Williams v. ERIE COUNTY DIST. ATTY'S OFFICE
Decision Date | 20 April 2004 |
Citation | 848 A.2d 967 |
Parties | Charles Stephon WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. ERIE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE and Bradley H. Foulk, District Attorney in His Official Capacity, Appellees. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Charles S. Williams, appellant, pro se.
Bradley H. Foulk, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Before: LALLY-GREEN, MONTEMURO,1 and JOHNSON, JJ.
OPINION BY JOHNSON, J.:
¶ 1 In this case, we consider for the first time whether and to what extent 42 Pa. C.S. § 9543.1, which governs post-conviction requests for DNA testing, applies to petitioners who have pleaded guilty to the underlying charge. The question arises in the context of Charles Stephon Williams's pro se challenge to the trial court's order denying his post-conviction discovery request. He contends that the court's refusal to provide him with documentary and physical evidence for purposes of DNA testing, or alternatively to order such testing, violated his confrontation and due process rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. He fails, however, to explain why he should be permitted such discovery, years after his guilty plea, or alternatively to demonstrate that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in denying his petition. Consequently we affirm.
¶ 2 On November 12, 1995, Williams was charged with endangering the welfare of children. After additional charges related to the same arrest were filed against Williams, he pleaded guilty. We denied Williams's direct appeal in 1997. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 707 A.2d 554 (1997) (table), appeal granted, 735 A.2d 1269 (table), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 737 A.2d 250 (Pa.1999). On May 23, 2003, Williams filed with the trial court a Petition to Inspect and Test Evidence and Production of Discovery. On May 29, 2003, the trial court denied Williams's petition. The trial court's order stated that Order, 5/29/03. The trial court's Memorandum Opinion in support of this order, filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.1925(a), stated that Memorandum Opinion, 7/8/03. ¶ 3 From the trial court's Order denying his petition, Williams appeals, presenting the following questions for our review:
Brief for Appellant at 3. Williams thus challenges the same order on two constitutional bases: the Confrontation Clauses, found in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; and due process, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Based on our most favorable reading of the argument set forth by Williams, we cannot agree with any of his claims.
¶ 4 We begin by acknowledging that Williams's petition, in effect, constitutes a request for post-conviction relief. We evaluate any post-conviction petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), see 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, regardless of the title of the document filed. See Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50 (Pa.Super.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Chester, 557 Pa. 358, 733 A.2d 1242, 1250-51 (1999) (). To this end, Williams acknowledges as much when he notes that he "is appealing a denial of post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing w[h]ere the appellant is seeking DNA testing and has asserted his innocence." Brief for Appellant at 10.
¶ 5 When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, our scope of review is "limited by the parameters of the act." Commonwealth v. Strong, 563 Pa. 455, 761 A.2d 1167, 1170, n. 3 (2000). Our standard of review permits us to consider only "whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free from legal error." Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 732 A.2d 1167, 1176 (1999). Moreover, in general we "may affirm the decision of the trial court if there is any basis on the record to support the trial court's action; this is so even if we rely on a different basis in our decision to affirm." Commonwealth v. O'Drain, 829 A.2d 316, 321 n. 7 (Pa.Super.2003).
¶ 6 First, we must determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction to review Williams's Petition, which was filed nearly seven years after his conviction became final. The PCRA provides that any PCRA petition "shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final," barring some indication on the petition that one of several exceptions applies. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). Circumstances excusing untimeliness are government interference preventing the petitioner from raising the issue at an earlier time; the emergence of after-discovered evidence; or the development by the United States Supreme Court or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court of a new and pertinent constitutional right and a holding that said right shall apply retroactively. See 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Because timeliness implicates the jurisdiction of this Court, we may not disregard timeliness requirements in order to reach the merits of the claims. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (2000).
¶ 7 Our review of the record discloses no clear basis on which to argue that any of these exceptions applies to excuse the drastic untimeliness of Williams's petition. Moreover, Williams fails to provide authority or evidence suggesting that any exception applies. Although we grant "wide latitude" to pro se appellants, we cannot overlook an absence of substantive argument on something as important as the PCRA court's jurisdiction to review an applicant's petition. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 429 Pa.Super. 421, 632 A.2d 928, 928 (1993). Consequently, to the extent Williams's appeal relies on § 9545 ( ), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of Williams's petition, and his appeal is hereby dismissed due to the underlying petition's untimeliness.
¶ 8 This defect does not end our discussion, however, because Williams argues that he is entitled to physical evidence for purposes of DNA testing, Brief for Appellant at 8-11, 15-16, which may require the application of timeliness rules that differ from those generally applicable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 835 A.2d 747 (Pa.Super.2003) ( ). This argument brings us into the realm of after-discovered evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 828 A.2d 1146 (Pa.Super.2003). In Baker, we declined to find the mere prospect of exculpatory DNA evidence sufficient to fall within the PCRA's timeliness exception for after-discovered evidence. See id. at 1147-48. Because the testing at issue in that case had not yet been ordered, we held that the lack of test results meant that there could be "no new after-discovered evidence upon which to support an exception to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA," and that § 9545(b)(1)(ii) therefore could not save Baker's petition. Id. We also noted the newly-minted amendment to the PCRA concerning post-conviction DNA testing codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1. Insofar as Baker had failed to argue his claim by reference to that section, however, we made "no comment upon the ultimate success of such a motion should Appellant elect to proceed with it." Id. at 1148, n. 1.
¶ 9 The above-mentioned new section of the PCRA took effect on September 8, 2002. Thus, only two cases reviewing claims that rely on § 9543.1 have been the subject of binding precedent, both in this Court. See McLaughlin, 835 A.2d 747; Commonwealth v. Weeks, 831 A.2d 1194 (Pa.Super.2003). Our Supreme Court has yet to grant either of these cases review or otherwise consider § 9543.1. Relevantly, § 9543.1 provides as follows:
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