Wilson v. State
Citation | 14 P.3d 912 |
Decision Date | 22 December 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 99-162.,99-162. |
Parties | Wesley WILSON, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Representing Appellant: Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Assistant Appellate Counsel.
Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kimberly A. Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ. THOMAS, Justice.
The most significant of the issues presented in this appeal by Wesley Wilson (Wilson), from his conviction for aggravated assault and battery, is found in his claim that the district court erred in refusing a proffered jury instruction on the statutory definition of "serious bodily injury." He also urges, as appropriate, alternative grounds for reversal, that a lapse of 140 days between his arraignment and his trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial, as well as the dictates of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b), and that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts. We conclude that a discerning analysis of Wilson's contentions discloses no reversible error. The Judgment and Sentence entered in the district court is affirmed.
Wilson presents these issues for our review:
The State's brief includes this statement of the issues:
On October 2, 1998, Wilson moved into the home of the victim and her three children. Four days later, Wilson, who had been drinking, assaulted the victim in her bathroom. The couple had been to a party at a relative's home, and upon their return to the victim's house Wilson became argumentative. His anger escalated quickly, and when the victim went to the bathroom, Wilson broke into the bathroom. He struck the victim with his fists, a toilet seat that he tore off the toilet, and a towel rack he pulled off the wall. The victim reported the beating to the police. Later, Wilson apologized, but at the same time he insisted that the victim recant her statement to the police.
In an Information filed on October 9, 1998, Wilson was charged with one count of aggravated assault and battery, as well as other offenses which are not related to this appeal. At his arraignment on November 17, 1998, Wilson pled not guilty, and trial was scheduled for March 22, 1999. Prior to his arraignment, Wilson filed a motion for a speedy trial and for notice of the intent of the State to produce evidence of prior bad acts at his trial. On March 18, 1999, the State filed notice of its intent to introduce evidence of some of Wilson's prior bad acts, pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b). At a motion hearing the next day, Wilson argued that the evidence of prior bad acts should be excluded because he learned of the State's intent only four days before the scheduled trial date. The district court ruled that some of the W.R.E. 404(b) evidence would be received, but it ordered the trial continued to allow the defense time to prepare to respond to that evidence. Wilson's trial began on April 5, 1999. The jury convicted him of aggravated assault and battery, and he was given a life sentence as a habitual offender, pursuant to Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 6-10-201 (Lexis 1999). Wilson appeals the Judgment and Sentence of the district court.
In presenting his claim of error with respect to the jury instructions, Wilson invokes Brett v. State, 961 P.2d 385, 389 (Wyo.1998), and contends that the district court failed to correctly instruct on an essential element of aggravated assault and battery as the crime is defined in Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 6-2-502 (Lexis 1999).1 As couched by Wilson, the argument extends the Brett holding beyond the corollary rules that have been recognized in Wyoming.
The district court gave this instruction on the elements of the crime charged:
Wilson does not contend that the elements instruction was incorrect in any way.
The district court then offered the following definitional instructions:
Both definitions are taken from Wyo.Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104 (Michie 1997). The district court refused to give the jury the statutory definition of "serious bodily injury,"2 pointing out that the term was not an essential element of the charged offense. The fact that the term is included in the definition of a "deadly weapon" did not require, in the mind of the district court, that the definition be given. We perceive that it would have been difficult to give both instructions without further explanation as to how the two definitions relate to the charged offense.
Our standard for reviewing alleged errors in instructing the jury is:
Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 925 (Wyo. 1999). Our charge then is to establish, given the facts of the case, the parameters of our standard in the context of our law relative to giving statutory definitions in the instructions in criminal cases.
First, we remind the judiciary and the bar that:
The trial court failed to provide the jury with the statutory definition of a term which described an essential element of the crime of larceny, which was fairly raised by Brett and was material to this case. "[T]he failure to give any instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction."Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 662 (Wyo.1993) (citations omitted).
Brett, 961 P.2d at 391 (emphasis added). The exceptions to the requirement of instruction on statutory definitions are limited:
A court need not give an instruction defining a term unless it has a technical legal meaning so different from its ordinary meaning that the jury, without further explanation, would misunderstand its import in relation to the factual circumstances. Cardenas v. State, 811 P.2d 989, 996 (Wyo. 1991). Prejudicial error must be demonstrated by appellant and prejudice will not be demonstrated unless the instruction confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of law. Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 700 (Wyo.1993); Lowseth v. State, 875 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo.1994). Failure to instruct properly on an element of a crime does not constitute plain error where that element is not contested at trial or where evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming. Miller [v. State], 904 P.2d [344] at 349 [(Wyo.1995)].
Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo. 1997).
In this case, the district court gave the statutory definitions for those terms that were elements of the charged offense. Wilson contends, however, that error must be found for the failure to give as an instruction the statutory definition for a term that is used in the statutory definition of one of the elements. The full phrase in the definition of a deadly weapon is "reasonably capable of producing death or serious bodily injury[.]" Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(iv). The definition of serious bodily injury that Wilson requested would have duplicated the term "death" included in the instruction defining "deadly weapon." In the context of the charged offense, which requires only bodily injury as an element, the requested instruction had a definite potential for confusing the jury. As used in the definition of a deadly weapon, the term "serious bodily injury" does not have "a technical legal meaning so different from its ordinary meaning that the jury, without further...
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