Watson v. Michigan Bureau of State Lottery

• Decision Date: 22 July 1997
• Docket Number: Docket No. 191740
• Citation: 224 Mich.App. 639,569 N.W.2d 878
• Parties: Laura A. WATSON and Sweet Sixteen Lotto Club, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MICHIGAN BUREAU OF STATE LOTTERY and Commissioner of the Michigan Bureau of State Lottery, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 878

569 N.W.2d 878

224 Mich.App. 639

Laura A. WATSON and Sweet Sixteen Lotto Club, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MICHIGAN BUREAU OF STATE LOTTERY and Commissioner of the Michigan Bureau of State Lottery, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 191740.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 1, 1997, at Lansing.

Decided July 22, 1997, at 9:15 a.m.

Released for Publication Oct. 8, 1997.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., and Keith D. Roberts and John M. Cahill, Asst. Attys. Gen., for Respondents-Appellants.

Before HOOD, P.J., and McDONALD and YOUNG, JJ.

HOOD, Presiding Judge.

Respondents appeal as of right from the trial court's order allowing the individual petitioners, Laura A. Watson and nine others, to assign their lotto prize installments. We affirm.

Petitioners were members of plaintiff Sweet Sixteen Lotto Club. Sweet Sixteen was the jackpot winner in the Michigan lotto drawing held on July 19, 1995. The jackpot amount was approximately $2,100,000. Each petitioner's pro-rata share was to be paid in twenty gross annual installments of $6,562.50, payable through the year 2014. Petitioners agreed to sell their remaining pro-rata prize installment payments to Prosperity Partners, Inc. Petitioners had to execute and deliver to Prosperity an assignment of their remaining lotto prize installments.

Petitioners and Sweet Sixteen filed a petition for an order allowing the assignment of their lottery winnings. In their petition, petitioners stated that they were not able to assign their lottery winnings to Prosperity unless the trial court issued an order permitting the assignment pursuant to M.C.L. § 432.25(1); M.S.A. § 18.969(25)(1). The trial court subsequently ordered that respondents show cause why an order allowing petitioners to assign their prize winnings should not be issued. In their answer to the order to show cause, respondents indicated that the assignment of proceeds from a lottery prize was specifically precluded as a matter of law pursuant to M.C.L. § 432.25(1); M.S.A. § 18.969(25)(1) and administrative rules. Respondents relied on an unpublished per curiam opinion and an unpublished order from this Court, as well as cases from other jurisdictions.

At the hearing on the order to show cause, respondents argued that assignments are awkward and complicated and place a burden on the lottery bureau. Respondents also argued that the Legislature had prohibited such assignments. The trial court found that a prize winner should have "a right of assignment." The court noted that the only consideration is whether there is double jeopardy or liability to the state. The trial court then issued an order allowing petitioners to assign their prize winnings. In its findings of fact, the trial court stated:

This Court has the authority and jurisdiction to issue an appropriate judicial order to direct that lottery prize payments are to be made to a person other than the prize claimant, pursuant to 1972 PA 239, § 25, being M.C.L. § 432.25, and concludes that the request of Plaintiffs herein warrants issuance of such an order.

I

Respondents first argue that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over petitioners' claim against the State of Michigan because it is a contract action. ¹ We disagree. Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Smith v. Smith, 218 Mich.App. 727, 729, 555 N.W.2d 271 (1996). We note that, although the jurisdictional issue here was not raised in the trial court, a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even if raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 729-730, 555 N.W.2d 271.

M.C.L. § 600.605; M.S.A. § 27A.605 defines the original jurisdiction of circuit courts:

Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state.

Pursuant to M.C.L. § 600.6419(1)(a); M.S.A. § 27A.6419(1)(a), the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction:

To hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated or unliquidated, ex contractu, and ex delicto, against the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.

A complaint raising a claim against the state or its agencies and seeking only money damages must be filed in the Court of Claims. Silverman v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 445 Mich. 209, 217, 516 N.W.2d 54 (1994); see also Welch v. Dist. Court, 215 Mich.App. 253, 256, 545 N.W.2d 15 (1996). A complaint seeking only equitable or declaratory relief must be filed in the circuit court. Silverman, supra.

In this case, petitioners were not seeking money damages from respondents. Rather, petitioners sought only declaratory relief that would allow them to assign their lottery winnings to Prosperity. Accordingly, the Court of Claims does not have exclusive jurisdiction over petitioners' claim. The circuit court therefore properly exercised subject-matter jurisdiction over petitioners' petition.

II

Respondents next contend that the Lottery Act, M.C.L. § 432.1 et seq.; M.S.A. § 18.969(1) et seq., and the administrative rules promulgated pursuant to that act specifically preclude the voluntary assignment of a prize winner's interest in a lottery prize. Specifically, respondents, contend that the Lottery Act only permits payments to those other than winners according to a judicial determination such as a marital property disposition or child support order or other such "appropriate judicial order," and that assignments such as the one sought by petitioners are completely unrelated to these types of orders. No Michigan court has previously issued a published opinion construing M.C.L. § 432.25(1); M.S.A. § 18.969(25)(1) as it relates to this issue.

The relevant part of the Lottery Act, M.C.L. § 432.25(1); M.S.A. § 18.969(25)(1), provides:

The right of any person to a prize drawn is not assignable, except that payment of any prize drawn from the state lottery may be paid to the family members or to the estate of a deceased prizewinner as provided in subsection (2), to a person pursuant to an appropriate judicial order, or to the state pursuant to section 32.[ ²

Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Rose Hill Center, Inc. v. Holly Twp., 224 Mich.App. 28, 32, 568 N.W.2d 332 (1997);; Smeets v. Genesee Co. Clerk, 193 Mich.App. 628, 633, 484 N.W.2d 770 (1992). If the plain and ordinary meaning of the language is clear, judicial construction is normally neither necessary nor permitted. Lorencz v. Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 370, 376, 483 N.W.2d 844 (1992). If reasonable minds can differ with respect to the meaning of a statute, however, judicial construction is appropriate. Heinz v. Chicago Rd. Investment Co., 216 Mich.App. 289, 295, 549 N.W.2d 47 (1996). The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 442 Mich. 201, 212, 501 N.W.2d 76 (1993). The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute. House Speaker v. State Administrative Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 567, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993). The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed. Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc. v. Watersmeet Twp. (After Remand), 217 Mich.App. 7, 12, 551 N.W.2d 199 (1996). A court must look to the object of the statute, the harm it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes the purpose of the statute. Marquis v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich. 638, 644, 513 N.W.2d 799 (1994). Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the act. Barr v. Mt. Brighton Inc., 215 Mich.App. 512, 516, 546 N.W.2d 273 (1996).

One probable objective of M.C.L. § 432.25(1); M.S.A. § 18.969(25)(1) is to prohibit voluntary assignments to the extent that there is no procedural safeguard to protect prize winners from their own human frailties. On the other hand, the statute also functions to prevent the state from being unduly burdened. The statute unambiguously places a general prohibition on the assignment of lottery prizes, but specifically provides three exceptions to this prohibition: (1) the winnings may be paid to the family members or to the estate of a deceased prizewinner; (2) the winnings may be paid to a person pursuant to an appropriate judicial order; or (3) the winnings may be paid to the state pursuant to a winner's liability to the state or support arrearage.

The language of the exception at issue in this case--pursuant to an appropriate judicial order--is ambiguous to the extent that the statute does not define the language and does not set forth factors to be considered in determining whether this exception is to apply. In interpreting statutes, however, all words and phrases are to be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language. In re PSC's Determination Regarding Coin-Operated Telephones, 204 Mich.App. 350, 353, 514 N.W.2d 775 (1994). Reference to a dictionary is appropriate to ascertain the ordinary meaning of a word. Popma v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 446 Mich. 460, 470, 521 N.W.2d 831 (1994).

The phrase "judicial order" means an order that involves the exercise of judicial discretion and affects the final result of litigation. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed), p 761. The adjective "appropriate" connotes suitability or compatibility. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged Edition (1966), p 106. Accordingly, an appropriate judicial order is an order issued within the proper discretion and jurisdiction of the court.

Despite the language of the statute, respondents seek an interpretation of an "appropriate judicial order" that...