Willhite v. State, No. 2-08-269-CR (Tex. App. 7/30/2009)
| Decision Date | 30 July 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-08-269-CR.,2-08-269-CR. |
| Parties | FREDDIE FRITZ WILLHITE, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, State. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4 of Tarrant County.
Panel: GARDNER, LIVINGSTON, and WALKER, JJ.
Appellant Freddie Fritz Willhite entered an open plea of guilty to murder, was convicted by the trial court, and was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. In two points, Appellant contends that the trial court failed to admonish him of the consequences of his guilty plea and that his guilty plea was involuntary. We affirm.
Factual and procedural background2
Appellant was indicted for the murder of his wife, Donna Willhite. At the plea hearing, Appellant, as well as his counsel, signed written plea admonishments. By those admonishments, Appellant waived his right to a jury trial, right of confrontation and cross-examination, and right against self-incrimination. Further, the admonishments informed Appellant that he faced a range of punishment of life or not more than ninety nine years or less than fifteen years for the first degree felony offense of murder, enhanced by a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Appellant also signed a judicial confession.
At the plea hearing, which was held in open court and transcribed by the official court reporter, Appellant stated he understood the admonishments and was freely and voluntarily entering a plea of guilty. Appellant had no questions regarding the admonishments or his plea. A week and a half later, at the punishment hearing, Appellant's counsel informed the court that Appellant wished to withdraw his plea and to have his counsel removed. Appellant was sworn and testified his plea was involuntary because it had been coerced.3 However, at the conclusion of his testimony, Appellant stated he wished to continue with the same attorney. The trial court denied Appellant's requests, and after hearing evidence of guilt from several expert and lay witnesses, as well as evidence of Appellant's prior conviction for aggravated assault for enhancement purposes, sentenced Appellant to thirty years' confinement.
Appellant first argues that the trial court failed to admonish him of the range of punishment that would follow from pleading guilty. Before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must provide several admonitions to the defendant, including an admonition of the range of punishment attached to the offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(1) (Vernon 2009). This ensures that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary, such that the defendant fully understands the consequences of pleading guilty. See Whitten v. State, 587 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (op. on reh'g), overruled on other grounds, Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Anderson v. State, 985 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd).
Strict compliance with article 26.13 is not required; the legislature provided the courts with flexibility when giving the statutory admonitions:
The court may make the admonitions required by this article either orally or in writing. If the court makes the admonitions in writing, it must receive a statement signed by the defendant and the defendant's attorney that he understands the admonitions and is aware of the consequences of his plea. If the defendant is unable or refuses to sign the statement, the court shall make the admonitions orally.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(d). See also Estrada v. State, 981 S.W.2d 68, 70-71 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd) ().
Substantial compliance by the trial court with article 26.13 is sufficient unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishments of the court. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c). Substantial compliance is a prima facie showing that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and shifts the burden to the defendant to show he entered the plea without knowing the consequences. Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
Appellant's written waiver, joined by his attorney, states that Appellant fully understood the admonishments and had no questions, that Appellant was aware of the consequences of his plea, that Appellant was mentally competent, and that he entered his plea knowingly, freely, and voluntarily. Appellant admits he received written admonishments, but argues oral admonishments were nonetheless also required, and urges that he was confused, lacked actual awareness of the range of punishment, and did not know what he was signing at the time.4
Article 26.13, on its face, expressly allows either oral or written admonishment; both are not required. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(d). There is no requirement that the judge orally admonish a defendant when the defendant has signed written admonishments, statements, or waivers, and it is established that he understood them. See Scott v. State, 86 S.W.3d 374, 375-76 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); Lee v. State, 39 S.W.3d 373, 375 n. 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Estrada, 981 S.W.2d at 70; Wright v. State, 962 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). Furthermore, at the plea hearing that was on the record, Appellant repeatedly assured the trial court that he understood, read, and had no questions regarding the written admonishments. See Jackson v. State, 139 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd); Hancock v. State, 955 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (citing Edwards v. State, 921 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1996, no pet.).
Appellant cites several cases to support his argument; yet these are inapplicable because they involved situations in which admonishments were either unclear from the record or not stipulated to by the parties. See Vannortrick v. State, 227 S.W.3d 706, 708-710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (); Fakeye v. State, 192 S.W.3d 112, 115 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006) (), aff'd, 227 S.W.3d 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Rachuig v. State, 972 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, pet. ref'd) (). None of these cases contradict the rule that oral admonishments are unnecessary when a trial court properly admonishes a defendant in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(d).
In sum, the trial court complied with the requirements set forth under article 26.13 by providing Appellant complete written admonishment regarding his range of punishment. See Hancock, 955 S.W.2d at 371-72. We overrule Appellant's first point.
Appellant argues in his second point that his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial court failed to explain that he was waiving his right to a jury trial and his right to be free from self-incrimination.
A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of three constitutional rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the right not to incriminate oneself. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711 (1969). Accordingly, to be consistent with due process, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. at 242, 89 S. Ct. 1711; see also, Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1609 (1998); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28, 113 S. Ct. 517, 523 (1992).5 To determine whether the plea was voluntary, we ask whether the plea represented a "voluntary and intelligent choice" available to the defendant. See Parke, 506 U.S. at 29, 113 S. Ct. at 524 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164 (1970)).6 We then examine the record to determine whether the defendant understood the charge and its consequences. See DeVille v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 654, 657 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 968 (1994).
When the record indicates that the trial court duly admonished the defendant, this presents a prima facie showing that defendant's plea was voluntary. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; Jackson, 139 S.W.3d at 14. Defendants who previously admitted their pleas were voluntarily and knowingly made carry a heavy burden on appeal to prove otherwise. Labib v. State, 239 S.W.3d 322, 332 (Tex. App-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Acosta v. State, 160 S.W.3d 204, 211 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
We note from the outset that the trial court's written admonishments create a prima facie showing that Appellant's plea was voluntarily entered. See Jackson, 139 S.W.3d at 14. Nevertheless, Appellant argues that he was confused and lacked actual awareness of the rights he was waiving or what he was signing at the time.7
At the plea hearing, Appellant signed written admonishments, which stated he fully understood the plea admonishments, had no questions, and waived his right to a jury trial and his right against self-incrimination. Appellant also signed a judicial confession, whereby he swore that he had read the indictment and that the allegations therein were "true and correct." Appellant verbally assured the trial court that he understood both documents, had no questions, and voluntarily pled guilty:
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