Woodbury County v. City of Sioux City, 90-777

• Decision Date: 18 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-777,90-777
• Citation: 475 N.W.2d 203
• Parties: WOODBURY COUNTY, Iowa, and Leo P. Miller, Appellants, v. CITY OF SIOUX CITY, Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 203

475 N.W.2d 203

WOODBURY COUNTY, Iowa, and Leo P. Miller, Appellants, v. CITY OF SIOUX CITY, Iowa, Appellee.

No. 90-777.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 18, 1991.

Douglas L. Phillips of Blair, Stoik, Phillips & Ellis, P.C., Sioux City, and Brigit M. Barnes, Asst. County Atty., for appellants.

James L. Abshier, City Atty., and C. Maurice Rawe, Asst. City Atty., for appellee.

Thomas C. Fritzsche, Asst. Scott County Atty., for amicus curiae Scott County.

William F. Sueppel and William J. Sueppel of Meardon, Sueppel, Downer & Hayes, Iowa City, for amicus curiae League of Iowa Municipalities.

Lee H. Gaudineer of Austin, Gaudineer, Austin, Salmons & Swanson, Des Moines, for amicus curiae Ass'n of Counties.

Denver D. Dillard, Linn County Atty., for amicus curiae Linn County.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and SCHULTZ, CARTER, LAVORATO, and NEUMAN, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

This case presents issues arising from a city-county conflict regarding whether a county must accept into its jail persons arrested by city officers. This conflict also extends to the allocation and determination of detention costs incurred prior to an arrestee's appearance before a magistrate. In 1989, Woodbury County (County) and its sheriff ¹ commenced a declaratory judgment action against the City of Sioux City, Iowa (City), requesting the court to determine the disputed issues. Following a hearing on stipulated facts, the district court ruled that the County must receive and detain arrestees. The court also determined the allowable costs of maintaining detained arrestees and the allocation of those costs between the parties. Neither party was satisfied with the results. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

In our de novo review of this equity action, we accept the facts stipulated to by the parties. Woodbury County owns the only state-approved functioning jail facility in the County. The cost of operating the jail facility is levied against all property owners in the County.

The City, which is located in the County, operates a police department. The normal procedure following the arrest or detention of an individual by the City's officers is to deliver the individual to the County's jail facility to be booked and housed. At the first available opportunity, the individual is either released on a scheduled bond or taken before a magistrate for an initial appearance to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. If probable cause is found, a bond is set, and the individual is released if a bond is posted.

We now turn to the contentions raised by the parties.

I. County's obligation to confine persons arrested by the City police. In this division we must determine whether the County is required to confine in the county jail persons who are arrested by the City's officers on either state or municipal charges during the period between arrest and appearance before a magistrate. Even though an arrestee is required to be taken without unnecessary delay to the nearest or most accessible magistrate, Iowa Code sections 804.21-.22, ² an arrestee may need to be detained for a period of time when the magistrate court is not in session. ³ Thus, the question becomes whether the County may legally refuse to accept and hold a detained arrestee in the county jail until the magistrate court convenes.

The trial court concluded that resolution of this issue is controlled by Iowa Code section 356.1 which provides in pertinent part as follows:

The jails in the several counties in the state shall be in charge of the respective sheriffs and used as prisons:

1. For the detention of persons charged with an offense and committed for trial or examination.

The trial court held that the County was required to accept and detain an arrestee in the county jail.

The County maintains that subsection 1 is plain and unambiguous and requires the County to hold a city prisoner in detention only when that prisoner has been both charged and committed by a magistrate. The trial court rejected this two-step prerequisite for detention by the County. It concluded that an absurd result would occur if small town police officers must maintain physical custody of all arrested persons until a magistrate was able to commit them to the county jail. The court concluded that the legislature did not intend such a result and construed the word "and" to mean "or" so that the County would have to receive all arrestees who are charged with a violation of either a city ordinance or a state violation.

Certain rules offer guidance in determining the meaning of a statute. The court usually will not resort to rules of statutory construction if the terms of a statute are explicit. State v. Perry, 440 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Iowa 1989). However, if the "statutory language appears fairly certain but adherence to the strict letter of the law leads to injustice, absurdity, or contradiction, we may look to another meaning." Id. (citation omitted). Sometimes we have construed the word "and" as the disjunctive "or" to give statutes a sensible, practical and workable construction. Koethe v. Johnson, 328 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Iowa 1982). On the other hand, a court is not free to ignore express statutory language in favor of what it believes the statute should provide. Donnelly v. Board of Trustees, 403 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Iowa 1987). Furthermore, to consider legislative intent, the court has a duty to avoid conjecture. In re Guardianship of Wiley, 239 Iowa 1225, 1231, 34 N.W.2d 593, 596 (1948).

In this case, the trial court rejected an interpretation of section 356.1(1) based on the express terms of the statute because it deemed that the result would be absurd under today's circumstances. It recognized that most cities and towns no longer have jails or places for the detention of arrestees. We do not address the validity of these conclusions, however, we believe the trial court should have construed Iowa Code section 356.1(1) in the context of the time period during which it was enacted. "The legislative intent that controls in the construction of a statute has reference to the legislature that enacted it...." In re Guardianship of Wiley, 239 Iowa at 1231, 34 N.W.2d at 596. The history of subsection 1 reveals that it was derived from Iowa Code section 3103 (1851), which contained language almost identical to section 356.1(1). A revised version of section 3103 appeared in Iowa Code section 5637 (1897), and embodied language identical to the present subsection 1. Consequently, an appropriate determination of legislative intent requires a focus on the period of the late 1800s.

To determine the legislature's intent in the previous century, we first examine the common law which serves as an antecedent to guide us in interpreting section 356.1(1). See Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 1988). Furthermore, we are obligated "to interpret statutes in conformity with the common law wherever statutory language does not directly negate it." Id. at 452. Common law placed the duty upon the arresting officer to hold the arrestee until appearance before a magistrate. 5 Am.Jur.2d Arrest § 75 (1972); 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 63 (1975). If we interpret the word "and" in section 356.1(1) in its ordinary conjunctive sense of connecting two clauses, an arresting officer rather than a county would bear the responsibility to hold the arrestee. This interpretation follows the common-law rule and the statutory language does not directly negate it. Thus, we conclude that the word "and" should be construed as a conjunction, not as the disjunctive "or."

We believe this conclusion is further supported by examination of the statutory framework which existed in 1897. We examine not only the statute in question, but also all other relevant statutes which may disclose a common underlying motivating purpose. Presbytery v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Iowa), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830, 96 S.Ct. 50, 46 L.Ed.2d 48 (1975). The 1897 Iowa Code chapter governing preliminary hearings authorized a magistrate to commit an arrestee to a county jail during adjournments of the hearing or if an indictable offense was found. Iowa Code §§ 5219, 5230 (1897). Iowa Code section 5220 (1897) provided that if there was no county jail, the sheriff must retain custody of the defendant during the proceeding. If section 5637 (currently section 356.1(1)), required a county to accept an arrestee solely on the basis of arrest, the authority provided by sections 5219, 5230 and 5637 was unnecessary and superfluous. A familiar principle of statutory construction is that a statute should not be construed in a manner that renders a portion of the statute superfluous. Casteel v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 395 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (Iowa 1986). This rule also suggests a construction of section 356.1(1) favorable to the position taken by the County.

The City urges that this construction would prevent the county sheriff from placing the sheriff's own arrestee, who is temporarily detained for appearance before a magistrate, in the county jail. We reject this contention. Section 356.1 places the jail in the sheriff's charge. We believe that this section implies that the sheriff may use the jail for the detention of any arrestees. Section 356.1 further prescribes the type of persons that the sheriff must receive. We do not construe this section to prevent the sheriff's lawful use of the facility.

In summary, we conclude that section 356.1(1) requires the County to accept an arrestee from the City after the arrestee has been both charged and committed by a magistrate. Our conclusion does not prohibit the City and County from entering a contractual arrangement for the use of the jail. Such a contractual arrangement was the practice prior to the present conflict and seems to provide a logical solution. A contractual arrangement between the City and County raises fiscal considerations and problems...