Wedergren v. Board of Directors

• Decision Date: 17 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. 65653,65653
• Parties: Joel L. WEDERGREN, Appellant, v. The BOARD OF DIRECTORS, South Tama County Community School District; The South Tama County Community School District; Verna Lacina, President of the Board of Directors, South Tama County Community School District; Leo Benda; Raymond Coleman; and Jerry Koster, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 12

307 N.W.2d 12

Joel L. WEDERGREN, Appellant, v. The BOARD OF DIRECTORS, South Tama County Community School District; The South Tama County Community School District; Verna Lacina, President of the Board of Directors, South Tama County Community School District; Leo Benda; Raymond Coleman; and Jerry Koster, Appellees.

No. 65653.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 17, 1981.

Gary L. Robinson of Klinger, Robinson & McCuskey, P. C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Michael J. Moon of Cartwright, Druker & Ryden, Marshalltown, for appellees.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, McGIVERIN, and LARSON, JJ.

McGIVERIN, Justice.

Joel L. Wedergren appeals from the district court's decision upholding the school board's action in discharging him from his job as superintendent of the South Tama County Community School District. We affirm the court's decision.

Wedergren was first employed by the school district in March 1977. In 1978 the Board and Wedergren entered into a contract of employment. The contract term began July 1, 1978, and was to be for the three-year maximum allowed by law. § 279.20, The Code 1979.

The Board voted on March 8, 1979, to consider discharging Wedergren from his position. Since the discharge was during the term of the contract, he could be discharged only for just cause. § 279.25. As required by section 279.25, the Board followed the hearing and review procedures contained in section 279.24. The parties agree that the statutory procedures were followed.

A hearing officer, selected by the parties pursuant to section 279.24, held an evidentiary hearing in May 1979. His proposed decision recommended that Wedergren not be discharged. The Board, on its own motion, elected to review the proposed decision. The Board heard the case de novo upon the record made before the hearing officer, and made its own findings of fact and conclusions of law. It then voted to discharge the superintendent. On Wedergren's appeal, the district court affirmed the Board's action. Wedergren has appealed to us.

We must consider the following issues:

(1) Does section 279.24 on its face or as applied to Wedergren deny him procedural due process because of inadequate notice of termination?

(2) Was Wedergren denied the procedural due process right to an impartial decisionmaker because of a combination of functions or the personal bias of some Board members?

(3) Was the decision to consider discharge void because of a violation of chapter 28A, the Iowa open meetings law?

(4) Have substantial rights of the superintendent been prejudiced because Board policies were not followed?

(5) Is the Board's finding of just cause unsupported by substantial evidence?

I. Adequacy of notice. Wedergren raises constitutional challenges to the adequacy of notice of the reasons for consideration of termination and, as discussed in division II, the fairness of the hearing before the Board. He claims a denial of procedural due process guaranteed by U.S.Const. amend. XIV and Iowa Const. art. I, § 9.

The interests protected by the due process clause are not infinite. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 556 (1972). Procedural due process applies only if a liberty or property interest is implicated. Id.

In Wedergren's case, we conclude that he had a property interest in his contract and therefore is entitled to due process. At the time of his termination, he was in the first year of a three-year contract. Under Iowa law, the Board was obligated to honor the contract unless it discharged him for just cause during a contract year. §§ 279.24 ("An administrator's contract shall remain in force and effect for the period stated in the contract"), .25 ("An administrator may be discharged at any time during the contract year for just cause"). A superintendent's interest in having his contract term honored, protected by state law, is a property interest under the due process clause. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77, 92 S.Ct. at 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d at 560-61; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699, 33 L.Ed.2d 570, 580 (1972); Estabrook v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 283 N.W.2d 306, 310 (Iowa 1979). Having concluded that Wedergren is protected by due process, we must decide whether it was afforded him in this case.

Wedergren first challenges the adequacy of the notice required by section 279.24 and given him in this case.

Once the Board voted to consider discharging him, it had to give him written notice. § 279.25. "The notice shall state the specific reasons to be used by the board for considering termination ...." § 279.24. Wedergren does not challenge the timeliness or method of notice. Cf. Smith v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 212 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 1973) (because of breakdown in mail service, requiring appeal within seven days after notice of decision mailed is unconstitutional). Rather, Wedergren challenges the adequacy of the notice. He claims that since neither the statute requires, nor his notice contained, a list of the names of people making accusations and specific factual bases for the charges, he was denied due process. Brouillette v. Board of Directors, 519 F.2d 126, 128 (8th Cir. 1975); Bishop v. Keystone Area Education Agency Number 1, 275 N.W.2d 744, 752 (Iowa 1979).

To comport with due process, a person must ordinarily be informed somehow of the issues involved in order to prevent surprise at the hearing and allow an opportunity to prepare. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1020, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 299 (1970). The test is fundamental fairness, not whether the notice meets technical rules of common law pleading.

The notice required by section 279.24, and given Wedergren, does not fall short of due process. The statute requires "specific reasons." The Board's notice gave Wedergren a list of ten reasons and specific examples of Wedergren's shortcomings. Of course, the statements could have been made more specific by stating names of accusers and more details on each accusation. Wedergren, however, did not utilize the discovery procedures afforded him to determine the exact details of the charges or the names of his accusers, if he believed he could not adequately prepare his defense. §§ 272A.8, 17A.13(1) ("Discovery procedures applicable to civil actions are available to all parties"). Wedergren claims he tried to use discovery by making requests for tapes of executive sessions of the Board, which were denied by the hearing officer. He did not attempt any less intrusive means of obtaining the information, such as by written interrogatories, does not challenge the denial of his requests for tapes, and did not request any continuance to prepare. In this situation, we find his due process rights to fair notice were met. No error exists in this assignment.

II. Impartial decisionmaker. A basic tenet of procedural due process is that a person is entitled to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L.Ed.2d 712, 723 (1975); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271, 90 S.Ct. at 1022, 25 L.Ed.2d at 301; Keith v. Community School District, 262 N.W.2d 249, 258-62 (Iowa 1978). Wedergren generally makes two claims: (1) the Board has unconstitutionally combined the functions of investigation, prosecution and adjudication, and (2) three Board members held such animosity towards him that their personal prejudice precluded a fair decision. We do not find a denial of due process.

Wedergren's first contention is that the Board has unconstitutionally combined the functions of investigation and adjudication. Prior to the March 8 decision to consider termination, at least some members of the Board heard complaints from people or investigated on their own about Wedergren's performance. This information was then used in deciding to initiate termination proceedings. After the evidentiary hearing before the hearing officer, the Board also decided on the record made before the hearing officer to terminate Wedergren.

In the performance of its duties, and in making the initial decision required by sections 279.24 and .25 to consider termination, a board must necessarily be exposed to facts or allegations about a superintendent's conduct. In the absence of evidence that a board has prejudged the facts of the case, we will not find a denial of due process by the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions. Cf. Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 309, 54 L.Ed.2d 195 (1977) (board disqualified because one member made a pledge during campaign to vote to remove superintendent which amounted to prejudgment of factual issues). Ordinarily, some exposure of a decisionmaker to facts in dispute does not automatically disqualify the decisionmaker on due process grounds. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55, 95 S.Ct. at 1468, 43 L.Ed.2d at 728 ("mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adversary hearing"); Bishop, 275 N.W.2d at 752. See generally, 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 19:4 (2d ed. 1980). We also do not find a violation of due process when the Board voted to consider termination and also voted to finally terminate. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 56-58, 95 S.Ct. at 1469-70, 43 L.Ed.2d at 728-30.

To support his argument that there has been an unconstitutional combination of investigation and decision making, Wedergren relies on Keith. In Keith, however, we were concerned with a different problem. Our primary concern there was that the board, in its ultimate decision to terminate the teacher's contract, had to call solely upon its own personal knowledge of what occurred rather than evidence gathered in an adversary hearing. Keith, 262 N.W.2d at 253, 260. In contrast, in Wedergren's case, due to a change in termination statutes since Keith, the Board was...