Winborne v. Doyle, 3633

• Decision Date: 01 May 1950
• Docket Number: No. 3633,3633
• Citation: 190 Va. 867,59 S.E.2d 90
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: HENRY P. WINBORNE v. JOHNNY S. DOYLE, JR. Record

Page 90

59 S.E.2d 90

190 Va. 867

HENRY P. WINBORNE v. JOHNNY S. DOYLE, JR.

Record No. 3633.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

May 1, 1950.

George E. Allen, for the plaintiff in error.

L. C. Harrell, Jr., for the defendant in error.

JUDGE: HUDGINS

HUDGINS, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Henry P. Winborne complains of a judgment for $3,375 entered against him in favor of J. S. Doyle, Jr., for the rental value of a certain house and lot in Emporia, Virginia.

The dominant error assigned is the refusal of the trial court to sustain a plea of res adjudicata.

It appears from the plea of res adjudicata that a court of competent jurisdiction entered a declaratory judgment fixing and determining the rights of the parties to the rents, issues and profits in and to certain premises involved in this litigation. The record in that proceeding establishes the following facts:

On or about the 8th day of February, 1942, Notis C. Winborne, wife of Henry P. Winborne, died testate. By her will she devised and bequeathed to her husband, the defendant in this action, 'all of my real and personal property until his death or remarriage. At his death or remarriage, the remainder of my property to be divided equally between my living, lawful brothers and sisters, except my house and lot on East Atlantic Street No. 309, now occupied as my home. This, in the event of H. P. Winborne's death or remarriage, I bequeath to J. S. Doyle, Jr., my nephew, when he becomes twenty-five (25) years of age. He to have the income from this house and lot after that time.'

Defendant remarried on June 29, 1944, at which time J. S. Doyle, Jr., was only sixteen years of age. At that time a dispute arose between Henry P. Winborne and J. S. Doyle, Jr. Winborne claimed that, notwithstanding his remarriage, he was entitled to the use and occupation of the premises until Doyle was twenty-five years old. On the other hand, Doyle claimed that he was entitled to the income from the property on and after the date of Winborne's remarriage.

This controversy between the parties was set forth in a notice of motion filed by J. S. Doyle, Jr., who sued by John S. Doyle, his father and next friend, and the brothers and sisters of Notis C. Winborne against Henry P. Winborne, in which the court was asked to construe the will and to declare who was entitled to the property and the income therefrom. A jury was waived and all matters of law and fact were submitted to the judge, who held 'that the true and intended meaning of said will is that from and after the marriage of Henry P. Winborne, J. S. Doyle is entitled to the rents, issues and profits from the house and lot on East Atlantic Street No. 309. * * *'

There was no appeal from this order; hence, it is conclusive as to all issues between the parties presented in that proceeding.

Two months after the declaratory judgment was entered, defendant vacated the premises, but refused to pay for its use and occupation, although he had rented a part of the building and had collected rents therefrom. Thereafter Johnny S. Doyle, Jr. instituted this action by notice of motion alleging that defendant was indebted to him 'for the fair rental value of said property' from the date of defendant's remarriage until it was vacated.

Defendant contends that the rental value of the premises was a pertinent issue which could, and should, have been raised in the declaratory judgment proceeding and plaintiff's failure to ask for a personal judgment against defendant in that action constitutes a bar to the present action.

The doctrine of res adjudicata is that when a final judgment has been rendered upon the merits of a controversy by a court of competent jurisdiction it is conclusive of all rights, questions, and facts in issue as to the parties and their privies. This includes issues of law and fact that were actually raised and decided in the former case, and, under some circumstances, it is conclusive of other questions which might have been raised and determined in that action. 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, sec. 161, p. 908; 50 C.J.S., Judgments, sec. 657, p. 102; Gentry v. Farruggia (W. Va.), 53 S.E. (2d) 741.

This general rule does not mean that a prior judgment is conclusive of matters not in issue or adjudicated, and which were not germane to, or essentially connected with, the actual issues in the case, although they may affect the ultimate rights of the parties and might have been presented in the former action. 50 C.J.S., Judgments, sec. 657, p. 103.

For further discussion of the doctrine of res adjudicata see the following Virginia cases: Sherwood v. Lohman, 184 Va. 511, 35 S.E. (2d) 757; Griffin v. Griffin, 183 Va. 443, 32 S.E. (2d) 700; Cohen v. Powers, 183 Va. 258, 32 S.E. (2d) 64; Royall v. Peters, 180 Va. 178, 21 S.E. (2d) 782; Unemployment Compensation Comm. v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202, 18 S.E. (2d) 390; Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E. (2d) 700, 141 A.L.R. 633; Griffith v. Raven Red Ash Coal Co., 179 Va. 790, 20 S.E. (2d) 530.

The general rule is that in a declaratory judgment proceeding coercive relief is not sought. However, coercive relief may be demanded -- that is, the rights of the parties may not only be determined, but they may be enforced, in the one action. Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 175 Va. 366, 8 S.E. (2d) 303; Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. (2d) 251, 155 A.L.R. 495; Annotation 501.

The former action was instituted to construe the will of the testatrix and to have the court determine who was entitled to the rents, issues and profits from the house and lot after the remarriage of defendant. No other issue was presented or determined. The court met this issue squarely and, by a formal and solemn declaration, held that plaintiff was entitled to the rental value of the house and lot on and after June 29, 1944.

It would be unreasonable to hold that a court had jurisdiction to determine the rights of parties, but the successful party had no remedy to enforce such rights after they had been so determined. No such unjust results can be read into the declaratory judgment statutes, Chapter 25 of the 1950 Code. Sec. 8-578 provides: 'In cases of actual controversy, courts of record within the scope of their respective jurisdictions shall have power to make binding adjudications of right, whether or not consequential relief is, or at the time could be, claimed and no...