Wright v. State, No. A08-1666.

Decision Date14 May 2009
Docket NumberNo. A08-1666.
Citation765 N.W.2d 85
PartiesEric Maurice WRIGHT, petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Eric Maurice Wright, Stillwater, MN, pro se.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Assistant Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, MN, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

OPINION

GILDEA, Justice.

Appellant Eric Maurice Wright appeals the postconviction court's summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. In 2005, a Stearns County jury found Wright guilty of the first-degree premeditated murder of 82-year-old Raymond Wander. The district court convicted Wright and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On direct appeal, we affirmed Wright's conviction and sentence. State v. Wright, 719 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Minn.2006).1 Specifically, we held that: (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Spreigl2 evidence of Wright's prior assault, id. at 918; (2) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct, id. at 918-19; (3) Wright's sentence was not unlawfully determined, id. at 919; and (4) Wright's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance, id. Wright subsequently filed a postconviction petition, and the postconviction court denied all claims without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Wright appeals, raising 13 claims that he argues warrant an evidentiary hearing or a new trial.3 We affirm.

I.

We first consider whether the postconviction court erred by summarily denying Wright's postconviction petition as a "second or successive petition" under Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2008). Minnesota Statutes section 590.04, subdivision 3 provides, in relevant part, "The court may summarily deny a second or successive petition for similar relief on behalf of the same petitioner and may summarily deny a petition when the issues raised in it have previously been decided by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court in the same case." The postconviction court summarily denied all of Wright's postconviction claims under this provision because, according to the court, Wright raised his claims in successive postconviction "motions." We review a postconviction court's findings of fact for abuse of discretion and its legal conclusions de novo. Arredondo v. State, 754 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Minn.2008).

Wright filed a petition for postconviction relief on June 5, 2008. The court did not issue a final disposition on Wright's petition until August 21, 2008. In the interim, the court considered Wright's May 22, 2008 motion for the release of the grand jury transcripts. After the court denied the motion for transcripts for lack of good cause shown, Wright submitted a letter to the court on July 3, 2008, asking the court to reconsider that motion. The court characterized this letter as a "successive postconviction motion" for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3. But the court had not yet ruled on the June 5 petition for postconviction relief, and the July 3 letter did not raise any postconviction claims. The court therefore should not have considered it to be a "successive petition" for purposes of the statute.

Before the postconviction court ruled on the June 5, 2008 petition, Wright also filed a "motion" on August 8 that added a "new evidence" issue to his postconviction petition. The court characterized this motion as a "successive petition" supporting summary dismissal under Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3. But the August 8 motion was not a separate petition; it was an amendment to the pending June 5 petition. The legislature contemplated such amendments in the postconviction statute. See Minn.Stat § 590.03 (2008) ("The court may at any time prior to its decision on the merits permit ... amendments [to the petition]. The court shall liberally construe the petition and any amendments thereto and shall look to the substance thereof and waive any irregularities or defects in form."). We therefore conclude that Wright's August 8, 2008 motion was not a "successive petition" for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3.

In sum, Wright filed one postconviction petition on June 5, 2008, and one amendment to that petition on August 8, 2008. Wright also moved the court on July 3, 2008 to reconsider a motion to release grand jury transcripts. Because Wright did not file a "second or successive petition" for postconviction relief, Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 does not apply here. Accordingly, we hold that the postconviction court erred to the extent it summarily denied Wright's claims under that provision of the postconviction statute.

II.

In addition to supporting its denial of Wright's petition on the basis that it was a successive petition, the postconviction court also appears to have denied Wright's petition because the court concluded that Wright's claims are barred under the rule of State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976) (holding that matters raised or known at the time of direct appeal will not be considered on petition for postconviction relief). With the exception of Wright's claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and his claim that "new evidence" entitles him to a new trial, which we consider below, we agree with the postconviction court that Knaffla bars consideration of Wright's other 11 claims. See supra note 3 (listing 13 claims). Postconviction review of claims other than ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and "new evidence" is barred because these claims are based on evidence in the trial record, and therefore these 11 claims were known or should have been known to Wright at the time of his direct appeal. See White v. State, 711 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn.2006) (stating that postconviction claims based on the trial record could have been known at the time of direct appeal and are therefore Knaffla barred).

There are two exceptions to operation of the Knaffla bar. If the defendant presents a novel legal issue or if the interests of justice require the court to review the claim, the Knaffla bar does not preclude postconviction review. White, 711 N.W.2d at 109. Wright does not present a novel legal issue in his postconviction petition. Instead, Wright requests that we review the merits of his otherwise barred claims in the interests of justice. To be reviewed in the interests of justice, a claim must have merit and must be asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay. Spears v. State, 725 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn.2006) (citing Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Minn.2006)). After a painstaking review of the record, we hold that the interests of justice exception is not met and that Wright's claims, with the exception of his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and new evidence, are barred from review.

III.

We turn next to Wright's argument that he received ineffective assistance from his appellate counsel on the direct appeal of his first-degree premeditated murder conviction. Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are properly raised in this postconviction petition because Wright did not know about this claim at the time of direct appeal, nor could he have known about this claim at that time. See, e.g., Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn.2007) (stating that an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is properly raised in a postconviction petition if the basis of the claim was not part of the record before the appellate court). But a postconviction petition must include "a statement of the facts and the grounds upon which the petition is based and the relief desired." Minn.Stat. § 590.02, subd. 1(1) (2008). The postconviction court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if "the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief." Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2008). To establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the petitioner bears the burden of showing both that counsel's performance was not objectively reasonable and, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Fields v. State, 733 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn.2007). The petitioner must overcome the "presumption that counsel's performance fell within a wide range of reasonable" representation. Gail v. State, 732 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Minn.2007).

Wright appears to present four grounds in support of his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. He claims that counsel was ineffective because counsel (1) failed to adequately investigate trial records, (2) provided inaccurate information to this court on direct appeal, (3) failed to prevail on the Spreigl evidence issue on direct appeal, and (4) failed to raise five additional issues on direct appeal.4

With respect to the first three grounds, Wright does not support his claim with facts that demonstrate how his counsel acted unreasonably. Rather, on these three grounds Wright presents mere "argumentative assertions" that do not warrant an evidentiary hearing. See Leake, 737 N.W.2d at 535. We hold that the postconviction court did not err in denying relief on these grounds.

With respect to Wright's fourth ground in support of his ineffective assistance claim, that counsel failed to raise five additional issues on direct appeal, we recognize that counsel is under a duty to raise only meritorious claims. Nunn v. State, 753 N.W.2d 657, 661 (Minn.2008). Counsel does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail. Id.

Wright first argues that his appellate counsel should have raised a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Under our precedent, "[w]hen an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is based on appellate counsel's failure to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the [petitioner] must first show...

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