Williams v. Williams

• Decision Date: 24 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 91-133,91-133
• Citation: 817 P.2d 884
• Parties: Debra J. WILLIAMS, Appellant (Defendant), v. Robert R. WILLIAMS, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 884

817 P.2d 884

Debra J. WILLIAMS, Appellant (Defendant), v. Robert R. WILLIAMS, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 91-133.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Sept. 24, 1991.

Micheal K. Shoumaker, Sheridan, for appellant.

Steven R. Czoschke, Gillette, for appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, J., Retired.

ROONEY, Justice, Retired.

Appellant words the issue on appeal from a divorce decree: "Did the District Court abuse its discretion in dividing the assets of the parties?" Appellee added the issue: "Did reasonable cause exist for this appeal?"

We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion, but we do not find the cause for appeal to be unreasonable so as to award attorney fees to appellee pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05. ¹

The parties were married on August 11, 1984. No children were born of the marriage, but appellee adopted one of appellant's two children from a former marriage. In 1986, appellant moved from the parties' home in Gillette to Colorado. Appellee obtained an uncontested legal separation from appellant on July 13, 1990. On September 27, 1990, appellee moved for a decree of divorce. After trial, the decree was entered on April 16, 1991.

W.S. 20-2-114 provides in part:

"In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children."

Appellant contends that the trial court ignored the portion of the statute which reads "the condition in which they will be left by the divorce" by not giving sufficient consideration to her physical condition as a result of two automobile accidents, and she contends that the portion of the statute which reads "the party through whom the property was acquired" need not be applied. She acknowledges the difficulty of her position, and begins the argument in her brief:

"The Appellant believes she should have alimony or a greater portion of the property. Her argument is difficult to reconcile with Wyoming Law. Even a party who is awarded alimony must show both a need for it and the other spouse's ability to pay. Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029 (Wyo.1989). If the Appellant did not receive the award of alimony, the Appellant must show that the trial court abused its discretion. To show the abuse of discretion she must show that the trial court's distribution of marital property was so unfair and unequitable as to shock the conscience of the court. Overcast v. Overcast, 780 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Wyo.1989)."

Two well established rules are pertinent to the consideration of this issue:

"A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances."

Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo.1980).

"Our rule is that where the sufficiency of evidence is an issue we uphold the judgment if there is evidence to support it, and in so doing we look only to the evidence submitted by the prevailing party and give to it every favorable inference which may be drawn therefrom, without considering any contrary evidence."

Hance v. Straatsma, 721 P.2d 575, 578 (Wyo.1986). And see Igo v. Igo, 759 P.2d 1253 (Wyo.1988), involving the same issue as here presented.

Under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the trial court acted in a manner which exceeded the bounds of reason. Appellant's physical condition ² was only one of the many circumstances to be considered by the court in making a division of the property. The parties had lived together for only about two years. Appellant had attended college and had a degree in accounting and a position with the State of Colorado. Although child support was not requested by appellant, the divorce decree directed appellee to pay $800 monthly for support of the adopted child (for about five years unless emancipation occurs for other than reaching majority). The amount is in accord with that directed by statute. The decree directed appellee to pay monthly the cost of appellant's medical insurance for a one year period, and to maintain a reasonably comprehensive health and accident insurance policy covering the adopted child (the parties to share equally health care expenses not covered by the policy including deductibles).

Appellee was awarded property owned by him prior to the marriage and that inherited by him, viz 5,708 shares of Ralston Purina stock...