Woodruff v. SGL716, A12–1117.
| Decision Date | 22 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. A12–1117.,A12–1117. |
| Citation | 831 N.W.2d 9 |
| Parties | Terry Scott WOODRUFF, Respondent, Julie Tollefson, Respondent, v. 2008 MERCEDES, VIN# WDDGF81X28F159446, PLATE: SGL716, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. The holding of Patino v. One 2007 Chevrolet, 821 N.W.2d 810 (Minn.2012), that, under the vehicle-forfeiture statute, a vehicle may not be judicially forfeited when the vehicle's driver is not convicted of a designated offense, applies retroactively.
2. Where a driver accused of driving while impaired is not the owner of the subject vehicle, the driver's agreement as part of a guilty plea not to assert certain rights or defenses in any subsequent forfeiture action brought under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63 (2012) is not binding upon the owner of the subject vehicle.
Joseph P. Tamburino, Caplan & Tamburino Law Firm, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent Tollefson.
Debbie E. Lang, Caplan & Tamburino Law Firm, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent Woodruff.
Mark J. Schneider, Jeffrey D. Bores, Chestnut Cambronne PA, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
Considered and decided by STONEBURNER, Presiding Judge; HUDSON, Judge; and KIRK, Judge.
This appeal is from an order granting respondents' petition challenging forfeiture of the appellant vehicle because the owner, respondent Julie Tollefson, did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the vehicle would be operated in a manner contrary to law by its driver, respondent Terry Woodruff. While this case was pending, the Minnesota Supreme Court released its opinion in Patino v. One 2007 Chevrolet, 821 N.W.2d 810, holding that after a timely demand for judicial determination of forfeiture is made, if the person charged with a designated offense under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 1(e), is not convicted of the offense, the district court is required under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(f), to return the vehicle to the person legally entitled to it. Id. at 817. Because respondents made a timely demand for judicial determination of forfeiture and Woodruff was not convicted of a designated offense, the district court was required to return appellant vehicle to Tollefson. Id. Though Patino was released while this case was pending, we conclude that Patino applies retroactively and therefore affirm the district court's order granting respondents' petition contesting forfeiture.
Respondent Julie Tollefson is the registered owner of the appellant vehicle. She met respondent Terry Woodruff over the Fourth of July holiday in 2010, and they saw each other a few times over the next few months. In September 2010, Woodruff and Tollefson attended a Minnesota Twins game. Woodruff drove Tollefson's vehicle.
According to their testimony, Woodruff and Tollefson each consumed three drinks over the next four to five hours and were generally in each other's presence. Tollefson did not believe that either she or Woodruff was intoxicated, and she testified that Woodruff showed no signs of intoxication.
As they were driving home, Woodruff made an abrupt lane change to exit the highway and was pulled over on suspicion of drunk driving. Woodruff failed the field sobriety tests as well as the preliminary breath test, and the officer placed Woodruff under arrest for driving while impaired (DWI). The officer then administered a preliminary breath test to Tollefson to determine if she was able to drive the vehicle home. Tollefson tested under the legal limit, but because the test showed that Tollefson had consumed alcohol, the officer instructed Tollefson to drive the vehicle to a nearby parking garage, where an officer escorted her to the police station. At the police station, Woodruff refused to take a breath test, and he was charged with second-degree DWI. 1
Shortly after Woodruff's arrest, the City of Golden Valley sent a notice of seizure and intent to forfeit the vehicle. Respondents made a timely demand for judicial determination pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9, and the parties agreed to stay the action pending the resolution of the criminal matter. Tollefson was permitted to retain possession of her vehicle while the matter was pending.
In January 2011, Woodruff entered into a plea agreement whereby he pleaded guilty to third-degree DWI, but agreed not to raise a Mastakoski defense under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9, at any subsequent forfeiture proceeding. In Mastakoski v. 2003 Dodge Durango, 738 N.W.2d 411 (Minn.App.2007), review denied (Minn. Nov. 21, 2007), this court held that a vehicle is subject to forfeiture under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63 if it was used in the commission of a designated offense, even if the driver was not convicted of a designated offense. Id. at 415. Though it is not clear from the record, it appears that, by agreeing not to raise a Mastakoski defense, Woodruff was agreeing not to argue at a subsequent forfeiture proceeding that the vehicle was not used in the commission of a designated offense. SeeMinn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(e). Tollefson was not a party to this agreement.
In October 2011, the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued Patino v. One 2007 Chevrolet, 805 N.W.2d 906 (Minn.App.2011), aff'd,821 N.W.2d 810 (Minn.2012), holding that when the person charged with a designated offense as defined by Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 1(e), is not convicted of the designated offense, the district court is required under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(f), to return the vehicle to the person legally entitled to it. Id. at 910.
A two-day forfeiture hearing took place in April 2012. The district court found Tollefson's testimony credible that Woodruff showed no signs of intoxication. The district court concluded that “Tollefson established by clear and convincing evidence that she did not have actual or constructive knowledge that [the vehicle] would be used in a manner contrary to law.” The district court therefore held that Tollefson was an “innocent owner” under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d), precluding forfeiture of her vehicle. Neither party raised, nor did the district court address, the applicability of subdivision 9(f) or the holding in Patino.
This court's holding in Patino was affirmed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in September 2012. Patino, 821 N.W.2d at 817 () (emphasis added) (quoting Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(f)). Appellant now challenges the district court's holding, while respondents argue that Patino has rendered this appeal moot.
I. Are respondents entitled to retain possession of the vehicle after the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Patino holding that when the person charged with a designated offense is not convicted of the designated offense, under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(f), the vehicle must be returned to the person legally entitled to it?
II. Was the plea agreement between the state and respondent Woodruff not to raise certain defenses in the subsequent forfeiture action binding upon the owner of the vehicle, respondent Tollefson?
III. Should the rule announced in Patino be applied retroactively?
IV. Did the district court err in determining that Tollefson was an “innocentowner” under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d)?
Forfeiture is a civil in rem action, independent of any criminal prosecution, governed by the rules of civil procedure. Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(a). Because forfeiture actions are punitive in nature, appellate courts are to strictly construe the language of a forfeiture statute, resolving any doubts in favor of the party challenging forfeiture. Riley v. 1987 Station Wagon, 650 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn.2002). The district court's findings of fact are given great deference and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Blanche v. 1995 Pontiac Grand Prix, 599 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn.1999). A district court's findings of fact are not to be disturbed if they are supported by reasonable evidence. Rogers v. Moore, 603 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Minn.1999). But questions of law are reviewed de novo. Heino v. One 2003 Cadillac, 762 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn.App.2009).
Tollefson made a timely request for judicial determination of the validity of the forfeiture, and therefore the matter is governed by subdivision 9 of Minn.Stat. § 169A.63.2Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(a); Patino, 821 N.W.2d at 814–15. Subdivision 9(f) provides that when
forfeiture is based on the commission of a designated offense and the person charged with the designated offense appears in court as required and is not convicted of the offense, the court shall order the property returned to the person legally entitled to it upon that person's compliance with the redemption requirements of section 169A.42.
Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(f). Though Woodruff was charged with second-degree DWI, a designated offense, he pleaded guilty to third-degree DWI, which is not a designated offense. Id., subd. 1(e). Because the person charged appeared in court and was not convicted of the designated offense, the provisions of subdivision 9(f) were satisfied, and the district court was required to return the vehicle to the party legally entitled to it and dismiss the original petition for forfeiture.3Patino, 821 N.W.2d at 814.
Yet neither party discussed, at the district court level or in its briefing to this court, whether the holding in Patino required the subject vehicle to be returned to Tollefson because Woodruff was not convicted of a designated offense.4SeeMinn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(f). Appellant argues that we should not consider the issue, as this court's decision in Patino was released several months before the bench trial in this case took place, giving respondents ample opportunity to raise the...
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