Wright v. State

• Decision Date: 07 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 84, 2007.,84, 2007.
• Citation: 953 A.2d 144
• Parties: Jerrin A. WRIGHT, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

953 A.2d 144

Jerrin A. WRIGHT, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

No. 84, 2007.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: January 9, 2008.

Decided: February 7, 2008.

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Sussex County, Cr. I.D. No. 0507022890.

Upon Appeal from the Superior Court.

AFFIRMED.

Joseph A. Hurley, Esquire, Wilmington, DE, for Appellant.

Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, for Appellee.

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.

JACOBS, Justice:

The defendant-below appellant Jerrin Wright ("Wright") appeals from a Superior Court final judgment of conviction, of second degree murder, reckless endangering in the first degree, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, Wright claims that the Superior Court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of accident. We find no merit to Wright's claim and affirm.

FACTS

On July 23, 2005, Scott Lubitz, while standing outside the Nu-Phaze Bar and Grill, was fatally shot by Wright. Lubitz was an innocent bystander who was witnessing an argument between Wright and another bar patron, Roland Harris.

Shortly before the closing time at the Nu-Phaze Bar and Grill, Harris went outside to the parking lot, and was talking with two men when he noticed Wright looking at him. Harris and Wright had known each other for approximately 13 years, since high school. Because it was closing time, several other persons were also in the parking lot. Harris asked Wright why was he looking at him, and a verbal argument resulted. Wright displayed a handgun that was tucked in his waistband. After Harris told Wright that he was not "scared of a gun," Wright pulled the gun out and pointed it at Harris. Continuing to reaffirm his lack of fear, Harris moved towards Wright, who then fired two shots in Harris' direction. The shots whizzed by either side of Harris, who continued "going after" Wright through the parking lot. Wright backed away, but continued to shoot in Harris' direction. According to Harris, Wright shot the gun "four, five times." At that point, Harris' uncle told Harris to "chill," because Wright had shot someone. While Harris was being restrained by his uncle, Wright continued shooting and then retreated to his car. Wright fired one more shot at Harris, and drove away, threatening to kill Harris. At trial, Harris testified that Wright had fired "[m]aybe nine or ten" times all together. The police recovered five 9 mm casings, all fired from the same gun. At trial, it was established that one of Wright's shots had struck Lubitz in the head, killing him.

For shooting at, and narrowly missing Harris, Wright was charged with, and convicted of, reckless endangering in the first degree.¹ For killing Lubitz, Wright was charged with murder in the first degree, specifically, recklessly causing the death of Lubitz while committing the felony of reckless endangering Harris.² The jury, however, convicted Wright of the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree i.e., causing the death of Lubitz with criminal negligence during the commission of another felony.³

With respect to the charges associated with Lubitz's death, the jury was instructed on murder in the first degree, as well as the lesser included offenses of murder in the second degree, manslaughter,⁴ and criminally negligent homicide.⁵ At trial, Wright requested a jury instruction on the defense of accident. Concluding that accident was not a legally tenable defense given the undisputed facts in this case, the Superior Court, ruling from the bench, denied Wright's request for an accident instruction, as follows:

[I]n reading the accident cases ... it befuddles me how it would be an accident. Those cases basically are: I thought the gun was empty; I didn't mean to pull the trigger; I though the safety was on. Not multiple times and actually there is some case law, I think from Justice Holland, when you fire a gun several times and it's not a machine gun, when you go through and pull the trigger, that's not an accident. You may not intend for somebody to die, but that is not what an accident is about.

This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Wright claims that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the defense of accident. He argues that Lubitz's death was "the result of an unfortunate accident" and that Lubitz was not the "target of his anger." The sole merits issue is whether an accident instruction was required.

The Standard of Review

The Superior Court refused to give the requested jury instruction, because it determined that accident was not a legally available defense under the facts of the case, based on the evidence presented. A threshold issue that we must first decide is the applicable standard of review, which the parties dispute.

Where a trial court is asked to give a jury instruction in a criminal case, the court must determine: (1) that the defense or lesser included offense for which the instruction is requested could apply as matter of law; (2) that the evidence presented meets the statutory requirements to entitle the defendant to the requested instruction; and (3) whether the particular form, content, or language of the instruction proposed by the defendant represents a correct statement of the law.⁶

To perform the first two steps of the analysis, a trial court must look at the relevant statutory provisions governing the availability of instructions: 11 Del. C. § 303(c)⁷ (for instructions on statutory defenses, such as justification); 11 Del. C. § 206(c)⁸ (for instructions on lesser included offenses); and 11 Del. C. § 302(b)⁹ (for instructions on other issues or matters, including accident). If the court determines that in light of the evidence presented the requested instruction is not available under the relevant statute, on appeal a question of law is presented: did the trial court, in determining the litigant's entitlement to a jury instruction, properly apply the relevant statutory provision to the facts at bar? Therefore, our review of the trial court's refusal to give the jury instruction is de novo.¹⁰

If, however, the trial court determines that in light of the evidence presented the requested instruction is legally available, and gives the instruction—but not with the exact form, content, or language proposed by the defendant—we review that determination for an abuse of discretion.¹¹

To summarize, this Court will review de novo a refusal to instruct on a defense theory (in any form); and it will review a refusal to give a "particular" instruction (that is, an instruction is given but not with the exact form, content or language requested) for an abuse of discretion. To the extent that some of our previous decisions appear to suggest a standard of review different from that announced here,¹² we overrule them.¹³

Because in this case the requested instruction was not given in any form, we review Wright's claim de novo to determine (i) whether the accident "defense" was available as a matter of law, and, (ii) if so, whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support an accident instruction. Because we conclude that the accident defense was not legally available, we do not reach the second prong of the analysis.

The Availability Of An Accident "Defense"

Because it is not expressly listed and defined in Chapter 4 of the Delaware Criminal Code (Title 11) or in any other Delaware statute, "accident" is not a statutory defense to a criminal charge. In prior cases, we have approved instructions that define accident as "an unforeseen, unplanned, fortuitous," "sudden and unexpected event occurring without intent or volition due to carelessness, unawareness, ignorance or a combination of these which produces an unfortunate result."¹⁴ We have, however, held that evidence of accident may be adduced under 11 Del. C. § 302(b), and that such evidence, if believed, "could negate either or both the culpable state of mind and the voluntariness of the act."¹⁵

The defense of accident may be raised to show that the defendant cannot be culpable of the offense charged because the defendant's conduct was not a voluntary act,¹⁶ defined as "a bodily movement performed consciously ... as a result of effort or determination."¹⁷ In this case, the defense of accident was not available to negate the requirement of a "voluntary act," because it is undisputed that Wright intentionally and voluntarily pulled the trigger and fired his gun several times in a crowded place. That conduct was the "but for" cause of Lubitz's tragic death.¹⁸

The question is whether the accident defense was, nonetheless, legally available to show that the defendant lacked the culpable state of mind required for conviction. For killing Lubitz, Wright was charged with first-degree murder—a crime that required recklessness as the state of mind. Wright requested—and obtained—jury instructions on lesser included offenses. For some of those offenses, negligence was the required state of mind. Ultimately, the jury found Wright guilty of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder, more specifically, causing Lubitz's death by an act of criminal negligence while engaged in the commission of the felony of recklessly endangering Harris' life.

Relying on Smith v. State¹⁹ and Capano v. State,²⁰ the State argues that no accident defense or instruction was legally available to Wright because, under the facts of the case (pulling the trigger at least five times in a crowded place), Wright's conduct could not have fallen below the level of recklessness or criminal negligence. In Smith, we noted that "self-defense and accident defenses are contradictory to reckless conduct," such that "if an act is done recklessly, it cannot be due to an accident."²¹ Similarly, in Capano, we held that ...