Foreign Commerce ("IFC") tax exemption. Vitol received a 2014 Notice of Appraised Value for Property Tax Purposes ("2014 Notice") that did not contain any IFC exemption. Vitol did not file a written or online protest with the Appraisal Review Board ("ARB") by the deadline stated in the 2014 Notice. Vitol engaged in discussions about its exemption request with HCAD. Months later, Vitol filed a written protest with the ARB, alleging that HCAD failed to provide proper notice of the denial of the IFC exemption and that HCAD improperly denied the exemption.
After the ARB denied Vitol's protest, Vitol appealed to the trial court. HCAD filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on Vitol's failure to timely protest and exhaust its administrative remedies. The trial court denied Vitol's motion for continuance of the hearing on the plea. After the hearing, the trial court granted HCAD's plea and dismissed Vitol's claims for lack of jurisdiction. Vitol appeals the trial court's denial of Vitol's motion for continuance and the trial court's granting of HCAD's plea to the jurisdiction. We affirm.
Vitol owns and operates a petro-chemical storage facility, often referred to as a tank farm, in Harris County, Texas, subject to ad valorem property taxes. On April 15, 2014, Vitol submitted a confidential rendition to HCAD regarding Vitol's gasoline products stored in certain tank numbers with a property address of 906 Clinton Drive, "INV @ KINDER MORGAN GALENA PARK." Vitol reported that the original cost of these products was $15,224,054.
Vitol claimed that its gasoline products were pre-committed to be shipped out of state as of the September 1, 2013, appraisal date for tax year 2014. On April 15, 2014, Vitol submitted to HCAD a form 11.12(IC) report of goods in interstate or foreign commerce as of September 1, 2013. Form 11.12(IC) states that the property owner's "response will help [HCAD] determine if such inventories are qualified for exemption under Texas Tax Code Sec. 11.12."1 The tank numbers and barrel amounts provided on the form are identical to those on Vitol's rendition. The location is "Kinder Morgan Galena Park, TX." Other details Vitol provided include: the reason for the inventory's presence in Texas, whether it was in possession of a carrier, the name of the carrier, the inventory's final destination, the date it left Texas, and the percentage committed to the carrier.
On June 20, 2014, HCAD mailed the 2014 Notice to Vitol. The 2014 Notice described the property as "Tank Farms (Products Inside Tanks) INV AT KM LIQUIDS TERMINAL LP" with a property location of 906 Clinton Drive in Galena Park, Texas. The appraised value of the property was $15,224,054. The 2014 Notice listed the estimated amount of taxes to be paid using last year's specified rates for each of seven taxing jurisdictions, which totaled approximately $355,600. The 2014 Notice also contained a column labeled "Exemptions Granted," which listed a "0" for each of seven taxing jurisdictions. One of the exemption codes available to be granted was "IFC Interstate or Foreign Commerce."
The 2014 Notice stated: The 2014 Notice stated that it included a protest form and information on how to prepare and present a protest. The 2014 Notice provided the HCAD website link to file a protest online. The 2014 Notice stated: "Hearings for the 2014 tax year will begin May 12, 2014, at 13013 Northwest Fwy." The 2014 Notice also stated:
After receiving the 2014 Notice, Tony Oliver, Vitol's Assistant Secretary, exchanged emails with two HCAD representatives, Paul Wright and Hartley Chevalier, regarding Vitol's IFC exemption request. Oliver provided certain requested information about Vitol's inventory. In the meantime, the tax roll was certified, including Vitol's account. In an email dated September 29, 2014, Chevalier stated that HCAD had denied Vitol's requested IFC exemption. Oliver then requested a formal denial, and Wright responded:
Your account was notice [sic] on 6-20-2014 without a Freeport or IFC exemption. As stated on your notice . You notify [sic] Mr. Chevalier of an IFC exemption you are requesting; however, it is still your responsibility to file a timely protest on the IFC exemption if not granted prior to your protest deadline. Therefore your notice is your formal denial of the IFC exemption and you can use this email as a notification of the denial of your IFC exemption....
On November 5, 2014, Vitol filed two written property tax notices of protest. One claimed that the chief appraiser did not provide required notice of the denial of Vitol's IFC exemption request under section 11.45 of the Tax Code. The other one claimed that if Wright's email constituted an actual denial of the IFC exemption under section 11.45, then the denial was improper. The ARB concluded that HCAD provided Vitol with sufficient notice on June 20, 2014, and denied Vitol's protest. Vitol appealed the ARB's protest order to the trial court.
HCAD filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on Vitol's not exhausting its administrative remedies as required by chapter 41 of the Tax Code.2 According to HCAD, Vitol was entitled to protest denial of the IFC exemption and all issues related to the 2014 Notice but Vitol did not timely protest. Vitol moved to continue the hearing on HCAD's plea, seeking "fuller" responses to requests for discovery and depositions of certain HCAD's representatives. The trial court denied Vitol's motion. Vitol filed a response to HCAD's plea, arguing that HCAD failed to deliver notice of its disallowance of the IFC exemption and that Vitol timely protested HCAD's failure under section 41.411 of the Tax Code.3 The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction, dismissing all of Vitol's claims against HCAD. Vitol timely appealed.4
Vitol brings two issues. First, Vitol contends the trial court erred by granting HCAD's plea to the jurisdiction because Vitol raised a fact issue that it exhausted its administrative remedies. Second, Vitol contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying Vitol's motion to continue the hearing on the plea so that Vitol could discover additional jurisdictional facts.
The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that can be challenged by a plea to the jurisdiction. Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2015) ; Tex. Dep't of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We review a trial court's ruling on a plea de novo. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226, 228 ; Woodway Drive LLC v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 311 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
Where, as here, a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. The movant must meet the summary-judgment standard of proof by conclusively demonstrating that the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See id.at 227–28. We credit as true all evidence favoring the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Id.at 228. If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court may not grant the plea, and the fact issue will be resolved at trial by the factfinder. Id.at 227–28. If relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court rules on the plea as a matter of law. Id.at 228.
The chief appraiser prepares a record of all taxable property in the district and states the appraised value for each. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.01(a) (West 2015). The ARB examines the appraisal district's appraisal records to determine whether appraisals are substantially uniform, exemptions are properly granted, and the appraisal...
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