Waters v. Walt Disney World Co.

• Decision Date: 12 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-CV-531ML.,01-CV-531ML.
• Citation: 237 F.Supp.2d 162
• Parties: Ellen WATERS and Karen Woodbine v. WALT DISNEY WORLD COMPANY, Walt Disney Travel Company, Walt Disney International, Disney Vacation Development, Inc., and the Disney Stores, Inc., Alias
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

237 F.Supp.2d 162

Ellen WATERS and Karen Woodbine v. WALT DISNEY WORLD COMPANY, Walt Disney Travel Company, Walt Disney International, Disney Vacation Development, Inc., and the Disney Stores, Inc., Alias

No. 01-CV-531ML.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

February 12, 2002.

Donald A. Woodbine, Corliss Landing, Providence, RI, for plaintiffs.

Kelley A. Jordan-Price, Chares D. Blackman, Hinckley, Allen & Snyder, Providence, RI, Michael J. Connolly, Hinckley, Allen & Snyder, LLP, Boston, MA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LISI, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and for consideration of sanctions against Plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. In addition, Plaintiffs have filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court's ruling denying their motion for an order dismissing their complaint without prejudice. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied. A complete discussion concerning the appropriateness of sanctions is contained below.

I. Facts and Travel of the Case

Plaintiffs Ellen Waters and Karen Woodbine ("Plaintiffs") allege that, in 1961, Mark Waters ("Waters"), their husband and father, respectively, assisted Robert Jaffray ("Jaffray") "in planning, developing, designing, and drawing a concept entitled `Miniature Worlds,'" which consisted of "a theme park, with a number of small-scale nations placed around a lake." The Plaintiffs further allege that, in late 1962, Jaffray met with the representatives of the Disney Defendants ("Defendants") in New York and requested that they "sponsor and/or cooperate" with Waters and Jaffray in building and operating their Miniature Worlds concept. The Plaintiffs claim that Defendants thereafter informed Jaffray that they were not interested in building Miniature Worlds, but then proceeded to "build and operate Epcot's World Showcase" ("Epcot") in Florida, which is purportedly "for all practical purposes, almost identical to the `Miniature Worlds' concept planned, developed, designed and drawn by" Jaffray and Waters. The Plaintiffs have asserted claims against Defendants for misappropriation, conversion, copyright infringement, fraud, and quantum meruit.¹

Plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in Providence County Superior Court. Defendants removed this diversity action to federal court and then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.² Attached to that motion were certain supporting affidavits. Plaintiffs moved for an order dismissing their complaint without prejudice. On November 27, 2001, three days prior to a scheduled hearing on the parties' motions, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion for sanctions and attorney's fees, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 11 ("Rule 11"), for Defendants' alleged failure to honor a purported dismissal agreement. At the hearing held on November 30, 2001, Plaintiffs made no substantive arguments in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss; rather, Plaintiffs' counsel urged this Court to dismiss their complaint without prejudice based on the alleged dismissal agreement between the parties. This Court denied Plaintiffs' motions, notified Plaintiffs' counsel, Donald A. Woodbine, that the Court was considering sanctioning him for his failure to comply with Rule 11(c)(1)(A), and advised the parties that Defendants' motion to dismiss would be treated as a motion for summary judgment. On December 13, 2001, this Court issued an Order notifying Plaintiffs that, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), Defendants' motion to dismiss was being treated by the Court as one for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Pursuant to that Order, Plaintiffs were given ten days from the date of the Order to file any Rule 56 materials in opposition to Defendants' motion. Plaintiffs did not file any materials in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, choosing instead to file a motion for reconsideration of the Court's denial of their motion for an order to dismiss their complaint without prejudice.

II. Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment shall be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The Court "must view all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997).

The moving party bears the burden of showing the Court that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.1995) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Once the movant has made the requisite showing, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "Summary judgment is not appropriate merely because the facts offered by the moving party seem most plausible, or because the opponent is unlikely to prevail at trial." Gannon v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 777 F.Supp. 167, 169 (D.R.I.1991) (citation omitted).

Where the facts are sufficiently clear to permit a determination, "[i]ssues of timely filing may be decided under Rule 56." Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 520 (1st Cir.1990); see also Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349, 352 (1st Cir. 1992) ("In a proper case, Rule 56 may be used to determine the applicability of a statutory time bar to a particular set of facts."). Nevertheless, summary judgment is not appropriate where the record acknowledges the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the question of timeliness. See Doyle v. Shubs, 905 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1990) (employing this standard).

B. Choice of Law

It is axiomatic that this Court applies state substantive law when sitting pursuant to federal diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Crellin Techs., Inc. v. Equipmentlease Corp., 18 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1994). State statutes of limitations have been uniformly held to be substantive in nature, rather than procedural. See Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945) ("[A] statute that would completely bar recovery in a suit if brought in a State court bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely formally or negligibly. As to consequences that so intimately affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity case should follow State law."). The court employs the choice-of-law principles of the forum state when the parties involved in the dispute express no preference to be governed by a particular state's laws. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 491, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Crellin, 18 F.3d at 4; Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1128 (1st Cir.1978); see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-1-105(1). Therefore, this Court applies Rhode Island choice-of-law principles to determine if Florida, California, or Rhode Island substantive law will control.

Rhode Island uses an interest-weighing approach to reconcile conflicts of law. See Gordon v. Clifford Metal Sales Co., 602 A.2d 535, 538-39 (R.I.1992); Pardey v. Blvd. Billiard Club, 518 A.2d 1349, 1351 (R.I.1986); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, 923 (1968); see also A.C. Beals Co. v. R.I. Hospital, 110 R.I. 275, 292 A.2d 865, 870-71 (1972). In this case, application of Florida or California law to Plaintiffs' state-law based claims would not result in a different outcome than if this Court were to apply Rhode Island law.³ Compare Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 95.11, 95.031, Houston v. Florida-Georgia Television Co., 192 So.2d 540, 543 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1966), Collins v. Los Angeles County, 241 Cal.App.2d 451, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586, 588 (1966), and Cal. Civ.Code §§ 19, 3426.6, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code §§ 338, 339, with Swiss v. Eli Lilly & Co., 559 F.Supp. 621, 624 (D.R.I.1982), and R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6-41-6, 9-1-13(a). Moreover, Plaintiffs have not opposed Defendants' contention that Rhode Island law should govern this action. Consequently, the Court will apply Rhode Island law.

C. Discussion

Plaintiffs' complaint asserts the following five causes of action against Defendants: 1) misappropriation; 2) conversion; 3) copyright infringement; 4) fraud; and 5) quantum meruit. In Rhode Island "[a]n action for misappropriation must be brought within three years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered." R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-41-6. The limitations period applicable to claims for copyright infringement is three years. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). Claims for fraud, conversion, and quantum meruit must all be brought within ten years. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(a); Bourdon's Inc. v. Ecin Indus., 704 A.2d 747, 753 (R.I.1997) (stating that statute of limitations for fraud claims is the general ten-year period applicable to civil actions).

Under Rhode Island law, the general rule is that a cause of action will accrue and the statute of limitations will begin to run, at the time the injury occurs. Swiss, 559 F.Supp. at 624; see...