Williams-Batchelder v. Quasim

• Decision Date: 25 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 24491-8-II.,24491-8-II.
• Citation: 19 P.3d 421,103 Wash.App. 8
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Veronica WILLIAMS-BATCHELDER, Appellant, v. Lyle QUASIM, in his official capacity as Secretary, and Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent.

19 P.3d 421

103 Wash.App. 8

Veronica WILLIAMS-BATCHELDER, Appellant, v. Lyle QUASIM, in his official capacity as Secretary, and Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent.

No. 24491-8-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

August 25, 2000.

Howard L. Graham, Attorney At Law, Tacoma, for Appellant.

Lucretia A. Fishburn, Attorney General's Office, Tacoma, for Respondent.

ARMSTRONG, C.J.

Veronica Williams-Batchelder's family child day care home license was revoked when DSHS learned that she did not live in the home as required by the license. Later, DSHS refused to renew Williams-Batchelder's license to operate an adult family home because her family child day care home license had been revoked. Batchelder appeals the nonrenewal of her adult family home license arguing that: 1) the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act preempts state law; 2) the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Washington State Law Against Discrimination require DSHS to reasonably accommodate her by waiving the licensing requirement; 3) equitable estoppel bars DSHS from revoking her adult family home license; and, 4) the administrative code section¹ that allows DSHS to refuse a license because of a previous license revocation exceeds the scope of the enabling legislation, which allows refusal only if the applicant `has a history of significant noncompliance with federal or state regulations, rules, or laws.'² We find no error and accordingly affirm.

FACTS

In 1995, Veronica Williams-Batchelder was licensed to operate a family child day care home (day care home) on North Prospect Street. The license for a day care home required that she reside at the facility.³ Batchelder also maintained a residence with her husband on Galleon Drive.

In the spring of 1995, Batchelder applied for a license to operate a child day care center (day care center) at the North Prospect address. The license for a day care center does not require the licensee to live on site.⁴ Batchelder, however, did not have a special use permit as required by Tacoma's zoning ordinance and so DSHS denied the application. Batchelder later applied for and was granted a special use permit in February 1996.⁵

But in July 1995, DSHS revoked Batchelder's day care home license after it verified that she was not living at the North Prospect residence. An ALJ later upheld the revocation, as did a review judge.

Meanwhile, as the day care home case was being litigated, Batchelder applied for and was granted a license to operate an adult family home (AFH) at her residence on Galleon Drive.⁶ The AFH license expired December 31, 1996. In August 1996, Residential Care Services (RCS), the part of DSHS responsible for conducting the AFH licensing program, was notified that Batchelder's day care home license was revoked.

After her day care home license was revoked, Batchelder applied for a license to open an AFH at the North Prospect address. DSHS denied this application in January 1997 because of the revocation of the day care home license.

On February 18, 1997, Batchelder arranged to have a chair lift installed in her Galleon Drive AFH.⁷ One week later, DSHS notified Batchelder of its decision to revoke her AFH license for Galleon Drive. This notification was later amended in September 1997 to deny Batchelder's renewal application.

Batchelder contested the denial of her application to renew her AFH license. An ALJ upheld the denial as did an administrative review judge. Batchelder appealed to Thurston County Superior Court, which also upheld the denial of her AFH license renewal.

Central to most of Batchelder's arguments is her assertion that her day care home license was revoked because of a `subsequently corrected zoning code violation.' This is incorrect. Several months before her day care home license was revoked, Batchelder applied for a day care center license. But DSHS denied the permit because Batchelder did not have a special use permit as required by Tacoma's zoning ordinance. Batchelder did get a special use permit from Tacoma in February 1996, some six months after her day care home license was revoked. Nevertheless, the only license Batchelder held in July 1995 was for a day care home. And this required that she live at the home. She did not and because of this, her license was revoked.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

Proceedings before the Board of Appeals are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, RCW 34.05. In review of such administrative agency action, we apply the standards of the APA directly to the record before the agency.⁸ Tapper v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 122 Wash.2d 397, 402, 858 P.2d 494 (1993). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo under an error of law standard. Wilson v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 87 Wash.App. 197, 201, 940 P.2d 269 (1997); St. Martin's College v. Department of Revenue, 68 Wash.App. 12, 15-16, 841 P.2d 803 (1992). We defer to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutes if the matter is within the agency's expertise. St. Martin's College, 68 Wash.App. at 16, 841 P.2d 803.

II. Fair Housing Act

Batchelder argues that the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. sec. 3604 et seq., preempts state law regulating AFHs. Batchelder also argues that the FHAA and the Washington State Law Against Discrimination (WSLAD), RCW 49.60.222, require the Department to reasonably accommodate her by waiving former WAC 388-76-560(5) and (8)(i) (1997).⁹ The Department contends that state law is not preempted by the FHAA because there is no actual conflict between the state and federal law. The Department further argues that Batchelder is not entitled to reasonable accommodation because she does not meet the test for requiring an accommodation.

The Department is correct that the FHAA does not preempt Washington law. Moreover, reasonable accommodation is not required for two reasons. First, there is no evidence of discrimination `because of a handicap.' And second, even if there was a discriminatory impact on the disabled adults in the AFH, a reasonable accommodation claim is inappropriate because the licensing regulation at issue is not applicable to the general population; it is specifically directed at AFHs.

Under the FHAA it is unlawful to:

[D]iscriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of—

(A) that person; or

(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or

(C) any person associated with that person.

42 U.S.C. sec. 3604(f)(2) (emphasis added). And for purposes of 42 U.S.C. sec. 3604(f), discrimination includes: `[A] refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.' 42 U.S.C. sec. 3604(f)(3)(B). Similarly, under RCW 49.60.222(1)(f), it is unlawful:

To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling, to any person; or to a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is sold, rented, or made available; or to any person associated with the person buying or renting.

Batchelder reasons that because she provides housing services to the disabled, she is `associated with' the disabled residents in her AFH and thus protected by the FHAA. Batchelder contends that in denying her a license, DSHS discriminated against her because of her association with disabled residents. And this discrimination impacts her residents. But even if we assume that Batchelder was discriminated against, the FHAA prohibits such discrimination only if it is `because of a handicap.' 42 U.S.C. sec. 3604(f)(2). Any discrimination against Batchelder was not because of a handicap. Rather, it was because of Batchelder's previous failure to comply with the minimum licensing requirements for another DSHS license, a family child care home license.

1. Preemption

Batchelder asserts that former WAC 388-76-560(5) and WAC 388-08-425¹⁰ are invalid to the extent that they conflict with the reasonable accommodation language of the FHAA and the WSLAD. Batchelder is correct that if there was an actual conflict between the FHAA and state or local law, the FHAA would preempt any state or local law. Larkin v. Michigan Dep't of Social Serv., 89 F.3d 285, 289 (6th Cir.1996) (a Michigan statute restricting the location of adult foster care homes was preempted by the FHAA for it discriminated against disabled persons). But, neither RCW ch. 70.128 nor former WAC 388-76-560(5) or WAC 388-08-425 conflict with the FHAA.

The purpose of RCW ch. 70.128 and the regulations promulgated therein is to require that AFH providers meet certain minimum licensing requirements to ensure that the vulnerable adults living in those facilities have their care needs met in a home-like environment. It is a facially neutral statute and sets forth reasonable licensing procedures for AFHs in this state. As the Larkin court noted, the FHAA does not prohibit states from imposing reasonable regulations and licensing procedures for adult foster care facilities. Larkin, 89 F.3d at 292. Nor does the FHAA prohibit states from imposing special safety standards for the protection of disabled persons. Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, Ohio, 974 F.2d 43, 47 (6th Cir.1992) (zoning ordinance requiring extensive safety protections for single family homes housing disabled persons violated the FHAA because the requirements had no correlation to the persons upon which they were imposed and were not tailored to the particular disabilities of the residents). The FHAA merely prohibits standards that are not `demonstrated to be warranted by the unique and special needs' of the population governed by the standards. Marbrunak, 974 F.2d at 47. Batchelder has not shown that DSHS...