Woods v. State
| Decision Date | 01 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 20A03–1202–CR–90.,20A03–1202–CR–90. |
| Citation | 978 N.E.2d 756 |
| Parties | Darrius WOODS, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Darrius WOODS, Appellant–Defendant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
No. 20A03–1202–CR–90.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Nov. 1, 2012.
Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court; The Honorable George W. Biddlecomb, Judge; Cause No. 20D03–0810–FA–50.
Marielena Duerring, Duerring Law Offices, South Bend, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Katherine Modesitt Cooper, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
BRADFORD, Judge.
Appellant–Defendant Darrius Woods appeals his conviction for Class A felony dealing in cocaine.1 Specifically, Woods contends that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
At all times relevant to the instant appeal, the City of Elkhart (“City”) had a noise ordinance which prohibited loud noises that could be heard from more than thirty-five feet away. At approximately 6:00 p.m. on October 10, 2008, Corporal Michael Bogart of the Elkhart City Police Department was parked in his marked police vehicle in the parking lot of a local establishment near the intersection of Main and Prairie Streets. Corporal Bogart was in the area observing traffic in response to multiple complaints about violations of the City's noise ordinance. Corporal Bogart, whose vehicle was parked approximately fifty to sixty feet from the intersection, heard loud, thumping music that was loud enough to violate the City's noise ordinance and determined that the music was coming from a blue Oldsmobile station wagon that was travelling northbound on Main Street.
After determining that the noise was coming from the blue Oldsmobile station wagon, Corporal Bogart pulled out of the parking lot directly behind the station wagon, turned on his police lights, and gave a short burst of his siren. Corporal Bogart followed the station wagon for approximately two blocks before the driver of the station wagon pulled over and stopped. While following the station wagon, Corporal Bogart observed the driver of the station wagon “raising up in his seat and reaching up and underneath him” as if the driver was attempting to retrieve or conceal something. Tr. p. 182. At this point, Corporal Bogart became concerned for his safety because, in light of his training and experience as a police officer, he knew that individuals often attempt to conceal weapons and drugs during traffic stops.
After the driver of the station wagon pulled into the parking lot of a restaurant and stopped, Corporal Bogart approached the driver's side of the station wagon and recognized the driver as Woods. Corporal Bogart explained the reason for the stop to Woods, i.e., a violation of the City's noise ordinance, and requested Woods's driver's license and registration. Corporal Bogart provided Woods's name and license registration to dispatch for the purpose of checking the status of Woods's driver's license and determining whether there were any active warrants for Woods's arrest. In light of the suspicious movements that Corporal Bogart observed while following Woods, which again, made Corporal concerned for his safety, Corporal Bogart asked Woods to exit the vehicle while waiting for dispatch to verify Woods's information.
As Woods was stepping out of the station wagon, dispatch radioed Corporal Bogart and informed him that there were four potential local warrants for Woods's arrest. Corporal Bogart then conducted an outer clothing pat down of Woods's person, during which he felt an object in Woods's right pant leg “that, obviously, was not part of his anatomy.” Tr. p. 187. Corporal Bogart was able to move the item “down from—from the outside of his clothes, [it] moved out and just fell to the ground.” Tr. p. 190. Corporal Bogart observed that the item that fell from Woods's pant leg was a clear plastic bag containing an off-white, rock-like substance which, based on his training and experience, he recognized as crack cocaine. Corporal Bogart also discovered approximately $322 or $332 in cash in Woods's pant pocket. Dispatch subsequently confirmed that there were four active local warrants for Woods's arrest. Woods was placed under arrest for the possession of cocaine and also because of the four local warrants. Corporal Bogart subsequently tested the off-white rock-like substance and discovered that it was in fact crack cocaine.
On October 15, 2008, the State charged Woods with Class A felony dealing in cocaine. On April 27, 2010, Woods filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. The trial court conducted a hearing on Woods's motion to suppress on August 5, 2010 and September 2, 2010, after which it denied Woods's motion. At trial, Woods again objected to the admission of the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, reiterating the reasons presented in his motion to suppress. The evidence was admitted over Woods's objection. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Woods guilty as charged. On February 22, 2012, the trial court sentenced Woods to forty years in the Department of Correction. The trial court further ordered that Woods's sentence in the instant matter be served consecutive to the sentence imposed under an unrelated cause number. This appeal follows.
Woods contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop. Although Woods originally challenged the admission of the evidence through a motion to suppress, he appeals following a completed trial and thus challenges the admission of the evidence at trial. “Accordingly, ‘the issue is more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial.’ “ Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 885 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (quoting Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind.Ct.App.2003)).
Our standard of review for rulings on the admissibility of evidence is essentially the same whether the challenge is made by a pre-trial motion to suppress or by an objection at trial. Ackerman v. State, 774 N.E.2d 970, 974–75 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), reh'g denied, trans. denied. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. We also consider uncontroverted evidence in the defendant's favor. Id.
Id.
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Washington, 784 N.E.2d at 587 (citing Bradshaw v.. State, 759 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind.Ct.App.2001)). Accordingly, we will reverse a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence only when the trial court abused its discretion. Id. (citing Bradshaw, 759 N.E.2d at 273). An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. (citing Huffines v. State, 739 N.E.2d 1093, 1095 (Ind.Ct.App.2000)).
Woods argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence stemming from the traffic stop because the evidence was discovered in violation of his constitutional rights under both Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In raising these constitutional challenges, Woods challenges the legality of both the traffic stop and the subsequent warrantless search of his person.
With respect to Article I, Section 11, Woods contends that the evidence discovered during the traffic stop should have been excluded from trial because the evidence is the fruit of an illegal traffic stop.
Article I, Section 11 provides, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated....” The purpose of this article is to protect from unreasonable police activity those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private. Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind.1994). The provision must receive a liberal construction in its application to guarantee the people against unreasonable search and seizure. Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind.1995). In resolving challenges asserting a Section 11 violation, courts must consider the circumstances presented in each case to determine “whether the police behavior was reasonable.” Id. We place the burden on the State to show that under the totality of the circumstances its intrusion was reasonable. State v. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ind.2004).
State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 339–40 (Ind.2006). Thus, we are called upon to determine whether the traffic stop was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. See id. at 340.
Woods argues that “the pretextual stop facilitated by a mere ordinance violation ‘of questionable validity’ was not reasonable in light of the circumstances and violated Woods [sic] rights under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.” Appellant's Br. p. 7 (emphasis omitted). In support, Woods relies on Turner v. State, 862 N.E.2d 695 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), in which a panel of this court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence recovered as a result of a traffic stop because the stated reason for the stop, i.e., speeding, was pretextual and unreasonable under the circumstances. In making this conclusion, the Court stated that although the officer estimated Turner's speed at fifty-five miles per hour, the officer did not know the speed limit in the area where he stopped Turner. Id. at 70. Turner, however, can be easily distinguished from the instant matter.
In Indiana, it is well-settled that “[a] police stop and brief detention of a motorist is reasonable and permitted under [Article I,] Section 11 if the officer reasonably...
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