Welch Foods, Inc. v. Attorney General, Docket No. 164659

• Decision Date: 15 September 1995
• Docket Number: Docket No. 164659
• Citation: 540 N.W.2d 693,213 Mich.App. 459
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
• Parties: WELCH FOODS, INCORPORATED and S. Martinelli & Company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Defendant-Appellee.

Page 693

540 N.W.2d 693

213 Mich.App. 459

WELCH FOODS, INCORPORATED and S. Martinelli & Company Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 164659.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Aug. 2, 1995, at Lansing.

Decided Sept. 15, 1995, at 9:35 a.m.

Released for Publication Dec. 18, 1995.

Burditt & Radzius, Chtd. by George M. Burditt and Steven M. Kowal, Chicago, IL, and Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone by Michael J. Hodge and James R. Lancaster, Jr., Lansing, for plaintiffs.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Frederick H. Hoffecker, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.

Before HOEKSTRA, P.J., and HOOD and CURTIS, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court's grant of summary disposition for the defendant and dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiff had claimed that the sparkling fruit juices they produce are not subject to Michigan's bottle law, M.C.L. § 445.571 et seq.; M.S.A. § 18.1206(11) et seq. We affirm.

Plaintiffs produce and sell fruit juices and sparkling fruit juices. The sparkling fruit juices are undiluted fruit juices that have been subjected to carbonation. Both plaintiffs bottle some of their sparkling fruit juices in 750-milliliter bottles, which are approximately the same size and shape as wine and champagne bottles. The labeling of these bottles is similar in appearance to that of champagne bottles. Martinelli also produces twelve-, ten-, and eight-ounce bottles, which are sold singly and in four-packs.

In October 1991, defendant issued a notice of intended action against plaintiffs, which informed them that he would commence an enforcement action against them if their sparkling fruit juice products did not conform to the bottle law. Plaintiffs requested a declaratory ruling from the Attorney General pursuant to 1979 AC, R 14.57. Plaintiffs sought a ruling that the bottle law did not apply to their sparkling fruit juice products. The Attorney General declined to issue the requested declaratory ruling. Plaintiffs responded by filing this action.

The construction of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Vugterveen Systems, Inc. v. Olde Millpond Corp, 210 Mich.App. 34, 39, 533 N.W.2d 320 (1995). A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that we must ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Erb Lumber Co. v. Homeowner Construction Lien Recovery Fund, 206 Mich.App. 716, 719, 522 N.W.2d 917 (1994). The first consideration in determining intent is the specific language of the statute. Id.; House Speaker v. State Administrative Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 567, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993). The bottle law was proposed by initiative pursuant to Const.1963, art. 2, § 9. Initiative provisions are liberally construed to effectuate their purposes and facilitate rather than hamper the exercise of reserved rights by the people. People v. Cohens, 111 Mich.App. 788, 795, 314 N.W.2d 756 (1981), citing Newsome v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 69 Mich.App. 725, 729, 245 N.W.2d 374 (1976). The words of an initiative law are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by the voters. Id. While we presume the Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed in a statute, judicial construction is permitted if the language is unclear and susceptible to more than one interpretation. Cowen v. Dep't of Treasury, 204 Mich.App. 428, 431, 516 N.W.2d 511 (1994). If the statutory language is ambiguous, or reasonable minds may differ in its interpretation, a reasonable construction must be given in light of the purpose of the statute. Witherspoon v. Guilford, 203 Mich.App. 240, 247, 511 N.W.2d 720 (1994).

Michigan's bottle law prohibits the sale of beverages in nonreturnable containers. M.C.L. § 445.572(1); M.S.A. § 18.1206(12)(1). "Beverage" is defined by the statute as

a soft drink, soda water, carbonated natural or mineral water, or other nonalcoholic carbonated drink; beer, ale, or other malt drink of whatever alcoholic content; or a mixed wine drink or a mixed spirit drink. [M.C.L. § 445.571(a); M.S.A. § 18.1206(11)(a).]

Where a statute defines a term, that definition supersedes a commonly accepted or dictionary definition, and it is binding on the courts. Titanus Cement Wall Co, Inc v. Watson, 158 Mich.App. 210, 217, 405 N.W.2d 132 (1987).

Defendant argues that plaintiffs' products fall within those beverages that are "other nonalcoholic carbonated drink[s]." Plaintiffs assert, however, that their products are "fruit juices," which are not "drinks," and thus do not fall within the statutory definition of "beverages." The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. We agree that plaintiffs' products are beverages for purposes of the bottle law because they are nonalcoholic carbonated drinks.

First, plaintiffs argue that the term "drink" does not include undiluted fruit juices, such as their products. In support of this position, plaintiffs refer to definitions as used by the Michigan Department of Agriculture and the United States Food and Drug Administration. Where a word is not defined within a statute, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and a court may consult dictionary definitions. M.C.L. § 8.3a; M.S.A. § 2.212(1); Markillie v. Livingston Co Bd of Rd Comm'rs, 210 Mich.App. 16, 21, 532 N.W.2d 878 (1995). We decline to define "drink" according to the technical definitions of the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration. Instead, we construe the term according to its commonly understood meaning.

"Drink" is defined as a "liquid suitable for swallowing." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1973). Plaintiffs argue that undiluted fruit juices are differentiated from diluted fruit juices. According to plaintiffs, the former is considered by consumers to be "juices" and the latter as "drinks." We cannot accept plaintiffs' assertion that undiluted fruit juices are not commonly understood to be drinks.

We note that the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration definitions, which plaintiffs press us to accept, are of the terms "fruit juice-drink," "fruit drink" and "fruit flavored drink." These definitions are more specific than merely "drink." Plaintiffs have provided affidavits of individuals who work in their industry that indicate that within the fruit...