Walker v. State, S94A1095
| Decision Date | 28 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. S94A1095,S94A1095 |
| Citation | 449 S.E.2d 845,264 Ga. 676 |
| Parties | WALKER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Raymond E. George, Dahlonega, Thomas M. Cole, Whelchel, Dunlap & Gignilliat, Gainesville, for Walker.
Lydia J. Sartain, Dist. Atty., Gainesville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Lee Darragh, Asst. Dist. Atty., Gainesville, for the State.
Leonard C. Parks, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Gainesville.
Susan V. Boleyn, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta.
Michael D. Groves, Asst. Atty. Gen., State Law Dept., Atlanta, for other appellee.
Jeffery Ray Walker was found guilty of the murder of Eugene T. Cooper and sentenced to life in prison. He appeals, and we affirm. 1
1. Walker argues the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict of guilty. We disagree.
a. The most significant evidence against Walker presented at trial was the recorded testimony of his co-defendant, Chris Hightower. In a series of interviews, Hightower told police: that he and Walker went to the victim's residence in Walker's car because Walker wanted to get some money; that Walker broke into the house; that he saw Walker sling the victim to the floor and shortly thereafter heard a shot; that he and Walker fled from the victim's yard after Walker came running from the house and jumped into the car; that on the Saturday morning following the murder Walker had $400 in cash and a quantity of drugs in his possession; and, that he had seen Walker with a .38 caliber revolver several days before the murder. Hightower's testimony concerning the cash and drugs in Walker's possession was corroborated by another witness. In addition, a police officer testified that Walker himself made several statements to police. On the night he was arrested at the scene of the murder, Walker said to police, "I know something, I can help you out," adding that he had been with some women who had come into the room with money and blood-soaked towels talking about a man they had killed. A police officer also testified that on the afternoon on which Walker was served with the murder warrant, Walker told him that he had not killed Cooper but had stayed in a field on the other side of the house while someone else committed the murder. Walker also told police that he knew about the murder but that someone else had done it. Finally, two witnesses who had been Walker's cellmates during the time he was awaiting trial in the county detention center testified that Walker had told them that he had shot the victim. Reviewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's determination of guilt, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Walker guilty of the crime for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
b. At trial, Hightower recanted his earlier statements to police, saying that those statements were untrue and the product of police coercion. Walker argues that in light of that recantation, no rational trier of fact could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no merit to this argument.
The jury was authorized to decide whether to believe the inculpatory statements made by Hightower to police investigators, or to believe his exculpatory assertions at trial that he and Walker had nothing to do with the crime and that his previous statements were the result of police coercion. See Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982).
2. Walker argues that the trial court erred in allowing testimony of his bad character. During the trial a defense witness, in recounting the events of the night before the murder, told of an incident in which Walker had been involved and concluded her narrative by stating that "Jeff's not the type of person who would fight anyways." On cross-examination, the state elicited testimony from this witness that on a particular occasion in the past she had been concerned that Walker would get into a fight because when he was under the influence of "crank" he was "mean as hell."
A defendant is permitted to prove through his character witness a general reputation for a specific trait, but if he chooses to do so, the state is then allowed to show, by way of rebuttal, general bad character with respect to that particular trait. Jones v. State, 257 Ga. 753, 757, 363 S.E.2d 529 (1988). By testifying that Walker was not the kind of person who would fight, the defense witness became subject to impeachment as to the veracity of that statement, Williams v. State, 257 Ga. 761, 763, 363 S.E.2d 535 (1988), and the trial court did not err in allowing the state to ask about a specific incident in which Walker had acted in such a way as to lead the witness to the conclusion that he would be prone to violence when using a particular drug. The testimony was relevant and its admission, even though it reflected adversely on the defendant, was proper.
We realize that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Here, though there was no proof that Walker had used methamphetamine on the night of the murder, there had been prior testimony that Walker had in fact purchased a quantity of methamphetamine that night. As the jury had already heard a witness testify that Walker was in possession of an illegal drug, the prejudicial impact of the statement, to the extent that that prejudice stemmed from statements identifying Walker as a drug user, was reduced. Thus, under these circumstances, the probative value of the evidence clearly outweighed its prejudicial effects.
3. Walker argues that the actions of the police in dealing with evidence denied him due process of law. Following the murder of Eugene Cooper and pursuant to their investigation, officers of the sheriff's department set up a roadblock on Saturday in front of the Cooper house in order to seek information about the murder from passing motorists. An officer testified that at about 8:00 p.m. that evening they learned from a witness, who denies she gave the police this information, that she had heard that Jeff Walker and Chris Hightower had committed the murder and that they were driving around in Walker's white Pontiac Grand Am. At this point, according to the police, a lookout was placed on Walker's car. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on the following Sunday morning the police stopped Walker's car and arrested him for theft of the vehicle. After police officers removed Walker and his companions, Chris Hightower and Billy Gooch, from the car, they found a bill of sale for the car showing that Walker had bought the car in July 1991, having put $600 down with the balance due on September 6, 1991. The police questioned all the occupants of the car about Cooper's murder, and, on the basis of information acquired during those interrogations, charged Walker with the murder.
A technician who had been called to the crime scene located and carefully photographed a set of automobile tire tracks in Cooper's yard; the technician used a ruler so that the tread type and width of the tires could be measured to scale. Investigators from the sheriff's office processed the interior and exterior of the car, but they found no evidence of blood. Fiber, hair and other tests done on the interior of the car likewise failed to connect any of the suspects with the murder. An officer testified that, contrary to ordinary practice, no photographs were taken of the car or the tires, nor were impressions made of the tires. 2 At trial, none of the investigating officers could recall anything about the type, size or series of the tires; however, the officer who processed the car testified that he had measured the tire tracks found at the scene of the crime and that they were consistent with the wheel base of Walker's car, though he did not record the measurement of the wheel...
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