Woods v. Kittitas County

• Decision Date: 20 December 2007
• Docket Number: No. 78331-4.,78331-4.
• Citation: 162 Wash.2d 597,174 P.3d 25
• Parties: Cecile B. WOODS, Petitioner, v. KITTITAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of the state of Washington, Evergreen Meadows, LLC, and Stuart Ridge, LLC, Steele Vista, LLC, and Cle Elum's Sapphire Skies, LLC, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

174 P.3d 25

162 Wash.2d 597

Cecile B. WOODS, Petitioner, v. KITTITAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of the state of Washington, Evergreen Meadows, LLC, and Stuart Ridge, LLC, Steele Vista, LLC, and Cle Elum's Sapphire Skies, LLC, Respondents.

No. 78331-4.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

December 20, 2007.

FAIRHURST, J.

¶ 1 Petitioner, Cecile B. Woods, seeks review of a Court of Appeals ruling that the superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C RCW, to review a claim that a site-specific rezone application does not comply with the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW. Woods claims the appellate court decision conflicts with our decision in Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass'n v. Chelan County, 141 Wash.2d 169, 4 P.3d 123 (2000). She also argues the Court of Appeals improperly decided other LUPA issues she raised at the superior court because she did not raise them on appeal and the superior court did not decide them.

¶ 2 Respondents, Evergreen Meadows, LLC, Stuart Ridge, LLC, Steele Vista, LLC, and Cle Elum's Sapphire Skies, LLC (hereinafter collectively referred to as CESS), and Kittitas County argue that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether a site-specific rezone complies with the GMA. CESS further argues that the Court of Appeals properly addressed and decided Woods' remaining LUPA issues and they do not warrant further review by this court.

¶ 3 We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that the superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under LUPA to decide whether a site-specific land use decision complies with the GMA. The superior court may decide only whether a site-specific land use decision complies with a comprehensive plan and/or development regulation. Because we stand in the superior court's position on review of an administrative decision, Woods' remaining LUPA issues are properly before us. We conclude that the Kittitas County Board of County Commissioners' (BOCC) decision to approve CESS's site-specific rezone application was supported by substantial evidence and was not an erroneous interpretation of the law or a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

¶ 4 CESS owns 251.63 acres of land in Kittitas County. CESS's property was originally zoned forest and range (F & R). The F & R zone, which was adopted in 1974, creates areas in which natural resource management is the highest priority and where uses incompatible with resource management are discouraged. Kittitas County Code (KCC) 17.56.010. Land zoned F & R generally permits minimum lot sizes of 20 acres. Former KCC 17.56.040(A) (1992).¹ Former KCC 17.56.020 (1996) lists permitted uses in the F & R zone including single-family homes, lodges, agriculture, livestock, forestry, mining, quarry mining, and home occupations that do not produce noise. Former KCC 17.56.030 (2001) lists conditional uses in the F & R zone including airports, sawmills, firing ranges, temporary asphalt plants, feed-lots, public sanitary landfills, utility substations, and farm labor shelters.

¶ 5 In January 2004, CESS applied to the county for a site-specific rezone from F & R to Rural-3 (R-3). The purpose and intent of the R-3 zone, which was adopted in 1992, is to "provide areas where residential development may occur on a low density basis." KCC 17.30.010. A primary goal in siting R-3 zones "will be to minimize adverse effects on adjacent natural resource lands." Id. Land zoned R-3 generally permits minimum lot sizes of three acres served by individual wells and septic tanks. Former KCC 17.30.040(A) (1992). Former KCC 17.30.020 (1996) lists permitted uses in the R-3 zone including single-family homes, lodges, agriculture, forestry, home occupations that do not produce noise, and mining. Like the F & R zone, the R-3 zone includes a variety of conditional uses, but the conditional uses allowed in the R-3 zone are generally less intensive than those allowed in the F & R zone. Former KCC 17.30.030 (1992) lists the conditional uses allowed in the R-3 zone including campgrounds, guest ranches, group homes, golf courses, mining, gas and oil exploration, home occupations that produce noise, and miniwarehouses.

¶ 6 Both the F & R and R-3 zones permit minimum lot sizes of one-half acre for lots within platted cluster subdivisions served by public water and sewer systems. Former KCC 17.56.040(B); former KCC 17.30.040(B). "[C]luster" subdivisions are "three or more buildable lots in which all lots are contiguous." Former KCC 17.65.020(A) (1996), repealed by Ord.2005-35 (2005). The permitted uses in a cluster subdivision "shall be those of the underlying zone and limited to single-family detached residential uses." Former KCC 17.65.030 (1996), repealed by Ord.2005-35 (2005). The maximum allowable percentage of cluster acreage is 30 percent for F & R zones and 40 percent for R-3 zones. Former KCC 17.65.040 (1996), repealed by Ord.2005-35 (2005).

¶ 7 The Kittitas County Planning Commission (KCPC) held a public meeting to discuss the site-specific rezone on April 26, 2004. The day of the public meeting, Mike Alberg, chairperson of the KCPC, received a letter from 1000 Friends of Washington (1000 Friends), which was distributed to commission members, urging denial of the rezone because it claimed the GMA requires a minimum density of five acres in rural areas and the R-3 zone allows a density of only three acres. The letter cited rulings of the Court of Appeals and the three Growth Management Hearings Boards (GMHBs) as the basis for 1000 Friends' claim that the GMA requires a five acre minimum density in rural areas.

¶ 8 After deliberation, KCPC approved the application by a vote of five-to-one. The BOCC approved the site-specific rezone by Ordinance 2004-15 on June 1, 2004.

¶ 9 In June 2004, Woods filed a LUPA petition, RCW 36.70C.070, in superior court, challenging the BOCC decision. Her petition claimed the decision (1) erroneously interpreted the law because it used incomplete findings and site-specific rezone standards and failed to include determinations regarding changed circumstances and consistency with the GMA, (2) was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, and (3) was a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts because the environmental review was incomplete² and failed to disclose contemporaneous rezones in upper Kittitas County.³ Woods argued that Wenatchee Sportsmen gave the superior court subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether a site-specific rezone complies with the GMA. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 92, 98.

¶ 10 The superior court granted Woods' petition and reversed the rezone. CP at 13-14. In its letter ruling, the trial court determined it had subject matter jurisdiction over the site-specific rezone. The court recognized, "[a]lthough the GMHB has jurisdiction to determine whether Kittitas County's RR-3 [sic] zoning ordinance violates the GMA, it does not have jurisdiction to review whether the BOCC's decision to rezone the subject property as RR-3 [sic] violates the GMA as applied by allowing urban growth (RR-3) [sic] in a rural area." CP at 11 (emphasis added). The trial court found:

Whether this RR-3 [sic] rezone is lawful depends on where the subject property is located within the county. In other words, the RR-3 [sic] ordinance may be consistent with the GMA when applied to some properties and inconsistent when applied to others. Since the property in this case is located outside of a designated UGA [urban growth area], a rezone that allows for development which is urban in nature violates the GMA. The fact that the property may never be fully built out is irrelevant to whether the application of RR-3 [sic] to this property has the potential to turn a rural area into an area of urban growth density.

Id. The trial court did not explain the reasoning for its conclusion that the R-3 zone is urban in nature. Lastly, because of the trial court's decision that "BOCC erred by granting a rezone which allows for urban growth density in a rural area," it was unnecessary to reach Woods' remaining LUPA issues. Id. at 12. CESS and the county appealed the superior court's decision to Division Three of the Court of Appeals. Woods v. Kittitas County, 130 Wash.App. 573, 123 P.3d 883 (2005).

¶ 11 The Court of Appeals held that the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether the rezone decision was consistent with the county's comprehensive plan but not whether the rezone complied with the GMA. Id. at 576-77, ¶ 2, 123 P.3d 883. It concluded Wenatchee Sportsmen held only that a party may challenge a site-specific rezone in superior court under LUPA based on incompatibility with the comprehensive plan, not noncompliance with the GMA. Id. at 583, ¶ 17, 123 P.3d 883. The appellate court declined to consider the rezone's compliance with the GMA and reviewed only the properly remaining LUPA issues. Id. at ¶ 18, 123 P.3d 883. It concluded that BOCC's decision was supported by sufficient evidence and BOCC did not clearly misapply the law when it determined that the site-specific rezone complied with the county's comprehensive plan. Id. at 588-89, ¶ 28, 123 P.3d 883.

¶ 12 Woods petitioned this court for review of the Court of Appeals reversal of the superior court decision, which we granted. Woods v. Kittitas County, 158 Wash.2d 1001, 143 P.3d 829 (2006).

II. ISSUES

A. Does the superior court have subject matter jurisdiction under LUPA to decide whether site-specific land use decisions comply with the GMA?

B. Should this court reach Woods' remaining LUPA issues and, if so, did BOCC properly approve CESS's rezone application?

III. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wash.2d 585, 590, ¶ 5, 121 P.3d 82 (2005). A reviewing court's primary goal is to determine and give effect...