Winkler v. Spinnato

Decision Date20 October 1988
Citation72 N.Y.2d 402,530 N.E.2d 835,534 N.Y.S.2d 128
Parties, 530 N.E.2d 835 Ernest WINKLER et al., Appellants, v. Joseph E. SPINNATO, Individually and as Fire Commissioner of the City of New York, et al., Respondents, and State of New York, Intervenor-Respondent.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

Relying on the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions (U.S. Const. 14th Amend.; N.Y. Const., art. I, §§ 6, 11), as well as the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Federal Constitution (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2, c. [1] ), plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Public Officers Law § 3(19) and § 30(5-a) (hereinafter the amendments). The amendments require a public officer residing outside New York State to move to one of the lawfully designated counties within one year from the effective date; public officers residing outside one of the designated counties, but within the State, may remain so domiciled but if they move, it must be to one of the designated counties (see, Public Officers Law § 3[19]; § 30[5-a] ). Henceforth, all those accepting employment as public officers must conform to both State and local residency requirements. We hold that the State of New York may constitutionally draw a distinction between firefighters who have violated only local residency requirements and those who have violated both local and State residency requirements.

I.

Since 1829, New York has required public officers to be residents of the State (Rev.Stat. of N.Y., part I, ch. 5, tit. 6, § 1 [1829] ). Public officers of local governments have also been required to be residents of the locality by which they are employed (Gen.Laws of N.Y., ch. 7, art. I, § 3, L.1892, ch. 681). After many years of not enforcing the statutory requirements, in 1986 the Fire Department passed orders (order No. 41, dated Apr. 2, 1986, and order No. 46, dated Apr. 11, 1986) to enforce the residency requirements. After these order the amendments were passed as a form of amnesty.

The plaintiffs in this action are firefighters employed by the Fire Department of the City of New York who do not live within the State of New York. They challenge the amendments on the ground that the amendments contain a distinction between two classes of residency law violators based solely upon the criterion of State residence. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality only of the amendments, not the residency requirement per se (see, McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civ. Serv. Commn., 424 U.S. 645, 96 S.Ct. 1154, 47 L.Ed.2d 366; Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97, appeal dismissed for lack of substantial Federal question 405 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 1173, 31 L.Ed.2d 227; Woods v. City of New York, 129 Misc.2d 851, 491 N.Y.S.2d 545, mod. on other grounds 119 A.D.2d 469, 500 N.Y.S.2d 681 affd. 69 N.Y.2d 771, 513 N.Y.S.2d 113, 505 N.E.2d 623). The Appellate Division upheld the amendments concluding that the distinction between the two groups is "founded upon a valid exercise of the State's authority to require its own employees, or the employees of any of its political subdivisions, to reside within this State" (134 A.D.2d 66, 68, 523 N.Y.S.2d 530). We agree.

II.

Plaintiffs' argument based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause is without merit. Plaintiffs have no "fundamental right", within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, to be employed as New York City firefighters (see, United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Mayor, 465 U.S. 208, 219, 104 S.Ct. 1020, 1028, 79 L.Ed.2d 249; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520; McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civ. Serv. Commn., 424 U.S. 645, 96 S.Ct. 1154, supra), since public employment is not a privilege which " 'bear[s] upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity' " (Matter of Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 271, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641, 397 N.E.2d 1309). Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause affords them no protection here (Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Commn., 436 U.S. 371, 98 S.Ct. 1852, 56 L.Ed.2d 354).

The challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of both the Federal and State Constitutions must also fail. Since plaintiffs are not a suspect class (Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010; Alevy v. Downstate Med. Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 334, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 348 N.E.2d 537) and there is "no fundamental right to government employment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause" (United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Mayor, 465 U.S. at 219, 104 S.Ct., at 1028,supra), the amendments must be upheld so long as they are "based upon some conceivable and legitimate State interest" (Maresca v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 485 N.Y.S.2d 724, 475 N.E.2d 95; see also, Woods v. City of New York, supra).

The State's long-standing interest in requiring its public officers to be State residents is understandable. It is without doubt that "[p]ublic employees who reside in New York are more likely, as a class, to spend their money in New York" (134 A.D.2d 66, 75, 523 N.Y.S.2d 530), thereby returning an economic benefit to the society from whose public fisc the officers' salaries are paid. In addition, State residents contribute more taxes to the State and its municipalities than do nonresidents who merely work within the State. Moreover, State residency requirements are premised on the belief that out-of-State residents do not have the same loyalty and commitment to the State as in-State residents. Like all public employees, those receiving amnesty must be State residents. The State has, however, subordinated its local interest to a limited degree, to accommodate those in violation. In order to comply with the State residency requirement, out-of-State residents must move; in-State residents, obviously, need not. Because out-of-State residents are already required to move, there is little reason to excuse them from moving into one of the lawfully designated counties. Because, on the other hand, in-State residents need not otherwise move, they are not being required to do so for the sole purpose of moving into a lawful county. But if they move from their current in-State residences, however, they, like out-of-State residents, must do so in compliance with the local residency law. This limited accommodation to those who already satisfy the State residency requirement and, therefore, do not have to move for that purpose, is rational and does not violate equal protection.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

ALEXANDER, Judge (dissenting).

Because I believe that in requiring only out-of-State firefighters to move into a lawful county the State is unconstitutionally conferring a benefit on its established residents, I respectfully dissent.

New York requires public officers of local governments to be residents of both the State and the locality in which they are employed. (Public Officers Law § 3[1]; § 30[1][d].) New York City firefighters, however, were permitted to live in one of six counties contiguous to New York City or in one of the counties within the City itself (together the lawful counties). (Public Officers Law § 3[9]; § 30[5].) When, in 1986, after many years of nonenforcement, the New York City Fire Department issued administrative orders enforcing these residency requirements, the Legislature amended Public Officers Law §§ 3 and 30 by adding § 3(19) and § 30(5-a) (the amendments). While requiring out-of-State firefighters to move into a lawful county, the amendments exempt the State resident firefighters from this local residency requirement. Specifically, the amendments provide that State resident firefighters currently in violation of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Morgan v. City of Wheeling
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 4, 1999
    ...to government employment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause." (Citations omitted.)); and Winkler v. Spinnato, 72 N.Y.2d 402, 406, 530 N.E.2d 835, 837, 534 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005, 109 S.Ct. 1640, 104 L.Ed.2d 155 (1989) ("Plaintiffs have no `fundamental......
  • Forti v. New York State Ethics Com'n
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • April 5, 1990
    ...59 L.Ed.2d 171; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 25, 49 L.Ed.2d 520; Winkler v. Spinnato, 72 N.Y.2d 402, 406, 534 N.Y.S.2d 128, 530 N.E.2d 835, cert. denied 490 U.S. 1005, 109 S.Ct. 1640, 104 L.Ed.2d 155). Under that test, the disparate treatment ......
  • Yarde v. Roberts
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • December 15, 2017
    ...the court need not entertain declaratory relief. See, Winkler v. Spinnato , 134 A.D.2d 66, 523 N.Y.S.2d 530 (2d Dep't 1987) aff'd 72 N.Y.2d 402, 534 N.Y.S.2d 128, 530 N.E.2d 835 (1988). Here, the court declines to entertain the declaratory judgment application, and grants respondents' motio......
  • Scarola v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • May 26, 2016
    ...35 A.D.3d 253, 253 (1st Dept. 2006) (internal citation omitted); Winkler v. Spinnato, 134 A.D.2d 66, 81 (2d Dept. 1987) aff'd 72 N.Y.2d 402, 530 N.E.2d 835 (1988) ("Where there is no genuine dispute between the parties, the courts are precluded, as a matter of law, from issuing a declarator......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT