Winters v. Kiffmeyer

• Decision Date: 30 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. C8-02-1180.,C8-02-1180.
• Citation: 650 N.W.2d 167
• Parties: John A. WINTERS, Petitioner, v. Mary KIFFMEYER, Minnesota Secretary of State, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

650 N.W.2d 167

John A. WINTERS, Petitioner, v. Mary KIFFMEYER, Minnesota Secretary of State, Respondent.

No. C8-02-1180.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

August 30, 2002.

John A. Winters, Winters Law Office, Crookstom, for Petitioner.

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Alan I. Gilbert, Chief Deputy and Solicitor General, Kenneth E. Raschke, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, St Paul, for Respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

PAGE, Justice.

Petitioner John A. Winters seeks relief under Minn.Stat. § 204B.44 (2000) from an alleged wrongful act by the secretary of state for her failure to place Winters' name on the ballot for the 2002 election as a candidate for the judicial seat currently held by the Honorable Donna Dixon of the Ninth Judicial District. It is the secretary of state's position that the seat is not up for election until the 2004 general election. This opinion confirms the order filed on July 25, 2002, denying the petition.

On October 24, 2001, Governor Jesse Ventura filed with the secretary of state a "Notice of Appointment" of Donna Dixon to fill a judicial vacancy in the Ninth Judicial District. The notice of appointment states that the governor has "appointed and commissioned" Judge Dixon to hold the office of judge of district court effective November 9, 2001, with the term to continue until January 3, 2005. Judge Dixon was sworn in and took office on November 9, 2001. Consistent with the length of the term indicated on the notice of appointment, the secretary of state did not designate Judge Dixon's seat as a judicial seat subject to election in the 2002 election scheduled to take place on November 5, 2002.

Winters claims that he has had a "general interest for several months in possibly running" against Judge Dixon, but did not know whether she was up for election in 2002. Winters claims that, since May 2002, he has checked the secretary of state's website and telephoned that office to determine whether the seat was up for election, without receiving a clear answer. These efforts intensified in late June and early July, in anticipation of the July 2-16, 2002, candidate filing period. Winters was informed by a court administrator on July 1, 2002, that Judge Dixon's seat was not subject to election in 2002. Shortly thereafter he received a copy of the notice of appointment of Judge Dixon, and thought there was something "technically wrong" with the appointment, but decided not to run against Judge Dixon in any event. However, after reading about this court's decision in another ballot contest, he reconsidered his decision not to run. On July 10, 2002, by petition for writ of mandamus filed as an original action in this court, Winters sought an order requiring the secretary of state to hold an election for Judge Dixon's seat. We dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.¹ On July 17, 2002, Winters filed the instant petition for relief under section 204B.44. We ordered expedited briefing, specifically ordering the parties to brief whether the relief requested in the petition should be barred by laches.

The issue presented in Winters' section 204B.44 petition involves interpretation of Article VI, section 8, of the Minnesota Constitution, which provides:

Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of judge the governor shall appoint in the manner provided by law a qualified person to fill the vacancy until a successor is elected and qualified. The successor shall be elected for a six year term at the next general election occurring more than one year after the appointment.

Specifically, we must determine when Judge Dixon's appointment was made-on October 24, 2001, when the governor filed the notice of appointment, or on November 9, 2001, the effective date of the appointment pursuant to the governor's notice. The answer to that question determines whether the successor is to be elected this year, the first general election more than one year after October 24, 2001, but less than one year after November 9, 2001, or in 2004, the first general election occurring more than one year after November 9, 2001. The answer to that question, therefore, also determines whether the secretary of state has committed or will commit a "wrongful act, omission, or error" by not placing Judge Dixon's seat on the ballot for the 2002 election. See Minn.Stat. § 204B.44(d) (2000).

Winters claims that, under Article VI, section 8, of the Minnesota Constitution, Judge Dixon's judicial seat should be up for election in 2002 because more than one year has elapsed since her appointment. Acknowledging that the constitution does not give much guidance on the issue of when the one-year period begins to run and that the legislature has passed no statute clarifying the operative act establishing when an appointment is made, Winters relies on the common meaning of the word "appointment" and argues that the common meaning "does not allow for some future effective date of the appointment." Winters claims that there is a need for a definitive act to constitute an appointment, and the date the governor's notice of appointment is filed with the secretary of state should constitute that act. He argues that to hold otherwise allows the governor to defeat judicial elections, the primary method of selection of judges mandated by the constitution.

In contrast, the secretary of state claims that Judge Dixon's appointment did not occur until November 9, 2001, and therefore under the constitution a successor is to be elected at the first general election occurring more than one year thereafter, which in this case would be the 2004 general election. The secretary of state claims that the opposite result would conflict with the constitutional purpose of allowing an appointed judge a minimum of one year to demonstrate her capabilities before being required to stand for election.

I.

We first consider whether laches should bar consideration of Winters' petition. Laches is an equitable doctrine applied to "prevent one who has not been diligent in asserting a known right from recovering at the expense of one who has been prejudiced by the delay." Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 242, 56 N.W.2d 570, 574 (1953). The doctrine has particular application in challenges to ballot preparation and election proceedings:

The very nature of matters implicating election laws and proceedings routinely requires expeditious consideration and disposition by courts facing considerable time constraints imposed by the ballot preparation and distribution process. As a result, we have examined applications for relief not only on their merits, but also from the perspective of whether the applicant acted promptly in initiating proceedings.

Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418, 419 (Minn.1992).²

"In considering laches, we have held that the practical question in each case is whether there has been such an unreasonable delay in asserting a known right, resulting in prejudice to others, as would make it inequitable to grant the relief prayed for." Fetsch v. Holm, 236 Minn. 158, 163, 52 N.W.2d 113, 115 (1952). In this case, Winters made some inquiries into whether the seat would be subject to election, but took no direct action until July 10, well into the filing period for the office. Other potential candidates and the sitting officeholder would be prejudiced by his delay. Running for any office requires a significant commitment of time and other resources. A candidate must organize a campaign committee, including finding a treasurer knowledgeable in the requirements of Minnesota Statutes chapter 10A that govern the operation of campaigns in Minnesota. See Minn.Stat. ch. 10A (2000) (delineating registration and reporting requirements for candidates for statewide office, including judges). The candidate must register the committee, decide when, where, and how to campaign, and then do so. In light of the nature of campaigns for public office, the sitting officeholder and other potential candidates will be materially prejudiced by an unexpected order to hold an election. Finally, Winters has presented no persuasive reason³ why he could not have brought this petition in a timely manner so as not to prejudice others in this fashion.

The late date at which Winters decided to pursue relief in this case, coupled with the significant effect that ordering an election would have on the current officeholder and other potential candidates for the seat, gives us great concern. Thus, the application of laches would be appropriate. Nonetheless, the need for certainty in the judicial election process compels us to address the merits of Winters' petition. See Peterson, 490 N.W.2d at 420 (addressing merits of case "because of the nature of these proceedings" despite concluding that petitioner did not act with dispatch in asserting challenge).

II.

Under the Minnesota Constitution, a successor to an appointed judge is elected for a six-year term "at the next general election occurring more than one year after the appointment." Minn. Const. art. VI, § 8. We must decide, then, when an appointment is made for these purposes. Winters argues that the appointment is made when the governor's notice of appointment is filed with the secretary of state; the secretary of state argues that the appointment is not made until its effective date. We hold that, for purposes of Article VI, section 8, a judicial appointment is made on its effective date.

Winters claims that the common meaning of "appointment" does not allow for some future date of the appointment. The common meaning of "appointment" —the designation of a person for an office—has two components, a person and an office. Here, the effective date describes the office at issue. Until the effective date, the office is not available to and cannot be claimed by the appointee. Therefore, the effective date is part and parcel of the appointment.⁴

In support of his argument, Winters also refers us to...