Winston v. Sanders
Decision Date | 03 June 1985 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 84-3118. |
Citation | 610 F. Supp. 176 |
Parties | Luella WINSTON, Plaintiff, v. Thomas E. SANDERS; City of Bloomington, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Michael A. Barford, Bloomington, Ill., for plaintiff.
Frederick Velde, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Springfield, Ill., for defendants.
This court is now called upon to decide whether the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Wilson v. Garcia, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), is to be applied retroactively in view of the decision in Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 3125, 57 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1978).
A brief look at the factual and procedural record in this case is in order.
The occurrence complained of in the Plaintiff's complaint here occurred on May 25 and 26, 1980. This complaint was filed purporting to allege a claim for constitutional violation under 42, U.S.C. § 1983, on March 2, 1984. A careful examination of the facial verbal fabric of Wilson v. Garcia and Beard v. Robinson leads solely to the conclusion that the latter is now inconsistent with the former. If the panel which decided Beard v. Robinson in 1977 (including this judge) had been given the benefit of Wilson v. Garcia, the result announced in Beard would have been contrary. This point was basically conceded by all counsel when this court heard argument on Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings in Springfield, Illinois, on May 29, 1985. The question then becomes whether or not the recent decision in Wilson v. Garcia should be retroactively applied given the factual and procedural posture of this case.
The most superficial examination of Beard v. Robinson will disclose that it plowed new ground as far as the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions were concerned in the State of Illinois. It is also equally clear that the progeny of Beard v. Robinson indicates extensive, if not massive, reliance thereon by litigants and lawyers who file such 1983 actions.1 The cases collected in the footnote here are certainly indicative of that fact. It is beyond any dispute at all that Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority of the Court in Wilson v. Garcia, intended to bring some sense of national uniformity into the process of selecting the appropriate statute of limitations for section 1983 actions since the Reconstruction Congress that enacted the same did not specify a statute of limitations and no Congress subsequent to 1871 has chosen to do so. It is also beyond dispute that with reference to personal injury actions, the State of Illinois now has, and has had for a long period of time, a two-year statute of limitations as now found in Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 110 § 13-202.
The question of the possible retroactive effect of Wilson v. Garcia is nowhere directly addressed in the Justice Stevens' opinion for the Supreme Court in that case. In the Defendants' brief filed May 24, 1985, there is a brief quotation out of context from the most recent Supreme Court decision in Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984), stating the general rule that as a general rule, judicial decisions apply retroactively, and there is some language and reference to a so-called "presumption" to that effect. However, the reasoning and the result in Solem is certainly not helpful to the Defendants in this case and, indeed, is not determinative of the issues here presented. Solem is in line with the earlier decision of Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966), which in effect held that the earlier decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), was not to be given retroactive effect. In this same vein, the Supreme Court in Solem has now decided that the case of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), is not to be given retroactive effect. The language chosen by Justice Stevens in Part II of his dissent in Solem 465 U.S. at ___, 104 S.Ct. at 1351 is interesting and perhaps relevant to our discussion here. He there stated:
The reasoning and the result of neither the majority nor the dissent in Solem are determinative of the retroactive application of Wilson v. Garcia in the context of this case.
The leading decision on the retroactivity of nonconstitutional, noncriminal decisions is Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1975). In Huson the issue presented involved the retroactivity of an earlier decision in Rodigue v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 395 U.S. 352, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 L.Ed.2d 360 (1969). Rodigue had held that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. was not governed by admiralty law. In Huson the Supreme Court held that the applicable state statute of limitations must be used under the aforesaid section 1331, but that it would be applied only prospectively. In arriving at this decision, the Supreme Court set out three factors to be considered in deciding whether a statute of limitations should be retroactive. Briefly and summarily stated, those three factors are as follows:
An excellent example of how a district judge should go about applying the Huson principles is found in Hambrick v. Royal Sonesta Hotel, 403 F.Supp. 943 (E.D.La. 1975). The approach of Chief Judge Heebe in Hambrick is most helpful to the examination that this court must make and is consistent with the standards most recently announced by our court of appeals in Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.1984) at 414.
In examining the record in this case in light of the Huson standards, there can be no doubt whatsoever that Wilson v. Garcia is patently inconsistent with Beard v. Robinson, and that Wilson v. Garcia announces a new principle of law in a nonconstitutional, noncriminal context. It is equally clear that there is nothing in the prior decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States to forewarn lawyers and litigants in the State of Illinois that the basic decision in Beard v. Robinson would be undermined. This conclusion is added to, but not dependent upon, the fact that certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States in Beard v. Robinson.
There can be little doubt, as indicated by the cases collected in the footnote of this opinion, that lawyers and litigants relied heavily upon the 1977 announcement in Beard v. Robinson. Thus, the history from Beard v. Robinson in 1977 to Wilson v. Garcia in 1985 leans very heavily against the retroactive application of Wilson v. Garcia and toward its prospective application only. These same values are involved in the third prong of Huson in...
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CHRIS N. v. BURNSVILLE, MINN.
... ... Franklin, 731 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.1984) (applying Garcia v. Wilson ); Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir.1985); Winston v. Sanders, 610 F.Supp. 176 (C.D.Ill.1985); de Furgalski v. Siegel, 618 F.Supp. 295 (N.D.Ill.1985); Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F.Supp. 461 ... ...
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...sitting by designation, has recently held that Wilson v. Garcia should be applied prospectively only in Illinois. Winston v. Sanders, 610 F.Supp. 176 (C.D.Ill. 1985). Winston emphasizes the massive reliance placed by litigants and lawyers on Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir.1977), c......
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Carpenter v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., Civ. No. F 85-5 to F 85-7.
...a footnote which simply states that Wilson "is not to be applied retroactively," citing Judge Sharp's opinion in Winston v. Sanders, 610 F.Supp. 176 (C.D.Ill.1985). However, the Chevron analysis in Winston looked to Illinois law, and thus is not directly applicable or persuasive in examinin......
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Johnson v. Arnos
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