Welch v. Keene Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-P-1200,89-P-1200
• Citation: 31 Mass.App.Ct. 157,575 N.E.2d 766
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,020 John F. WELCH v. KEENE CORPORATION et al. 1
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 766

575 N.E.2d 766

31 Mass.App.Ct. 157, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,020

John F. WELCH v. KEENE CORPORATION et al. ¹

No. 89-P-1200.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts,

Norfolk.

Argued March 20, 1991.

Decided Aug. 5, 1991.

Further AppellateReview Denied

Sept. 26, 1991.

Kevin E. Young, Boston, for Keene Corp.

Peter J. Rubin, Portland, Maine, for Owens-Illinois, Inc.

Albert P. Zabin (Christine M. Hayes with him), Boston, for plaintiff.

Thomas L. Crotty, Jr., & Joel G. Beckman, Boston, for H.K. Porter Co., Inc., submitted a brief.

Richard L. Neumeier, Thomas P. O'Reilly, Leonard F. Zandrow, Jr., and Janet L. Maloof, Boston, for The Celotex Corp., submitted a brief.

Before SMITH, PORADA and GREENBERG, JJ.

GREENBERG, Justice.

John F. Welch brought this action against thirteen manufacturers of asbestos materials, among them the defendants Keene Corporation (Keene) and Owens-Illinois, Inc. (Owens), seeking damages for an injury resulting from his exposure to asbestos products between 1954 and 1976. On March 21, 1989, the case was submitted to a jury on special questions, several of which are germane to this appeal. ² The jury returned a verdict of $878,566.55 for Welch against six of the defendants who then remained in the case, and found in favor of the defendant Fibreboard Corporation. Only Keene and Owens are presently before us on appeal (see note 1, supra ). The defendants' first claim error in the trial judge's refusal to grant their motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that Welch's injury was caused by exposure to their asbestos products. They also challenge the judge's admission of certain evidence and his instructions to the jury on damages. Keene further argues that Welch did not establish the corporation's failure to warn him of the inherent dangers of asbestos. Finding no merit to any of these contentions, we affirm the judgment.

1. Denial of defendants' motions. We turn first to the defendants' claim that it was error for the trial judge to deny their motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In reviewing the denial of a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the question before us is the same: that is, whether "anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff." Dobos v. Driscoll, 404 Mass. 634, 656, 537 N.E.2d 558 (1989), quoting from Raunela v. Hertz Corp., 361 Mass. 341, 343, 280 N.E.2d 179 (1972). The court may not substitute its judgment of facts for that of the jury. O'Shaughnessy v. Besse, 7 Mass.App.Ct. 727, 728, 389 N.E.2d 1049 (1979). With these standards in mind, we set forth pertinent facts as the jury could have found.

Welch began work as an asbestos insulator for Local 6 of the Asbestos Workers union of America in 1954. During a four and one-half year apprenticeship, he assisted insulators by carrying, applying, and mixing asbestos materials. Throughout his subsequent career as an insulator, he moulded thermal asbestos insulation to pipes, ducts, and boiler room equipment at a variety of installations. Welch worked at "hundreds" of work sites, many of which involved the presence of Keene's and Owens' products. ³ As a result of his exposure to asbestos dust, Welch developed asbestosis. ⁴ After working for 22 years, he stopped in 1976, at the age of 43, because of his medical condition.

During the time of Welch's employment at four specific sites, including three in Massachusetts, Owens manufactured and supplied the insulating material "Kaylo." ⁵ Owens' Kaylo was used at a job site in Natick during 1955 and 1956, a time when the jury could infer that Welsh was also at that job site in his capacity as a pipe insulator. There was also evidence of Welch's working with Kaylo at three other specific sites. In short, the evidence showed that Welch used Owens' Kaylo many times throughout his career and as early as 1955; that is, more than three years before Owens ceased making and distributing the product.

Welch used Keene's or its predecessor firm, Baldwin Hill's, asbestos-containing cement at three specific installations over his career. He applied Baldwin Hill's High Temp cement to pipes at two specific sites, a radar station in 1955, and again in 1963 to 1964 at a hospital. In addition, Welch used Keene's "85% Magnesium Cement" for a period of several months in 1967 and 1968, at a power plant job site. There was also evidence brought in through lay witnesses that the mixing and application of these asbestos products typically caused the release of a substantial amount of asbestos dust into the air.

The evidence before the jury as to causation included expert testimony on the origins of asbestosis as well as the cumulative and potentially deadly effect of asbestos dust on human lungs over time. Other expert witnesses testified concerning the knowledge of the asbestos industry about the dangers of the product as early as the 1930's. ⁶

The defendants' principal contentions are that, as matter of law, the evidence was insufficient on the identification, exposure, and causal relationship of defendants' products to plaintiff's illness and that the evidence did not establish a failure to warn.

a. Identification. The defendants claim that they were entitled to a directed verdict, or in the alternative, to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict due to Welch's failure to identify their specific products as the cause of his injury. Indeed, Welch's identification of the injurious product is a necessary element of his case. Smith v. Ariens Co., 375 Mass. 620, 623, 377 N.E.2d 954 (1978). Mathers v. Midland-Ross Corp., 403 Mass. 688, 691, 532 N.E.2d 46 (1989). It is enough, however, to reach the jury that Welch show that he worked with, or in close proximity to, defendants' asbestos products. See, e.g., Roehling v. National Gypsum Co. Gold Bond Bldg. Prod., 786 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir.1986). A plaintiff may also demonstrate exposure to a specific product through testimony of coworkers who can identify him as working with or around these products. Ibid. See also 9 Travers, American Law of Products Liability 3d § 113.34 (1988).

Based on the evidence introduced by Welch, we conclude that he sufficiently identified the products of Owens and Keene. Several portions of the record, including Welch's own description of his direct application of asbestos products, among them Owens' Kaylo and Keene's cements, on "hundreds" of sites, support our conclusion.

b. Causation. Regardless of Welch's ability to identify their specific asbestos-containing products, the defendants argue that the alleged exposure was not substantial enough to cause his injuries. We point out that Welch is not required to prove that "but for" the particular product of each manufacturer, he would not have been harmed; rather, he need only show "that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(1) comment a (1965). See O'Connor v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 401 Mass. 586, 589, 518 N.E.2d 510 (1988); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 780 F.2d 147, 156 (1st Cir.1985). With a view of the evidence favorable to the plaintiff, Cocco v. Deluxe Sys., Inc., 25 Mass.App.Ct. 151, 154, 516 N.E.2d 1171 (1987), we think that it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Welch's exposure to the defendants' products was substantial and that their products caused his injury.

There is no factual basis upon which to conclude that Welch's exposure to the defendants' products was insignificant or de minimis. Welch established that the conditions of his working environment exceeded the generally accepted safe exposure levels for ultimate users of the products. More important, Welch offered expert testimony that his asbestosis was caused by the cumulative effect of all the dust that he had inhaled over the span of his career. Because each inhalation of asbestos dust can result in additional damage to lung tissue, it is all but impossible to determine which exposure is directly responsible for the disease; nor, we add, is it Welch's burden to allocate blame. See Chase v. Roy, 363 Mass. 402, 408, 294 N.E.2d 336 (1973); O'Connor v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 401 Mass. at 591, 518 N.E.2d 510. Taking into account the testimony of Welch's experts, and giving the plaintiff's case the deference to which it is entitled, we find the evidence sufficient both to reach the jury and for the jury to answer affirmatively, as they did, in response to special questions 2, 3, and 4 (note 2, supra ). See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied 419 U.S. 869, 95 S.Ct. 127, 42 L.Ed.2d 107 (1974) (where the plaintiff, an insulation worker, had been exposed to the products of several defendants over a number of years, the court held that from this "strong" circumstantial evidence the jury could find that each defendant was the cause in fact of some injury to him); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1198-1201 (6th Cir.1988) (on the basis of expert testimony, the nature of the plaintiffs' injury, numerous studies, and extensive literature, the court concluded that Velsicol's chemicals and the duration of exposure were 'capable' of causing the types of injuries complained of).

c. Failure to warn. Generally, a manufacturer's duty of care includes an obligation, whenever possible, to eliminate known or reasonably knowable conditions of the product, or to provide an adequate warning of the latent dangers arising from the normal and intended use of the product. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 370 Mass. 69, 75, 345 N.E.2d 683 (1976). MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 135, 475 N.E.2d 65 (1985). Maldonado v. Thomson...