Wood v. Riverside General Hospital

• Decision Date: 11 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. G013623,G013623
• Citation: 25 Cal.App.4th 1113,31 Cal.Rptr.2d 8
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Thomas WOOD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RIVERSIDE GENERAL HOSPITAL et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 8

31 Cal.Rptr.2d 8

25 Cal.App.4th 1113

Thomas WOOD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RIVERSIDE GENERAL HOSPITAL et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. G013623.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.

May 11, 1994.

Pancer & Nachlis, Marvin B. Nachlis, San Bernardino, and Richard P. Langevin, Ontario, for plaintiff and appellant.

Patterson, Ritner, Lockwood, Zanghi & Gartner, John Zanghi and Karen N. Brueckner, San Bernardino, Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Timothy T. Coates and Carolyn Oill, Beverly Hills, for defendant and respondent County of Riverside.

OPINION

RYLAARSDAM, Associate Justice, Assigned. ^*

Thomas Wood commenced this action on May 10, 1989. Respondent Riverside County answered and eventually was granted summary judgment predicated upon the failure of Wood to present a claim for damages before filing the action as required by Government Code section 911.2. ¹ Wood argues that a "Patient Problem/Complaint Form" submitted to the hospital's quality assurance department on June 20, 1988, together with a "Supplemental Note" dated June 29, both complaining about the quality of his care constituted substantial compliance with the claims statute. We disagree.

Following an automobile accident on May 11, 1988, plaintiff was confined to Riverside General Hospital. His complaint alleges medical malpractice and related causes of action. It is undisputed that Riverside General Hospital was owned and operated by the County of Riverside and is entitled to the benefits of the claims provisions of the Tort Claims Act (GOV.CODE, § 900² et seq.).

While Wood was still hospitalized, his mother submitted a written communication to the hospital on his behalf, reciting in great detail numerous items of mistreatment. The first two pages of this document, dated June 20, 1988, consist of handwriting on a "Patient Problem/Complaint Form." The next four pages are typewritten and indicate neither the author nor the addressee. The final page is dated June 29, is typewritten, and bears the signature of Wood's mother. The parties apparently agree that this material was supplied to the hospital administration during June 1988. On July 19, the hospital's chief of staff acknowledged receipt of the "letter of June 29, 1988," and stated the matter "has been referred the appropriate people and committees to try to rectify problems so that they do not occur in the future."

No other communication constituting a "claim" was submitted by plaintiff to the County of Riverside.

I

The primary issue may be simply stated. Is there a triable issue of fact whether plaintiff's letters to the hospital constituted substantial compliance with the claims statute or did the court properly conclude, as a matter of law, that the letters did not constitute substantial compliance?

The Tort Claims Act provides that, with certain exceptions not relevant hereto, "... no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented ... until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity ..." (§ 945.4.) Section 915 specifies that the claim must either be delivered or mailed "to the clerk, secretary, or auditor" of the local public entity. No contention is made that this was done. Section 910.2 requires that the claim "be signed by the claimant or by some person on his behalf." The basic document, presumably transmitted on June 20, 1988, bears no signature; the "supplemental note" of June 29, bears the signature of Miriam Thomas, plaintiff's mother.

Finally, section 910 specifies the required contents of the claim. Some of these requirements are met; significantly, however, the letters completely fail to satisfy the requirements of section 910 subdivision (f) that the claim show the amount claimed or (for claims over $10,000), "whether jurisdiction over the claim would rest in municipal or superior court."

The letters certainly indicate that plaintiff was unhappy with the care received at the hospital. They complain of neglect, unsanitary conditions, failure of the hospital staff to be sensitive to and attend to plaintiff's pain, failure to call in required specialists, and failure to promptly treat some of plaintiff's conditions. However, even the most liberal reading of the letters does not permit an inference that plaintiff intended them to be the assertion of a claim for money damages.

Testing the contents of the letters against the requirements of the Tort Claim Act, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that, as a matter of law, they fail to constitute substantial compliance with the requirements of that act. "The principle [sic ] purposes of the claims statute are to give notice to the municipality in order that it be afforded a timely opportunity to investigate the claim and determine the facts; and to avoid unnecessary lawsuits by giving the municipality the opportunity to settle meritorious claims without going through an avoidable trial." (Lacy v. City of Monrovia (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 152, 155, 118 Cal.Rptr. 277; accord: San Diego Unified Port Dist v. Superior Court (Marriott Corporation) (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 843, 847, 243 Cal.Rptr. 163.) Plaintiff's letters failed to serve either of these purposes. There was a failure to direct the letters to one of the persons specified in section 915; it may be inferred from the acknowledgment by the hospital's chief of staff, that the matter was interpreted as raising concern with respect to internal hospital management and that it was dealt with in that fashion; there is no indication that the letters were forwarded to any county department responsible for the handling of claims against the county and the content of the letters is not such as to put a recipient on notice that a claim is in fact intended.

When analyzed in the light of the content requirements of section 910 subdivision (f) which requires notice of the amount of the claim, the letters again fail. Had there been any indication that plaintiff intended his letters to constitute a claim against the hospital, the recipient might well have forwarded them to the appropriate county department responsible for the handling of such claims. However, absent such indication, and in view of the failure to address the letters to one of the persons specified in the statute, the letters were inadequate to serve the statutory purposes.

"Where there has been an attempt to comply [with the claims statute] but the compliance is defective, the test of substantial compliance controls. Under this test, the court must ask whether sufficient information is disclosed on the face of the filed claim 'to reasonably enable the public entity to make an adequate investigation of the merits of the claim and settle it without the expense of a lawsuit.' " (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County of Riverside (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 183, 188, 165 Cal.Rptr. 29.) Arguably, had plaintiff's letters been sent to the appropriate agency for the handling of claims (and, had they been transmitted to the persons designated by the statute, they presumably would have been) the information supplied would have enabled the agency to make an adequate investigation. However, absent such transmission and absent any indication that the correspondence was intended as a claim for money damages, no opportunity to investigate or settle was provided.

City of San Jose v. Superior Court (Lands Unlimited) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 456-457, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701 notes a twofold test for substantial compliance: "to gauge the sufficiency of a particular claim, two tests shall be applied: Is there some compliance with all of the statutory requirements; and, if so, is this compliance sufficient to constitute substantial compliance?" (Italics in original.). Here there was a total failure to comply with at least two of the statutory requirements: failure to transmit the documents to the statutorily designated agent and failure to indicate that a monetary claim was being asserted. In the face of this, we conclude that, as a matter of law, there was no substantial compliance with...