Wernimont v. Wernimont
| Decision Date | 01 September 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-1284.,02-1284. |
| Citation | 686 N.W.2d 186 |
| Parties | Patrick WERNIMONT, Appellant, v. William Joe WERNIMONT, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Charles A. Blades, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Constance Alt and Theresa C. Davis of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
In this personal injury action, Patrick Wernimont sued his father, William Wernimont, for injuries arising out of the use of a skid loader that William owned. Patrick alleged that as his employer, William owed him a duty to provide reasonably safe machinery and a reasonably safe place to work. Patrick also alleged William failed to warn him of the danger the skid loader presented under the circumstances in which it was used. The district court sustained William's motion for summary judgment on the issues of employment and failure to warn. Patrick appealed and we transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed. We granted further review and on that review we vacate the court of appeals decision and reverse the district court judgment on both issues. We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The incident giving rise to this lawsuit happened on William's farm on December 28, 2000. Patrick suffered crushing injuries to his feet when the hydraulic lift arms of a skid loader suddenly fell and pinned his feet to the top of the skid loader where he was standing. William had purchased the skid loader in 1993 and owned it on the date of the incident.
Patrick had been a hired hand on his father's farm for about eight years until August of 2000 — three months before the incident. During this employment, William paid Patrick $1000 per month. The employment was not full-time; rather Patrick helped his father when he needed Patrick to do regular chores and other work. In addition to this employment, Patrick had his own farm. After August of 2000, Patrick continued farming and worked for a tree service. Patrick and William had a history of exchanging work.
On the day of the incident, William was feeding cattle on his farm. Some of the cattle belonged to Patrick and some belonged to William. William was using the skid loader in question for this chore. The skid loader had a bale spear (used to move hay bales) attached to the front end. The bale spear had on it a round hay bale, weighing over 1200 pounds. As William was operating the skid loader through a gate to the cattle, he raised the boom to see that he was not going to hit the cattle. While driving through the gate, William hit a patch of snow, causing the skid loader to tip forward on its front two wheels. The hay bale was touching the ground, and the back two wheels of the skid loader were off the ground.
William switched off the skid loader and went into the house for Patrick's help to right the skid loader. Although Patrick was ill with the flu, he felt well enough to help. While Patrick was dressing, William retrieved his tractor and log chain to pull the skid loader upright, but the skid loader was still "tippy." William then told Patrick to stand on the back-end of the skid loader to counterbalance it. Suddenly, the boom dropped, pinning Patrick's feet to the skid loader.
As a result of this incident, Patrick sued several product defendants as well as William. The product defendants eventually settled, leaving William as the only defendant.
Pertinent to this appeal, Patrick alleged in a count he captioned "negligence against William Joe Wernimont" that William was negligent in failing to warn him of the dangers associated with the skid loader. In a count he captioned "employer liability against William Joe Wernimont," Patrick alleged he was employed by William and for that reason William was liable to him pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 83 (now 1.416). Patrick further alleged that William, as his employer, was negligent in one or more of the following particulars:
William filed a motion for summary judgment. Patrick resisted, contending there were genuine issues of material fact concerning the issue of an employer-employee relationship and one or more legally recognizable duties. Patrick filed an affidavit in support of his resistance.
The district court sustained the motion for summary judgment, concluding Patrick had not presented any evidence supporting an employer-employee relationship and that Patrick was doing a favor for his father, not work for his employer. The court also concluded that Patrick had established no duty running from William to him and therefore all of his negligence allegations, including the failure to warn, must fail.
Patrick appealed and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court ruling, and thereafter we granted Patrick's application for further review.
Although Patrick raised numerous issues, he preserved only two for our review. Those issues concern the district court's action in sustaining William's motion for summary judgment as to the employer-employee relationship and the negligence theory based on a common-law duty to warn.
We review a summary judgment ruling for correction of errors at law. Summary judgment is appropriate under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981 only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. We examine the record before the district court to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether that court correctly applied the law.
Hegeman v. Kelch, 666 N.W.2d 531, 533 (Iowa 2003) (citations omitted). In addition, we view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and allow that party all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record. Delaney v. Int'l Union UAW Local No. 94, 675 N.W.2d 832, 834 (Iowa 2004).
As mentioned, Patrick alleged that he was employed by William on the date of the incident and for that reason William was liable to him pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 83, formerly rule 97, and now rule 1.416. This theory of liability becomes important from Patrick's standpoint, because under this rule, employer liability is governed by the "pure" comparative negligence principles of rule 1.416, not Iowa Code chapter 668 (comparative fault). Ries v. Steffensmeier, 570 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Iowa 1997). Thus, under rule 1.416, "proof of an employee's negligence, even if greater than fifty percent `does not bar recovery but merely mitigates damages.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Moreover, establishing the relationship is important from an injured employee's standpoint because of the duty imposed by the relationship: employers must use reasonable care to provide and maintain for their employees reasonably suitable and safe machinery and tools with which to work, and a reasonably safe place to work. Erickson v. Erickson, 250 Iowa 491, 498, 94 N.W.2d 728, 732 (1959).
William contends the following elements cited in Gabrielson v. State, 342 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Iowa 1984), must be established to prove an employer-employee relationship:
"(1) the right of selection, or to employ at will; (2) responsibility for the payment of wages by the employer; (3) the right to discharge or terminate the relationship; (4) the right to control the work; and (5) is the party sought to be held as the employer the responsible authority in charge of the work or for whose benefit the work is performed."
Gabrielson, 342 N.W.2d at 870 (citation omitted).
William asserts here that Patrick (1) was not receiving and had not received any wages from him for at least three months before the incident, (2) was self-employed at the time of the incident and worked for a tree service, and (3) had simply volunteered to help his father right the skid loader with no expectation of compensation for his assistance. In short, Patrick was simply a volunteer. In addition, William maintains that under Iowa law there is a presumption that worked performed between family members is gratuitous. For all these reasons, William concludes the principal elements for establishing an employment relationship were not present here; therefore, the district court was correct on this issue.
We have made clear that the five elements listed above are not controlling in every situation in which the issue is whether an employer-employee relationship exists. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 572 N.W.2d 537, 542 (Iowa 1997). Rather, the importance of the elements bearing on the existence of an employment situation varies. Id. (). "[I]f the issue turns on whether the person is a `gratuitous employee,' the most important element is the responsibility for payment of wages." Id.; accord Usgaard v. Silver Crest Golf Club, 256 Iowa 453, 456-57, 127 N.W.2d 636, 638 (1964). However, the parties' intent, even if not the primary factor, is always a consideration. Iowa Mut. Ins., 572 N.W.2d at 542; accord Usgaard, 256 Iowa at 456, 127 N.W.2d at 638.
Erickson, 250 Iowa at 495, 94 N.W.2d at 730; accord Ganzhorn v....
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